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# UN Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia

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The Pakistani Perspective

Tughral Yamin PhD

3/29/2018

This book recounts the UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia from the Pakistani perspective. It gives the political and military reasons for Pakistan to contribute troops to this dangerous mission and staying the course even after it lost 24 men on one single day in June 1993. It also highlights Pakistan's forgotten role in rescuing the stranded US Marines after their 3rd of October 1993 abortive raid turned into a disaster. It shows how UN peacekeeping duties helped the country recover shrinking space in international relations at that moment in its history.

## **UN Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia: The Pakistani Perspective**

### **Preface**

The abrupt end to the Cold War in the penultimate decade of the twentieth century brought to a close the post Second World War bipolar global order. Noteworthy among the events that changed the course of modern history were the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (1989), the fall of the Berlin Wall (1990), and the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991). These momentous happenings significantly altered, the regional and international milieu and allowed United States (US), the sole superpower, to set out new foreign policy objectives to redesign the existing world order. After having defeated the Soviet Union in the Cold War by means of the Afghan jihad and Pakistani support, the US Government (USG) decided to forsake the region and make a clean break. Afghanistan was promptly forgotten and left to the shenanigans of feuding warlords with catastrophic results. Pakistan, the erstwhile frontline ally also fell out of favor and was subjected to stringent sanctions to halt its nuclear program. It was also threatened with the terrorist tag to stop it from supporting the Afghan Mujahidin, who were no longer kosher.

At this critical juncture, Pakistan had to seek alternate ways to remain internationally relevant. The renewed emphasis on UN peacekeeping at this critical juncture provided it a chance to become part of global politics. Its willingness to send peacekeepers to Somalia and the Balkans earned it a welcome respite from isolation and economic curbs. The participation in the UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) from 1992-1994 not only allowed Pakistan to reintegrate itself with the international community but also helped it create a niche for itself in peacekeeping. Over time it became one of the largest Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) in the world.

No study has been done so far to find out how the peacekeeping opportunity in Somalia presented itself and how Pakistan benefited from participating in an operation that is otherwise considered a failure. The purpose of this book is to revisit the events of the UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia and explain how and why things happened. It also discusses the utility of international peacekeeping as an instrument of foreign policy.

My personal motivation in writing this book is that my unit 7 Frontier Force (FF) Regiment was the first battalion in the world to land in Mogadishu as part of UNOSOM.

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### List of Acronyms

<b>Serial No</b>	<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Fully Expanded Term</b>
1.	AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
2.	AOR	Area of Responsibility
3.	ARG	Amphibious Ready Group
4.	AU	African Union (replaced OAU in 2002)
5.	AWSS	Authorized Weapon Storage Site
6.	CDA	Chargé d'affaires
7.	CGS	Chief of General Staff
8.	CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
9.	CMO	Chief Military Observer
10.	CO	Commanding Officer
11.	COAS	Chief of Army Staff
12.	COO	Chief Operations Officer
13.	DGMO	Director General Military Operations
14.	DGMI	Director General Military Intelligence
15.	DMO	Director Military Operations
16.	ECOWAS	Economic Community of the Western African States
17.	FAST	Fleet Antiterrorism Support Team
18.	FDS	Food Distribution Sites
19.	FF	Frontier Force
20.	GoP	Government of Pakistan
21.	ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
22.	ICU	Islamic Courts Union
23.	LAS or AL	League of Arab State or Arab League
24.	MAG	Military Advisory Group
25.	MAL BATT	Malaysia Battalion
26.	MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
27.	MO	Military Operations and Military Observer

28.	MOD	Ministry of Defense
29.	NSA	National Security Advisor
30.	OIC	Organization of Islamic Conference/Cooperation
31.	OAU	Organization of African Unity
32.	PAKBATT	Pakistan Battalion
33.	PN	Pakistan Navy
34.	PS (C)	Personal Secretary to the Chief
35.	RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade
36.	SRSG	Special Representative of Secretary General
37.	SDA	Somali Democratic Alliance
38.	SNA	Somali National Alliance
39.	SNF	Somali National Front
40.	SSA	Somali Salvation Alliance
41.	SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
42.	SSNM	Southern Somali National Movement
43.	SO	Staff Officer
44.	UN	United Nations
45.	UNDPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
46.	UNITAF	Unified Task Force
47.	UNOSOM	UN Operations in Somalia
48.	UNSC	UN Security Council
49.	UNSCR	UNSC Resolutions
50.	UNSG	UN Secretary General
51.	USAF	US Air Force
52.	USC	United Somali Congress
53.	US CENTCOM	US Central Command
54.	USG	US Government
55.	USLO	US Liaison Office
56.	WFP	World Food Program

## CHAPTER I

### Literature Review

Pakistan is a peace loving country and its leaders and diplomats try their best to promote this image at all international forums. The official website of Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs proclaims that "Developing friendly relations with all countries of the world, especially major powers and immediate neighbors," is a foreign policy objective.<sup>1</sup> Participation in UN peacekeeping operation is considered as an extension of this objective. Pakistani decision makers realize that troop contribution helps in creating a positive impression of a responsible state that is willing to fulfill its international obligations. The term one of the "largest Troop Contributing Country (TCC)" is invoked as a matter of pride by senior officials of the foreign office.<sup>2</sup> However, little that has been written on this aspect on Pakistan's foreign policy and there exists a gap in literature on this subject. Authoritative books written by experienced Foreign Office officials such as former foreign secretary Abdul Sattar,<sup>3</sup> and veteran diplomat Shahid Amin are silent with regards Pakistan's participation in peacekeeping missions.<sup>4</sup> In the introduction to a monograph written on UN peacekeeping by Z.A. Bhutto famously declared: "*The problem of peace-keeping* (emphasis author's) by the United Nations is of close interest to Pakistan because of our involvement in the Kashmir dispute."<sup>5</sup> When Bhutto wrote these lines, Pakistan had yet to become a permanent fixture of UN peacekeeping operations and therefore it had not become a matter of foreign policy.

Although the US Government (USG) does not place its troops under the UN flag it considers UN peacekeeping operation as an instrument of the US foreign policy.<sup>6</sup> The US provides political and financial support for peacekeeping operations. The policy on

<sup>1</sup> Foreign Policy Objectives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, <http://www.mofa.gov.pk/content.php?pageID=objectives> (accessed August 14, 2017).

<sup>2</sup> Pakistan's Foreign Policy 2013-16: Achievements and Challenges, Statement by Mr. Sartaj Aziz, Adviser to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, at a Press Conference in Islamabad on 9 June 2016, <http://mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?mm=Mzg1Mg> (accessed August 14, 2017).

<sup>3</sup> Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2016: A Concise History* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2017).

<sup>4</sup> Shahid M. Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010).

<sup>5</sup> Z.A. Bhutto, *Peacekeeping by the United Nations* (Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1967), 6

<sup>6</sup> Representatives Adam Kinzinger (R-Ill) & David Cicilline (D-R.I), "UN peacekeeping: A key U.S. foreign policy tool," *The Hill*, February 13, 2014, <http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/198218-un-peacekeeping-a-key-us-foreign-policy-tool> (accessed June 26, 2018).

peacekeeping was reformed via a Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) by President Bill Clinton on May 3, 1994.<sup>7</sup> In 2015 President Barak Obama hosted a leader's summit on peacekeeping, which was the culmination of a yearlong effort.<sup>8</sup> Why does US need UN peacekeeping as an instrument of foreign policy is outlined in a research article published by the Brookings Institute titled "Why the US needs UN peacekeeping?"<sup>9</sup>

After the end of the Cold War, there was a marked increase in UN peacekeeping missions. The international intervention in Somalia in 1990s was a benchmark event in the history of peacekeeping. This illustrated a marked a surge in peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War events on the behest of the US. Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, has chronicled this metamorphosis in the history of peacekeeping operations in his book *Interventions: A Life in Peace and War*. This book also makes a mention of UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia.<sup>10</sup> Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun, who served as the first SRSG in Somalia has made a very critical analysis of the haphazard diplomatic effort in this conflict ridden area in his monograph *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities*.<sup>11</sup>

A glamorized version of the heroics of US marines in the streets of Mogadishu in the Hollywood film *Black Hawk Down* has created a one sided version of popular history.<sup>12</sup> The book and the film provide a blow by blow account of the 3<sup>rd</sup> of October 1993 – battle of Mogadishu – but largely ignores the role of the Pakistani peacekeepers in rescuing the trapped American soldiers in the vicinity of the Olympic Hotel. This book is an attempt to fill the gap in knowledge and to highlight the important role that the Pakistani peacekeepers played in the UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia.

<sup>7</sup> For greater detail about PDD-25 read the chapter authored by Donald C.F. Daniels on United States Policy in Trevor Findlay (ed.) *Challenges for UN Peacekeepers* (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1996), 85-97.

<sup>8</sup> FACT SHEET: U.S. Support to Peace Operations 2015 Leaders' Summit on UN Peacekeeping, Office of the Whitehouse Press Secretary, September 28, 2015, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/28/fact-sheet-us-support-peace-operations-2015-leaders-summit-un> (accessed July 16, 2018).

<sup>9</sup> Bruce Jones, "Why the US needs UN Peacekeeping?" *Brookings Institute*, December 10, 2015, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/12/10/why-the-u-s-needs-u-n-peacekeeping/> (accessed July 16, 2018).

<sup>10</sup> Kofi Anan with Nadir Mousavizadeh, *Interventions: A Life in Peace and War* (New York: Penguin Press, 2013), 40-46.

<sup>11</sup> Mohamed Sahnoun, *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities* (Washington D.C.: USIP, 1994).

<sup>12</sup> Mark Bowden, *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War* (USA: Signet Books, 1999). The movie, *Black Hawk Down* was adapted from this book in 2001.

What little is known about the Pakistani participation in the peacekeeping operations in Somalia is fast fading from public and personal memories and may eventually be lost forever. The principal actors have aged. Two of them General Abdul Waheed, the COAS of Pakistan Army and Ambassador Jamsheed Marker Pakistan's permanent representative to the UN excused themselves from being interviewed citing old age. Marker, who finds mention in the Guiness Book of World Records as the longest serving ambassador of any country in the world, passed away at the age of 95 on 21 June 2018.<sup>13</sup> In his well-written memoirs *Quiet Diplomacy: Memoirs of an Ambassador of Pakistan* published in 2010 Marker offers only one sentence on Somalia i.e.

Our main preoccupation at that time was the situation in Somalia, where Pakistan had a major presence in the peacekeeping force, and we followed, with mounting concern, the turbulent reports that emanated from Mogadishu at that time.<sup>14</sup>

Pakistan was the non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) from 1993 to 1994 and it was Mr. Marker, who on the instructions of his government had called for the special session of the UNSC after the 5 June 1993 incident to press for the immediate arrest of those complicit in the killing of Pakistani peacekeepers.<sup>15</sup> The UNSC Resolution (UNSCR) 837 of June 6, 1993 was a result of his efforts. Without naming Aidid, the Resolution had clearly condemned the deliberate attacks by United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) cadres to kill the peacekeepers and the malicious role played by their radio station in inciting violence. The Resolution had demanded in unequivocal terms for the arrest and punishment of SNA leaders involved in the sordid affair.<sup>16</sup> Marker had also countered claims that Pakistani peacekeepers had fired indiscriminately at protesting women and children after the 5 June fiasco. In a letter to the editor published in the *New York Times* of 12 June 1993, he

<sup>13</sup> Imtiaz Ali, "Veteran Pakistani diplomat Jamsheed Marker passed away in Karachi on Thursday, *Dawn*, June 21, 2018, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1415210/jamsheed-marker-passes-away-in-karachi> (accessed June 21, 2018).

<sup>14</sup> Jamsheed Marker, *Quiet Diplomacy: Memoirs of an Ambassador of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 376.

<sup>15</sup> Paul Lewis, "U.N. asks arrests of Somalia Killers," *New York Times*, June 7, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/07/world/un-asks-arrests-of-somalia-killers.html> (accessed December 26, 2016).

<sup>16</sup> UNSCR 837, June 6, 1993, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/837> (accessed June 15, 2017).

had emphasized that his country's soldiers had exercised due restraint in handling civilian mob in which women and children were used as human shields.<sup>17</sup>

The report of the international judicial inquiry into the events in Mogadishu that led to casualties among the peacekeepers on 5 June 1993 is available online.<sup>18</sup> The report vindicates the Pakistani point of view that they were kept in the dark about the reservations of the USC/SNA to the weapon inspection and their violent reaction to it. It also sheds light on the inordinate delay by the Italians in sending armored reinforcements. The Italian behavior during the UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia has been ascribed to their colonial legacy in Paolo Tripodi's candid account *The Colonial Legacy in Somalia: Rome and Mogadishu: From Colonial Administration to Operation Restore Hope*.<sup>19</sup>

Before Pakistan agreed to become part of the peacekeeping operations in Somalia, it was under tremendous US pressure. Syeda Abida Hussain, Pakistan's ambassador to the US (1991-1993) in her political biography *Power Failure: The Political Odyssey of a Pakistani Woman* has devoted nearly 90 pages to her time in Washington DC in her official capacity. She has explained in great deal the difficulties Pakistan was encountering on account of its nuclear program and for allegedly sponsoring terrorism. She has mentioned the visits of government official and services chiefs to Capitol Hill and the lukewarm reception they were accorded. Abida Hussain being a political appointee could also feel the strains of the uneven civil military relations back home, when she was asked to leave the meeting between the Army Chief General Asif Nawaz and US Secretary Defense Dick Cheney.<sup>20</sup> German author Hein G. Kiesling in his book on ISI contends that Abida Hussain had brought to the notice of the prime minister that Army Chief was bypassing her and directly dealing with US Army Central Command (CENTCOM). The Prime Minister is said to have cautioned his Army Chief to

<sup>17</sup> Jamsheed K.A. Marker, "Pakistanis in Somalia showed Restraint," *New York Times*, June 16, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/20/opinion/l-pakistanis-in-somalia-showed-restraint-682393.html>, (accessed December 9, 2016).

<sup>18</sup> Report on the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885 (1993) to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel which led to Casualties among them, [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SOMALIA\\_20S%201994%20653.pdf](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SOMALIA_20S%201994%20653.pdf) (accessed November 23, 2017).

<sup>19</sup> Paolo Tripodi, *The Colonial Legacy in Somalia: Rome and Mogadishu: From Colonial Administration to Operation Restore Hope* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999).

<sup>20</sup> Syeda Abida Hussain, *Power Failure: The Political Odyssey of a Pakistani Woman* (Karachi: OUP, 2015), 412 - 502.

“watch his step” through ministers Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan and Malik Naeem.<sup>21</sup> It is difficult to visualize a prime minister embroiled in a desperate battle for political survival sending messages admonishing a powerful army chief.

Vali Nasar, in his book *The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat* credits the Pentagon for making known its preference for Pakistani troops’ participation in operations in Somalia.<sup>22</sup> US Army’s direct overtures to Pakistan Army regarding participation in the operations in Somalia have been documented by Shuja Nawaz in his magnum opus *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army and the Wars Within*. Shuja is the US based younger brother of late General Asif Nawaz. In his book he claims to be the conduit through which the Americans approached his elder brother.<sup>23</sup> General Asif Nawaz died in office and did not leave behind any written account of how the Somalia operation was approved under his watch. General Pervez Musharraf, his DGMO had travelled to Somalia to meet the troops and has devoted two pages in his memoirs on peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Bosnia.<sup>24</sup> A detailed description of Pakistan Army’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia was made by Brian Cloughley, a former Australian defense attaché to Pakistan in his book on the history of Pak Army.<sup>25</sup>

Firsthand information was obtained from interviews with UNOSOM peacekeepers. Commanding Officer (CO) 7 FF Brigadier Kamal Aziz (retired) gave personal sitting to the author and shared documents related to the unit’s stay in Somalia. A number of officers from 7 FF such as Lt Col Muqeem Shah (retired), Col Jahanzeb Afridi (retired), Maj Gen Muhammad Jafar (retired), Maj Tariq Mahmood (retired) and Maj Siddiq Durrani (retired) provided useful inputs. Lt Gen Sikander Afzal (CO 19 Lancers) responded to telephone calls and sent detailed replies via email. Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Waqas Farooq (retired) 19 Lancers provided the after action report of the road clearance operation in which his tank troop was involved. It was my good fortune to get the entire report of 19 Lancers’ stay in Somalia

<sup>21</sup> Hein G. Kiesling, *Faith, Unity Discipline: The ISI of Pakistan* (Noida, UP: HarperCollins Publishers, 2016), 103.

<sup>22</sup> Vali Nasr, *The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat* (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2013), 93.

<sup>23</sup> Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army and the Wars Within* (Karachi: OUP, 2009), 448, 469 and 474.

<sup>24</sup> Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* (UK: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 75-76.

<sup>25</sup> Brian Cloughley, *A History of Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections* (Karachi: OUP, 2014), 520-523.

from Brigadier Syed Imran Naqvi. CO 1 Sind, Brigadier Sher Akbar (retired) gave multiple interviews about his unit's role in Somalia. Commodore Junaid PN, who accompanied a Pakistan Navy ship to Somalia as a lieutenant shared his experience of the sea journey and the visit of war-torn Mogadishu.

Two peacekeepers were kind enough to provide their unpublished accounts of their experiences in Somalia. My personal gratitude is due to CO 15 FF Colonel Fazal-i-Maqbool Afridi (retired) for the manuscript *War Digli to Villa Somalia*,<sup>26</sup> and to Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Mateen Mehsud (retired), who served as a company commander in 10 Baloch Regiment for *Yaad-i-Ayaam* (Memories of the Days Past) in Urdu.<sup>27</sup> Brigadier Syed Hasnain Haider (retired) shared his thoughts on the 5 June and Black Hawk Down incidents from the vantage point of the operations room in New York.<sup>28</sup> He had served in Somalia as a captain as an operational staff officer in UNOSOM headquarter in Mogadishu and later as a duty officer in the UN situation room in New York. Major General Anis Bajwa, Chief of Staff (COS) in HQ UNOSOM II, responded via email and telephone calls and was very candid in his opinion about the operations in Somalia. Lieutenant General Imtiaz Shaheen, the Chief Military Observer (CMO) and the first Force Commander gave a very frank interview on telephone and responded to emails. He was also gracious enough to give a personal interview at his residence in Lahore.<sup>29</sup> Maj Gen Asif Doraiz Akhtar (retired) was also kind to give an interview and share his memories as deputy commander of the Pakistani Brigade in Mogadishu.<sup>30</sup> Nisar Ahmed Malik provided a firsthand account about the evacuation of Pakistanis from Mogadishu. Sarwar Munir Rao, correspondent of Pakistan Television (PTV) visited Somalia in November 1994 and shared among other things a very interesting video clip of Foreign Minister Sardar Assef Ahmed Ali and Defense Minister Aftab Shaban Mirani's meeting with Farah Aidid in Nairobi en route to Mogadishu to spend Eid with the troops. An interview with Sardar Assef Ahmed Ali in his office in Lahore provided useful insights into what had prompted this high level visit

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<sup>26</sup> Colonel Fazal-i-Maqbool Afridi, FF (retired), *War Digli to Villa Somalia* (Unpublished Manuscript).

<sup>27</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Mateen Mehsud, Baloch (retired), *Yaad-i-Ayaam* (Unpublished account).

<sup>28</sup> Brigadier Syed Hasnain Haider, "Brief Account of the Black Hawk Down Incident from the Vantage Point of the UN Situation Centre," (October 2016).

<sup>29</sup> Interview with Lt Gen Imtiaz Shaheen (retired), November 12, 2017.

<sup>30</sup> Interview with Maj Gen Asif Doraiz Akhter at his home in DHA I Rawalpindi, December 16, 2017.

and why he met Aidid.<sup>31</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Jamshed Bajwa (Army Aviation retired) filled me in with the operational details regarding the serviceability of the Cobra helicopters.<sup>32</sup>

Rafique Dogar's *Operation Somalia* written in Urdu is journalistic account of what he saw on ground. Dogar arrived in Mogadishu by the end of March 1994 after the American troops had departed. He stayed for a month with the Pakistani troops. His thesis is that Somalia was destroyed because of international intrigue.<sup>33</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Ashfaq Hussain, who became popular for his humorous accounts of military life in the famous 'Gentlemen' series in Urdu, wrote a short account of the UN peacekeeping operation in his book *Gentlemen Subhanallah*.<sup>34</sup>

Despite a number of visits to the Foreign Office, I couldn't find any archival records of the UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia. Brigadier Zakeer, Director military affairs in the Establishment Division was kind enough to provide me access to the archives but none has been declassified after 1980. About the current situation in Somalia, I communicated with my friends Maj Feroz Khan (retired) and Usman Qazi in person and via email. Tariq Chaudhry, a former Pakistani diplomat, who had followed the events in Somalia as a young career Foreign Service officer also provided useful inputs. At the timing of writing this book, all three gentlemen were working for UN agencies in Somalia.

I consulted mainstream Pakistani newspapers such as *Dawn*, *The News* and *Jang* of the period 1992-1993 available in the National Archives, Islamabad to get a sense of the uncertain political conditions prevailing in the country at that time due to the power struggle within the so-called Troika, comprising the President, the Prime Minister and the Army Chief.<sup>35</sup> Perhaps due to the precarious domestic political situation no parliamentary debate was conducted on the deployment of Pakistani troops in Somalia and elsewhere in the world. The record available on the National Assembly website ([www.na.gov.pk](http://www.na.gov.pk)) reveals that the matter was first discussed in

<sup>31</sup> Interview with Sardar Assef Ahmed Ali in his office in Gulberg, Lahore, November 12, 2017.

<sup>32</sup> Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Jamshed Bajwa (retired) on January 12, 2018.

<sup>33</sup> M. Rafique Dogar, *Operation Somalia: A Journey – The Story of a Nation's Destruction* (Lahore: Deed Shunaid Publications, 1994).

<sup>34</sup> Col Ashfaq Hussain, *Gentlemen Subhanallah* (Lahore, Pakistan Idara Matbuat e Sulemani, 1999), 208 – 217.

<sup>35</sup> For an explanation of the term Troika read the term paper written by Armughan Javaid & Noor Zahra Irfan titled "Role of the Military in Politics in Pakistan," in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the course in History of Pakistan and South Asia at LUMS, 1998, [http://www.oocities.org/collegepark/library/9803/pak\\_political/militaryinpolitics.html](http://www.oocities.org/collegepark/library/9803/pak_political/militaryinpolitics.html) (accessed January 12, 2017).

the parliament on 7 June 1993, a day after 24 Pakistani soldiers were massacred in cold blood in Mogadishu, through a ‘call attention notice.’ The members of the assembly were perturbed about the killings and showed their concern for this great loss of human lives. The Minister for State for Foreign Affairs Siddiq Khan Kanju responded to their questions.<sup>36</sup> Ten months later, in April 1994, when the Americans and other western nations started withdrawing from Somalia leaving behind Pakistan and troops from a few more third world countries behind, questions were again raised in the parliament about the future of the Pakistani peacekeeping contingent in Somalia. Sardar Assef Ahmed Ali, the foreign minister gave answers to the points raised.<sup>37</sup> However, it is a fact that no act or bill has ever been passed on the subject of peacekeeping in the parliament.

The UNSC resolutions on Somalia are available on UN website. The major policy decisions taken in the UNSC, starting from the letter written by the Somali permanent representative at the UN to the President of the Security and UNSC Resolutions (UNSCR) 733 to 954 (a total of 17 resolutions from 23 January 1992 to 4 November 1994) pertaining to operations in Somalia are given in the table below:

No	Agenda Point	Date	Issue/Decisions	Remarks
1	Letter of the Somali permanent representative to the UN on behalf of Prime Minister Omer Arteh Ghalib. <sup>38</sup>	20 January 1992	Requesting a meeting of the Security Council on the deteriorating situation in Somalia.	The interim government in Mogadishu was not recognized by all warring

<sup>36</sup>*The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, Official Report, 17<sup>th</sup> Session, Vol. II, No. 6 (June 7, 1993): 182-193, [www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1459319876\\_671.pdf](http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1459319876_671.pdf) (accessed August 25, 2017).

<sup>37</sup>*The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, Official Report, Vol. III, No. 6 (April 14, 1994): 723-724, [http://devlums.com/sites/default/files/debate/1459419845\\_876.pdf](http://devlums.com/sites/default/files/debate/1459419845_876.pdf) (accessed June 7, 2017).

<sup>38</sup> Letter dated 20 January 1992 from the Chargé d’affaires of the Permanent Mission of Somalia to the UN addressed to the President of the Security Council, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%202023445.pdf> (accessed December 27, 2016).

				parties and thus the letter did not have everyone's consent, particularly that of Aidid.
2	UNSCR 733. <sup>39</sup>	23 January 1992	Imposes arms embargo in Somalia	
3	UNSCR 746. <sup>40</sup>	17 March 1992	Urges parties involved in the Somali civil war to cooperate with the UN	
4	UNSCR 751. <sup>41</sup>	24 April 1992	Approves 50 observers for Somalia; establishes under the SRSG a security force for Somalia (UNOSOM); Decides on	

<sup>39</sup> Items related to the situation in Somalia, 55, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SOMALIA%20S%20RES%20733.pdf> (accessed December 27, 2016).

<sup>40</sup> Resolution 746, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/746> (accessed December 26, 2016).

<sup>41</sup> Resolution 751, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/751> (accessed December 26, 2016).

			convening a conference on national reconciliation & unity in cooperation with the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.	
5	UNSCR 767. <sup>42</sup>	27 July 1992	Advance party of observers to arrive in Mogadishu on 5 July and the rest on 23 July 1992; Appeals to international community for humanitarian aid; Establishes 4 operational zones in Mogadishu under UNOSOM.	
6	UNSCR 775. <sup>43</sup>	28 August 1992	Authorizes	

<sup>42</sup> Resolution 767, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/342/21/IMG/N9234221.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed December 27, 2016).

			increase in strength of UNOSOM; Authorizes increase in airlift operations in areas of priority.	
7	UNSCR 794. <sup>44</sup>	24 November 1992	Deployment of 3,500 personnel under UNOSOM; Action under Chapter VII of the UN mandate.	
8	UNSCR 814. <sup>45</sup>	26 March 1993	Expands size and mandate of UNOSOM II	
9	UNSCR 837. <sup>46</sup>	6 June 1993	Condemns attacks on UNOSOM II. Orders apprehension of the perpetrators.	
10	UNSCR 865. <sup>47</sup>	22 September 1993	Process of national reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia.	
11	UNSCR 878. <sup>48</sup>	29 October 1993	Extends mandate of	

<sup>43</sup> Resolution 775, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/410/10/IMG/N9241010.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed December 27, 2016).

<sup>44</sup> Resolution 794, <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1992/794e.pdf> (accessed December 27, 2016).

<sup>45</sup> Resolution 814, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/814> (accessed December 28, 2016).

<sup>46</sup> Resolution 837, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/837\(1993\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/837(1993)) (accessed December 28, 2016).

<sup>47</sup> Resolution 865, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/865> (accessed December 28, 2016).

			UNOSOM II	
12	UNSCR 885. <sup>49</sup>	16 November 1993	Establishes commission of inquiry regarding attacks on UNOSOM II	
13	UNSCR 886. <sup>50</sup>	18 November 1993	Extends the mandate of UNOSOM II and national reconciliation in Somalia	
14	UNSCR 897. <sup>51</sup>	14 February 1994	Continuation of UNOSOM II; national reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia	
15	UNSCR 923. <sup>52</sup>	31 May 1994	Extends mandate of UNOSOM II; national reconciliation	
16	UNSCR 946. <sup>53</sup>	30 September 1994	Extends mandate of UNOSOM II	
17	UNSCR 953. <sup>54</sup>	31 October 1994	Extends mandate of UNOSOM II	
18	UNSCR 954. <sup>55</sup>	4 November	Extends mandate of	

<sup>48</sup> Resolution 878, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/878> (accessed December 28, 2016).

<sup>49</sup> Resolution 885, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/639/14/PDF/N9363914.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed December 28, 2016).

<sup>50</sup> Resolution 886, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/886> (accessed December 28, 2016).

<sup>51</sup> Resolution 897, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/897> (accessed December 28, 2016).

<sup>52</sup> Resolution 923, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/923> (accessed December 28, 2016).

<sup>53</sup> Resolution 946, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/946> (accessed December 28, 2016).

<sup>54</sup> Resolution 953, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/953> (accessed December 28, 2016).

<sup>55</sup> Resolution 954, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/954> (accessed December 28, 2016).

		1994	UNOSOM II for the final time, withdrawal of personnel	
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The report titled *Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council* gives a chronological report of UNSC deliberations on UN operations in Somalia (1992-93).<sup>56</sup> Lessons learned from the US/UN debacle in Somalia are available in reports such as the *Comprehensive Report on Lessons-learned Unit*.<sup>57</sup> A comprehensive report in *The Journal for Humanitarian Assistance* was published by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Peacekeeping and Multinational Operations in 1995.<sup>58</sup>

Last but not the least Lt Col Imran Hasan Khan Niazi (retired) in the Army Institute of Military History (AIMH) was helpful in reading the manuscript and evaluating it for historical correctness and for typographical errors.

### Theoretical Framework

It is difficult to give a theoretical framework to the peacekeeping operations in Somalia in the early 1990s. Three nations, Pakistan, Somalia and the US, located in three different continents were brought together in a situation of conflict for very different reasons. At the end of the Cold War both Pakistan and Somalia had lost their geostrategic significance in the international calculus. Somalia had completely unraveled and the civil war had left it in ruins. It had become a case of international concern. Less troubled than Somalia, Pakistan was fast losing political space on the regional and international plane. After the end of the Afghan *jihad*, it had not only lost its salience as the frontline US ally but screws were also being tightened for its covert nuclear program and alleged links with terrorists. Things weren't very good internally either. The political government was fighting a desperate battle for its survival and

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<sup>56</sup> 6. Items relating to the situation in Somalia, 312-336, [http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/89-92/Chapter%208/AFRICA/item%2006\\_Somalia\\_.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/89-92/Chapter%208/AFRICA/item%2006_Somalia_.pdf) (accessed December 26, 2016).

<sup>57</sup> *Comprehensive Report on Lessons-learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia: April 1992-March 1995* (UN Department. of Peace-keeping Operations - Lessons-Learned Unit, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Life & Peace Institute, Norsk Utanrikspolitisk Institutt, 1995).

<sup>58</sup> Fighting for Hope in Somalia, *The Journal for Humanitarian Assistance*, No.6, 1995, <https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/102> (accessed October 3, 2016).

was hardly in a position to make difficult foreign policy decisions. In the absence of a solid political leadership, the military made the decision regarding sending troops to Somalia. The Army in the Pakistani context is used to making national security decisions and has for long enjoyed good relations with its American counterparts.

At that point in world history America, as the sole superpower, wanted to play an enhanced role in the emerging world order to the hilt. This entailed among other things a visible involvement in a geo-strategically important but otherwise failing state such as Somalia. After the demise of the USSR, the US had revived the UN peacekeeping operations as a tool of international diplomacy. A window of opportunity opened for Pakistan, when the US military asked Pakistan Army to contribute peacekeepers for UN operations in Somalia. This fleeting opportunity was seized with both hands. This instinct for survival was at its primordial best and can be explained through the realist paradigm espoused by Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz. Both these theorists are of the opinion that states are pre-occupied either with the instincts of survival or a desire to dominate. So, whereas, Pakistan was sticking to the basic instinct of survival, the US was aggressively following the policy to dominate. Somalia as a state had collapsed and various warlords were fighting for influence and domination in their tribal pockets.

At this time in world politics, the interests of US and Pakistan conflated in Somalia and the latter opted to become part of the UN peacekeeping operations. On the contrary, Somali warlord General Farah Aidid considered the UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia as an infringement on his authority. The unfortunate massacre of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers on 5 June 1993 at the hands of Somali National Alliance (SNA) cadres changed the entire complexion of the operations. Whereas, Pakistanis decided not to pullout of the peacekeeping operations, the Americans went after Aidid. The change in nature of the military operations from supporting the humanitarian effort to hunting a so-called proclaimed offender proved disastrous. 18 US soldiers were killed in October 1993 in an abortive effort to catch Aidid. This proved to be the last nail in the US motivation to stay in Somalia. Clinton administration decided to withdraw post haste from the peacekeeping operations in Somalia. This proved to be the beginning of the end of the peacekeeping operations in Somalia. It is now considered a classic case of a failed mission in the annals of UN peacekeeping, but it served Pakistan's

purpose because it provided Pakistan a well-earned reprieve, though in the process it had to suffer significant human casualties. In times to come, it would provide Pakistan a chance to become one of the leading Troop Contributing Country (TCC) in peacekeeping operations. Somalia was the overall loser. It continues to suffer.

### **Dramatis Personae**

For anyone interested in reading about UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia in the 1990s, it is essential to know the names and portfolios of the principal actors. This included personalities from a number of countries and international organizations notably Pakistan, Somalia, the US and the UN. Not all of them will find mention in this narrative. For the sake of reference, a list of decision makers and participants has been prepared:

#### **Pakistani Decision Makers**

##### Presidents

Ghulam Ishaq Khan (1988-1993)

Sardar Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari (1993-1997)

##### Prime Ministers

Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, PML N (sworn in 6 November 1990; removed 18 April 1993; restored 26 May; forced to resign 18 July 1993)

Balkh Sher Mazari (18 April 1993 – 26 May 1993) Caretaker

Moeenuddin Ahmad Qureshi (18 July 1993 – 19 October 1993) Caretaker

Benazir Bhutto PPP (19 October 1993 – 5 November 1996)

##### Foreign Ministers

Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada (Balkh Sher Mazari cabinet, April – May 1993)

Abdul Sattar (Moeen Qureshi cabinet, July – October 1993)

Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari PPP (19 October 1993 – 14 November 1993)

Sardar Assef Ahmed Ali PPP (16 November 1993 – 4 November 1996)

##### Minister for State for Foreign Affairs

Muhammad Siddiq Khan Kanju PML N (10 September 1991 – 18 July 1993)

##### Foreign Secretary

Shaharyar M. Khan (30 August 1990 – 29 March 1994)

##### Permanent Representative at the UN

Ambassador Jamsheed Marker (September 1990 – March 1995)

**Ambassadors to the US**

Syeda Abida Hussain (26 November 1991 – 24 April 1993)

Maleeha Lodhi (21 January 1994 – 30 January 1997)

**Chargé d'affaires (CDA) in Mogadishu**

Tahir Iqbal Butt (Till 5 January 1992)

Abbas Haider Zaidi (From 22 November 1993)

**High Commissioner to Kenya**

Amir Muhammad Khan (1993)

Shafqat Kakakhel (1994 – 1998)

**Defense Ministers**

Ghous Ali Shah (18 September 1991 – 17 July 1993)

Aftab Shaban Mirani (October 1993 – November 1996)

**Secretary Defense**

Salim Abbas Jilani (November 1989 – November 1996)

**Chairman Joint Chiefs' of Staff Committee (CJSC)**

General Shamim Alam Khan (17 August 1991 – 9 November 1994)

**Chiefs of Army Staff (COAS)**

General Asif Nawaz (6 August 1991 – 8 January 1993)

General Abdul Waheed aka Waheed Kakar (12 January 1993 – 12 January 1996)

**Chief of General Staff (CGS)**

Lieutenant General Farrukh Khan (1991-1994)

**Director Generals Military Operations (DGMO)**

Major General Arshad Chaudhry (1992 - 1993)

Major General Pervez Musharraf (July 1993 – October 1995)

Major General Tauqeer Zia (1995-1999)

**Informal link between the USG and Pakistan Army**

Shuja Nawaz (Brother of General Asif Nawaz)

**US**

**Presidents**

George H.W. Bush (1989-1992)

William Jefferson “Bill” Clinton (1993 – 2000)

Back Channel Negotiator with Aidid

Former President James Earl ‘Jimmy’ Carter (September 1993)

Whitehouse Chiefs of Staff (COS)

James Baker (August 24, 1992 – January 20, 1993)

Thomas F. ‘Mack’ McLarty (January 20, 1993 – July 17, 1994)

National Security Advisors

Brent Scowcroft (January 20, 1989 – January 20, 1993)

Anthony Lake (1993–1997)

## **State Department**

Secretaries of State

James A. Baker (August 1989 – January 1992)

Lawrence S. Eagleburger (1992 -1993)

Warren Christopher (1993-1997)

Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs

Frank G. Wisner (1992–1993)

Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security

Lynn Etheridge Davis (1993-1997)

Director State Department Inter Agency Task Force for Somalia

Ambassador Brandon H. Grove Jr. (1992 – 1993)

State Department Africa Bureau Head

Ambassador David Shinn (1992 – 1993)

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Herman J. Cohen (May 12, 1989 – February 26, 1993)

George Moose (April 2, 1993 – August 22, 1997)

Ambassador to the UN

Madeline Albright (February 1993 – January 1996)

Ambassadors to Pakistan

Nicholas Platt (October 24, 1991 – November 3, 1992)

John Cameroon Monjo (November 10, 1992 – September 10, 1995)

Ambassador to Kenya

Smith Hempstone (1989-1993) opposed the US intervention in Somalia

Ambassador to Somalia

James K. Bishop (1990-1991) evacuated the embassy in Mogadishu

Special Envoy to Somalia (Operation Continue Hope)

Ambassador Robert Oakley (November 1992 - May 1993 and October 1993 – March 1994)

Ambassador Robert R. Gosende (1992-93) didn't get any ambassadorial appointment after Somalia

Assistant to the Special Envoy to Somalia

Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni (October 1993)

Coordinator at the US Liaison Office in Mogadishu

Ambassador Richard Wayne Bogosian (1993-1994)

Somalia Liaison Office, US Embassy in Nairobi

Ambassador Daniel H. Simpson (September 1994)

Head of the Inter Agency Task Force on Somalia

Ambassador Brandon Grove

### **Department of Defense**

Secretaries of Defense

Richard ‘Dick’ Bruce Cheney (1989 -1993)

Les Aspin (January 21, 1993 – February 3, 1994)

William Perry (February 3, 1994 – January 23, 1997)

### **Chairmen Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)**

General Colin Powell (October 1, 1989 – September 30, 1993)

General John Shalikashvili (October 25, 1993 to September 30, 1997)

### **Commander Central Command (CENTCOM)**

General Joseph P. Hoar (1991-1994)

General J.H. Binford Peay III (1994-1997)

**Commander Operation Gothic Serpent** to capture Mohamed Farrah Aidid in 1993

Major General William F. Garrison, Special Operations – Delta Force

## **CIA**

Director CIA: Robert M. Gates (1991 -93); R. James Woolsey (1993 -95)

Head of Africa Division: William R. Piekney (Islamabad station chief from 1984 to 1986)

Mogadishu Station Chief: Garrett Jones

Deputy Chief: John Spinelli, Code Name: Leopard

Department of Operations: Mike Shanklin, Code Name: Condor

## **Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) December 1992 – May 4, 1993 (Five Months)**

Commanding General 1<sup>st</sup> MEF: Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston, USMC

Commanding General 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division: Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC

Commanding General 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division: Major General Steven L. Arnold, US Army

Assistant Division Commander 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division: Brigadier General Lawson W. Magruder III, US Army.

Director Operations J-3: Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC

## **United Shield to protect the withdrawal of UN forces from Somalia (January to March 1995)**

Commander Combined Task Force (CTF): Lieutenant General Anthony C. Zinni.

## **LAS**

Esmat Abel Meguid, Egypt (Secretary General 1991-2001)

## **OAU**

Salim Ahmed Salim, Tanzania (Secretary General 1989-2001)

## **OIC**

Hamid Algabid, Niger (Secretary General 1988-1996)

## **UN**

Secretary Generals

Javier Perez de Cuellar, Peru (January 1, 1982 to December 31, 1991)

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Egypt (January 1992 to December 1996)

Under Secretary Generals DPKO

Marrack I. Goulding, Britain (1986 – 1993)

Kofi Annan, Ghana (March 1993 – 1994)  
 Special Envoy for Somalia  
 James O.C. Jonah, Under Secretary General, Sierra Leone (December 1991)

### **SRSGs**

Ambassador Mohamed M. Sahnoun, Algeria (April – October 1992)  
 Ambassador Ismat Taha Kittani, Iraq (November 1992 – February 1993)  
 Admiral Jonathan Howe, USN retired (March 1993 – February 1994)  
 Ambassador Lansana Kouyate, Guinea (Acting Appointment, February – June 1994)  
 Ambassador James Victor Gbeho, Ghana (July 1994 – September 1995)

### **Political Advisors to SRSG**

Ambassador Lansana Kouyate, Guinea (March-April 1993)  
 Ambassador April Glaspie, USA  
 Syed Hasan Raza, Pakistan (1993-1994)

### **UNOSOM I (September 1992 – March 1993) and UNOSOM II (April 1993 – 1994)**

#### **Force Headquarter**

##### Force Commanders

Lieutenant General Çevik Bir, Turkey (April 1993 - January 1994)  
 Lieutenant General Aboo Smah Bin Aboo Bakar, Malaysia (January 1994 -March 1995)

##### Deputy Force Commander UNOSOM I & II and Commander UNITAF

Major General Thomas Montgomery, US Army, (March 9, 1993 – March 28, 1994)

##### Chiefs of Staff (COS)

Brigadier Anis Bajwa, Pakistan (June 1993 – May 1994)  
 SO to COS Major Amir Ayub, Azad Kashmir Regiment  
 Brigadier Ghulam Ahmed, Pakistan (1994 – 1995)

##### Chief Operations Officer (COO)

Colonel Deepak Kapoor (Later Chief of Indian Army) 1994-95

##### Pakistani Staff in Force Headquarters

Lieutenant Colonel Obedullah Niazi  
 Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Tahir

Lieutenant Colonel Javed Zia

Lieutenant Colonel Javed Mujtaba

Chief Military Observer (CMO)/Force Commander

Brigadier Imtiaz Shaheen, Pakistan (1992-93)

### **Pak Contingent**

Brigade Commanders

Brigadier Ikarm ul Hasan (February 1993 – January 1994)

Brigadier Saulat Abbas (February 1994 – May 1995)

Deputy Contingent Commanders

Colonel Asif Doraiz Akhtar (January 1993 – February 1994)

Colonel Sultan Akhtar

General Staff Officer Grade I

Lt Col Hamid Khan

Commanding Officers (CO) of Pakistani Units

Lt Col Kamal Aziz (CO 7 FF)

Lt Col/Col Fazal-i-Maqbool Afridi (CO15 FF)

Lt Col Zulfiqar Rana (CO 5 FF)

Lt Col Abdul Rauf (CO 8 FF)

Lt Col Tariq Malik (CO 6 Punjab)

Lt Col Fayyaz Satti (CO 4 Punjab)

Lt Col Akhtar H. Bukhari/Lt Col Majid Azim (CO 10 Baloch)

Lt Col Sher Akbar (CO 1 Sind)

Lt Col Fahim Akhtar (CO 4 Sind)

Lt Col/Col Sikander Afzal (19 Lancers)

Col Saleem Akhund (33 Combat Aviation Squadron)

### **Somali Parties**

- Factions founded prior to the fall of Siad Barre (through 1991)
  - **United Somali Congress (USC).** Formed in 1987, the USC played a key role in ousting the government of Siad Barre in 1991 and became a target of the American led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) campaign in 1993.

- Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)
- Somali National Front (SNF)
- Somali National Movement (SNM)
- Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
- Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)
- Al-Itihad al-Islamiya (AIAI)
- United Somali Root (USR)
- Factions founded after the fall of Siad Barre/during UN Interventions (1991–1995)
  - **Somali National Alliance (SNA)**. This alliance of three political parties was headed by General Muhammad Farah Hassan Aidid.
  - **Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA)**
  - Somali National Front (SNF)
  - Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA)
  - United Somali Front (USF)
  - Somali Africans Muke Organization aka Somali Asli Mukti Organization (SAMO)
  - Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU)
  - Somali National Union (SNU)
  - Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM)
  - United Somali Party (USP)

### **Somali Leaders**

General Mohamed Farah (also spelled Farrah) Hassan Aidid (also spelled Aideed) aka **Farah Aidid** (1934-1996)

Faction. Chairman United Somali Congress (USC)/Somali National Alliance (SNA)  
Clan. Hawiye

Sub Clan. Habr Gidr (this clan name has been spelled differently in various places)

Area of Operation. Mogadishu

Armed Followers. Approximately 10,000

Political Stance. Aidid's party was instrumental in defeating Barre. SNA under Aidid was the political arm of USC. Aidid's main rival in Mogadishu was businessman Ali Mahdi Mohamed. Aidid was opposed to the US and UN involvement in Somalia and to Ali Mahdi's claim as interim president.

**Osman Hasan Ali Atto** also spelled Ato or Oto (1940-2013)

Unofficial Designation. Aidid's chief financier

Affiliation. Somali National Alliance (SNA)

**Ali Mahdi Mohammed** (b. 1939)

Clan. Hawiye

Sub Clan. Abgal or Abgaal

Designation. Interim President (1991-1997)

Political Faction. USC/Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA)

Stance. Bitter rival of Aidid and favorably disposed towards UN involvement in Somalia

Armed Followers. Approximately 3000

**Umar Arteh Ghalib** (born 1927)

Clan. Isaaq

Sub Clan. Habr Awaal

Political Affiliation. USC

Government Career

Foreign Minister in Siad Barre Government (1969 – 1977)

Prime Minister in Siad Barre Government and reappointed in the same position in the Caretaker Government of Ali Mahdi (January 24, 1991 to May 1993)

**General Mohamed Abshir Muse/Muse** (1926 -2017)

Clan. Majerteen

Political Affiliation. Muse headed the political wing of Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and was involved in a power struggle with Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed from 1991 to 1998.

Designation. Deputy Prime Minister in the caretaker cabinet of Ali Mahdi

Military/Police Career. Worked his way up to become commandant in the Somali Defense forces from 1958 to 1960 and then opted to join the Somali Police Force upon its inception and commanded the force for 9 years till the military coup of 1969.

Jail Term. Was jailed for nine years by Siad Barre.

Inclination. Sided with the Americans in 1993 and moved to Minnesota, USA in 2001. His deportation from the US in 2003 was prevented by the intervention of a number of former US diplomats including Ambassadors Gosende and April Glaspie. He died in Minnesota in 2017.<sup>59</sup>

### **General Mohammed Siad Hersi ‘Morgan’**

Background. Son-in-law and Minister of Defense of Siad Barre and commander of the Somali Special Forces (red berets) as a colonel

Faction. Somali National Front (SNF) created from the leftovers of the Somali National Army. Its troop strength was 9000 troops and it possessed seven T54/T55 tanks and eighteen 122 mm artillery pieces.

Area of Operation. Kismayo

### **Col Ahmed Omar ‘Jess’**

Faction. Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)

Main Location. Kismayo

Forces. 3000 troops mainly from old Somali National Army

Political Stance. Jess was aligned with Aidid in Mogadishu but was willing to allow the deployment of a UN contingent in Kismayo, where he was fighting with Hersi Morgan.

### **Layout of the Book**

The book has been organized into seven chapters. The first chapter gives the background of the crisis in Somalia, the literature review and the theoretical framework. The second chapter deals with the buildup leading to the UN intervention in Somalia. The third is about the international intervention in Somalia. The fourth and fifth chapters deals with the experiences of the Pakistani peacekeepers in Somalia. These chapters are based on war diaries and interviews of those, who participated in these operations, personal notes and regimental histories. The sixth chapter is about the operations of UNOSOM after the departure of American and western troops and the final evacuation from Somalia. The final chapter is that of conclusion.

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<sup>59</sup> Jack Crosby, “Mohamed Abshir Musa, leader of Somali independence movement, dies at 91,” *Star Tribune*, November 13, 2017, <http://www.startribune.com/obituary-mohamed-abshir-musa-was-a-leader-of-somali-independence-movement/456731143/> (accessed January 11, 2018).



## Chapter II

### **Background to the Somali Conundrum**

In order to unravel the tangled skein of the Somalia conflict, one has to look at a number things such as its geostrategic location, its tribal ethos, endemic poverty and the wildly independent streak of its people and its young but violent population.

#### **Geo-Strategic Location**

Somalia is a medium sized country with an area of 637,540 square kilometers. It is 1.25 times smaller than Pakistan. Somalia has fragmented mainly in the north and has at least six semi-autonomous regions. Prominent among these are the independent states of Somaliland and Puntland in the northeast and Jubaland in the extreme south. These ‘countries’ are not recognized officially and are not members of the UN. The flag of Somalia has a white star against a blue background. The five-pointed white Star of Unity represents the areas where the Somali ethnic group traditionally reside, namely Djibouti, Somaliland (former British occupied land), the Ogaden region in Ethiopia, the North Eastern Province in Kenya, and southern Somalia (former Italian colony). Interestingly, the Somali flag’s light blue backdrop was influenced by the UN flag, in recognition for the role the international organization played in Somalia’s transition to independence during the trusteeship period. It now officially denotes the sky as well as the Indian Ocean, which flanks the country.

The aerial distance of Somalia from Pakistan in a straight line is approximately 3,700 kilometers or roughly 2300 miles. The distance from the port of Karachi to the port of Mogadishu is approximately 2200 nautical miles. A sailor setting sail from Karachi to Mogadishu would most likely plot a course due west along the Pakistani coastline up to the mouth of the Persian Gulf and then go south skirting the coasts of Oman and Yemen, past the Gulf of Aden and along the Somali coast to reach his destination. Hypothetically speaking, if the world was flat, somebody looking through a powerful telescope from a lighthouse in Gawadar could actually see someone wearing bright clothes standing on the tip of the horn of Africa.

The ‘horn’ in East Africa resembles the Arabic numeral seven. It is home to Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia and directly influences the shipping chokepoint of Bab el-

Mandeb.<sup>60</sup> Located between the Arabian Peninsula and the horn of Africa, this strait strategically connects the Indian Ocean with the Mediterranean via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. The distance at the narrowest point between Ras Menheli in Yemen and Ras Siyan in Djibouti, is about 30 kilometers. The island of Perim divides the strait into two channels. In 2016, an estimated 4.8 million barrel per day of crude oil and refined petroleum products was flowing through this waterway toward Europe, the United States, and Asia.<sup>61</sup> All shipping through this strait is done within the visual distance of the coasts of Yemen, Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea.<sup>62</sup>

The Republic of Djibouti, a former French colony is a major refueling station in the region and a number of militaries, notably the US and its allies i.e. French, Italian, Spanish and the Japanese have their bases here. In 2017 China and Saudi Arabia also started building their military stations in Djibouti.<sup>63</sup>

### **Mogadishu**

Most of the action narrated in this book took place in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. The city is located in the south of the country in the coastal region of Bannaadir or Banadir. It is spread over hundred square kilometers and looks like a beached whale flopped on its belly next to the Indian Ocean. The city is divided into sixteen *dagmadas* or districts. Locally known as Hamar, Mogadishu is the most populous city of Somalia and has an estimated population of between 1.5 to 3 million people.

This ancient port city was redesigned by the Italian colonizers on modern lines and its architecture and names of the roads reflects the fascination of the city planners with international cities e.g. Via Washington, Via Londra, Via Roma and Via Moscow etc. Makka

<sup>60</sup> William W. Cooper & Piyu Yue, *Challenges of the Muslim World: Past Present and Future* (Oxford: Elsevier, 2008), xvii.

<sup>61</sup> Lejla Villar & Mason Hamilton, "Three important oil trade chokepoints are located around the Arabian Peninsula," US Energy Information Administration, August 4, 2017, <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32352> (accessed August 7, 2017).

<sup>62</sup> Alex de Waal, "Africa's \$700 Billion Problem Waiting to Happen," *Foreign Policy*, March 17, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/17/africas-700-billion-problem-waiting-to-happen-ethiopia-horn-of-africa/> (accessed June 8, 2017).

<sup>63</sup> Joseph Braude, "Why China and Saudi Arabia are Building Bases in Djibouti," *Huffington Post*, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-braude/why-china-and-saudi-arabi\\_b\\_12194702.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-braude/why-china-and-saudi-arabi_b_12194702.html) (accessed July 4, 2017).

al Mukarrama and Medina Road reflect its Islamic values. Makka al Mukarrama Road starts from near the old port and joins up with Afgoye Road near K4. Eight roundabouts numbered Kilometer 0 (K0) to K8 knot the road network within the urban sprawl of Mogadishu from east to west. Hawl Wadaag Road, the scene of the Black Hawk Down incident, is situated between K3 and K4. Via Lenin is the main north-south route from K4 roundabout near the international airport to 21 October Road on the east-west axis.<sup>64</sup>

21 October Road takes its name from that day in 1969, when Siad Barre seized power and established the Somali Democratic Republic. This road served as a major line of communication for the UN troops. The peacekeepers spent a lot of time and effort to keep it open. The US forces established Sword and Hunter bases along this road. Hunter base was on K7 roundabout at the intersection with road leading to the city of Afgoye. Major landmarks on this road are the stadium, where the Pakistani brigade HQ was deployed. In the movie *Black Hawk Down*, it is referred to as the Pakistani stadium. The Pasta factory is located towards the west and the cigarette factory in the center of 21 October Road. A deadly ambush was laid on this road against a Pakistani convoy returning from a weapon inspection on 5 June 1993. South of 21 October Road and running parallel to it, are the Armed Forces Street and the National Street. Food Distribution Site (FDS) 20, which was attacked by angry Somali crowds on 5 June 1993, was located on the National Street.

This once beautiful city on the Indian Ocean had all the trappings of a modern national capital such as Villa Somalia – the presidential palace, the parliament building, a national stadium, an international airport and seaport, university, hospitals, radio station, military academy, the tomb of the Unknown Soldier and splendid beaches. The airport is located south of the seaport. Mogadishu international airport is now called Aden Abdullah International Airport, after Aden Abdullah Osman Daar, the first president of Somalia. When the Pakistani peacekeepers first landed in Mogadishu in September 1992, all they could see was a shell of a city destroyed by warring militias. The area next to the airport was littered with destroyed aircraft, stark signs of a bitter civil war.

In the heart of the city is a large open bazaar known as the Bakaara Market.

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<sup>64</sup> Lt Col Michael Whetstone, USA (retired), *Madness in Mogadishu: Commanding the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division's Quick Reaction Company during Black Hawk Down* (Mechanicsburg PA: Stackpole Books, 2015), 133.

*Bakaaraha* is the derivative of *baqaar*, the Somali word for grain silo or storage. Created in late 1972, this market sells all items of essential use, such as agricultural produce, petrol and medicine. It is also famous for illicit activities, such as forged passports, birth certificates and university diplomas. Bakaara Market was also the scene of the ultimate American humiliation, when an enraged Somali crowd dragged the body of a dead US soldier through its streets in the aftermath of the Black Hawk Down incident in October 1993. The Pentagon did not disclose the name of the soldier, whose body was desecrated for fear that it may increase the hurt for the next of kin.<sup>65</sup>

Mogadishu is linked to the nearby cities of Afgoye or Afgooyie and Balad by metaled roads. Afgoye lies 25 kilometers west of Mogadishu, while Balad an agricultural town is located about 36 kilometers in the northeast. Afgoye has a salubrious climate and the Shebelle River passes through its middle. This city was a common destination for investors from the Gulf States in the 1980s. The Emir of Kuwait would often spend the holy month of Ramadan here. After the outbreak of the civil war in 1991, many internally displaced people in southern Somalia flocked to Afgoye to seek refuge. A Pakistani battalion with two of its companies was deployed in the destroyed building of the Agriculture University in Afgoye for some time. During 1914 to 1927, the Italians had connected the cities of Mogadishu, Afgoye and Villabruzi (modern-day Jawhar) by laying a railway track. Jawhar is approximately 90 kilometers in the north of Mogadishu. The British dismantled the railway line during the Second World War and it was never restored.<sup>66</sup>

The coastal road south of Mogadishu passes through the famous Jazeera (also spelled Jasira or Gessira) beach outside the city. It extends to Marka (Merca) and beyond right up to Kismayo (Chissimayo). Both cities like Mogadishu are ancient port towns on the Indian Ocean. Marka is at a distance of approximately 109 kilometers from Mogadishu in the Lower Shebelle province and Kismayo is located in the Lower Jubba region about 528 kilometers south west of Mogadishu. During the civil war the local militias fought for influence in this city. These

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<sup>65</sup> Arlene Levinson, “Dead Soldier Dragged Through Somali Streets a Modern-Day Unknown: Mogadishu: Pentagon says naming the mob's victim serves no purpose and would only pain those who loved and lost him,” *Los Angeles Times*, January 16, 1994, [http://articles.latimes.com/1994-01-16/news/mn-12448\\_1\\_dead-soldier](http://articles.latimes.com/1994-01-16/news/mn-12448_1_dead-soldier) (accessed December 25, 2017).

<sup>66</sup> Mogadishu–Villabruzzi Railway, <https://www.revolyv.com/main/index.php?s=Mogadishu%20%93Villabruzzi%20Railway> (accessed June 8, 2017).

included the Somali National Front (SNF) led by Mohammed Said Hersi aka General Morgan and Colonel Omar Jess of the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). Morgan had fled Somalia after the collapse Siad Barre's regime, who happened to be his father-in-law. He returned to his native Kismayao, when the American and Belgian forces arrived in this port city. Jess, who was close to Aidid, was pushed out.<sup>67</sup>

## **People, Religion, Traditions and Culture**

Somalia is sparsely populated and has a population density of only 17.5 people per square kilometer.<sup>68</sup> Its population of approximately seven million,<sup>69</sup> is twenty times less than that of Karachi. According to World Bank data available online, Somalia had a population of 6.32 million in 1990.<sup>70</sup> One thing common between Somalia and Pakistan is that both countries have an exceedingly young population. More than 80 per cent of the Somalis are under the age of 35.<sup>71</sup> Lack of jobs and opportunities has made the youth violent and restless.

The Somalis are a homogeneous people in terms of race, culture, language, heritage, and religion. Almost all of them adhere to the Islamic faith and are predominantly Shafii Sunnis.<sup>72</sup> They trace their genealogical lineage to a single father – the mythical Samaal.<sup>73</sup> From him, sprang a vast genealogical tree of clans that forms the basis of their social system. All matters are resolved through the traditional tribal justice system. The tribal way of life exemplifies the strengths and weaknesses of the Somali people. The clan system holds the people of the same tribe together but defies conventional state structures and is a source of inter-tribal friction. In the South the tribal tradition has been diluted due to urbanization and attempts to create a central state. In some areas the dominant clans or sub-clans have set up semi-autonomous rule e.g. in the Northeast Puntland is controlled by the Haarti group (a subset

<sup>67</sup> M. Rafique Dogar, *Operation Somalia: A Journey – The Story of a Country's Destruction* (Lahore: Deed Shunaid Publications, 1994), 64.

<sup>68</sup> Population Density (people per sq. km) in Somalia, <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/somalia/population-density-people-per-sq-km-wb-data.html> (accessed April 5, 2017).

<sup>69</sup> Somalia, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160144.pdf> (accessed April 5, 2017).

<sup>70</sup> World Bank data available at [https://www.google.com.pk/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9\\_&met\\_y=sp\\_pop\\_totl&idim=country:SOM:ERI&hl=en&dl=en](https://www.google.com.pk/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=sp_pop_totl&idim=country:SOM:ERI&hl=en&dl=en) (accessed April 5, 2017).

<sup>71</sup> "Launching Strategy for Youth in Somalia, Deputy Secretary-General Calls Young People 'Driving Force' in Advancing Peace, Sustainable Development Goals," *UN Press Release*, February 23, 2016, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/dsgsm942.doc.htm> (accessed April 5, 2017).

<sup>72</sup> Mohamed Dirye Abdulahi, *Culture and Customs of Somalia* (2001: Greenwood Press, Westport CT), 55.

<sup>73</sup> Somalia, <http://www.everyculture.com/Sa-Th/Somalia.html> (accessed April 5, 2017).

of the Darood) and Somaliland by the Isaaq clan. Many other parts of Somalia have been similarly governed by local groupings using the traditional governing system to resolve disputes and encourage some investment even in the absence of a formal state.<sup>74</sup>

Traditionally Somalis are nomadic people, roaming the desert and leading a pastoral lifestyle. They are ethnically homogeneous but divided along tribal lines. The predominant clans of Somalia are the Hawiye, the Isaaq and the Darood. Hawiye is the largest clan, and its members are found mostly in the South and in the capital Mogadishu, as well in the towns of Marka and Kismayo. They are believed to be the descendants of Arab migrants. Hawiye is subdivided into Ajuran, Degodia, Habr Gidr, Hawadle, Murosade and Abgal.<sup>75</sup> Both Aidid and Ali Mahdi belonged to Hawiye clan were from different sub clans i.e., Habr Gidr and Abgal respectively. Habr Gidr are usually farmers and herdsmen, while Abgal are traders. Ali Mahdi was a successful businessman. He owned the Makka Mukkramah Hotel at the time of the outbreak of the civil war. Aidid belonged to a family of camel herders,<sup>76</sup> and made a career in the police and the military.

Leadership in the central government exchanged hands frequently. In 1960, Aden Abdullah Osman Daar, a Hawiye, became the first president of Somalia. He was followed by three Darood presidents, three Hawiye and two Rahanweins (also spelt Rahanwayns). However, lack of fair power-sharing, absence of any real control of the distant northern territories and non-representation of the large Isaaq clan caused friction within the society.<sup>77</sup>

## **Colonial Past**

European interest in Somalia developed after 1839, when the British East India Company established a coaling station in the port town of Aden for their ships en route to

<sup>74</sup> Seth Kaplan, “Somalia’s Complex Clan Dynamics,” *Fragile States*, January 12, 2010, <http://www.fragilestates.org/2012/01/10/somalias-complex-clan-dynamics/> (accessed November 25, 2016).

<sup>75</sup> Mariam Arif Gassim, *Somalia: Clan Vs. Nation* (University of Michigan, 2002), 12.

<sup>76</sup> Alex Shoumatoff, “Presenting General Aidid,” *Dispatches from the Vanishing World*, <http://www.dispatchesfromthevanishingworld.com/dispatch-57-presenting-general-aidid/> (accessed April 20, 2018).

<sup>77</sup> Mikolaj Radlicki, “Who Really Rules Somalia? – The Tale of Three Big Clans and Three Countries,” May 19, 2015, <http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-05-18-who-really-rules-somalia-the-tale-of-three-clans> (accessed November 25, 2016).

India. Somalia, a resource barren area became a market for procuring meat for British troops, deployed in the naval base in Aden.<sup>78</sup> There were three sets of European colonizers in the horn of Africa in the nineteenth century i.e. Italians, British and French. They had usurped Somali territories from weak and decaying sultans through cunning, subterfuge and brute force.

In the late nineteenth century Muhammad Abdullah Hasan emerged as a symbol of resistance against creeping colonialism in northern Somalia. Dubbed the mad mullah by the British, Abdullah or Abdullahi was inspired by the Mahdi of Sudan. He gained prominence first as a preacher among the Darood tribes and later as the leader of the Dervish movement. He waged jihad against the British during the first two decades of the twentieth century and at one time forced them to evacuate their Somaliland Protectorate. He also made incursions into Italy's two nominal protectorates, the sultanates of Obbia and the Mijertein, and their colony in southern Somalia. The Italians found a temporary solution by granting him the Nogal Territory in northern Somaliland. The Dervish movement effectively put a stop to the eastward expansion of the Ethiopians towards the Indian Ocean. Today the Mullah is regarded as a forerunner of contemporary Somali nationalism.<sup>79</sup> After the fall of the Mullah, the British occupied the north of Somalia and Italians the South. The French occupied a small colony in the North West.

In the twentieth century, the Italians twice lost control of their colonial possessions in the horn of Africa to the British due to their defeats in the two World Wars. In order to expand their political influence, the British administration encouraged the Somali youth to become part of the government, first in the garb of the Somali Youth Club and subsequently as the Somali Youth League. In 1949, post-War international powers declared Italian Somaliland as UN Trust Territory under the Italian control for the next ten years. On July 1, 1960, the Italian Trust Territory was merged with the former British Somaliland protectorate and declared an independent Somali Republic. The constitution of the new country was based on the Italian model. The long colonial experience and the trust mandate nurtured a sense of ownership

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<sup>78</sup> Philip Briggs, *Somaliland with Addis Ababa and Eastern Ethiopia* (England: Bradt Travel Guide, 2012), 12.

<sup>79</sup> Robert L. Hess, "The 'Mad Mullah' and Northern Somalia," *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1964): 415-433.

among the Italians about Somalia. This sentiment was clearly discernible to the peacekeepers in 1990s.<sup>80</sup>

### **A Battleground for Cold War Superpowers**

The British resorted to typical post-colonial chicanery to keep the region destabilized by handing over parts of Somali territory to Kenya and Ethiopia. This became a bone of contention between Somalia and its neighbors and cause of wars and ill will. The string of external wars with neighboring countries created instability and allowed the post Second World War superpowers to pursue their own agendas in this geo-strategically important region. The main US allies in East Africa at that time were Emperor Haile Selassie in Ethiopia and the British in Kenya. Somalia had irredentist claims over the territory of Ogaden in Ethiopia and the north eastern province of Kenya. The post-colonial Somali rulers tried to unsuccessfully regain these territories but could not because of conflicting interests of the emerging international stakeholder. The US did not want to upset its allies in the region and spurned Somali offers for friendship and military aid.<sup>81</sup> Instead it provided military hardware to the Ethiopians. In the Ogaden War during 1977-78, although the Ethiopians by then were in the Soviet camp, their air force effectively used the US supplied Northrop F-5E Tiger II fighter-bombers against the Somali forces.<sup>82</sup>

During the initial days of the Cold War, USSR found it expedient to hedge its bets on Somalia. Full diplomatic relations were established in 1960. In June 1961 a major economic and technical assistance agreement was signed between Somalia and the USSR. As part of this agreement, the Soviet Union promised to provide 40 million rubles on long term credit at nominal interest rate of 2 ½ percent to build Somali industrial and agricultural base.<sup>83</sup> Military aid amounting to US \$32 million was also sanctioned on very soft terms to modernize and expand the Somali military. A substantial number of T34 tanks, MIG17 and 19 aircraft, small arms and ammunition were provided to equip the Somali armed forces. 300 Soviet military

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<sup>80</sup> For details read Paolo Tripodi, *The Colonial Legacy in Somalia - Rome and Mogadishu: From Colonial Administration to Operation Restore Hope* (Great Britain, Palgrave Macmillan: 1999).

<sup>81</sup> Robert G. Patman, *The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: The Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 48.

<sup>82</sup> For details read Tom Cooper, *Wings over Ogaden: The Ethiopian Somali War, 1978-79* (Helicon & Company, 2015).

<sup>83</sup> Patman, *The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa*, 48.

advisors were stationed in Somalia and 500 Somali pilots, officers and technicians were trained in the Soviet Union.<sup>84</sup>

In the days following independence, the Somali republic maintained good relations with former colonial masters Italy. Italy had created a governing elite of bureaucrats and parliamentarians, who was set to rule the newly independent country. Therefore, it was in its interest to keep the country afloat. During the 1960s Italian economic assistance totaled more than a quarter of all the non-military foreign aid received. The sheer volume of Italian aid created the first crop of millionaires in an otherwise poor country.<sup>85</sup> The other European country providing aid to Somalia was the Federal Republic of Germany. West Germany, in collaboration with the Italians and to a lesser extent the US, trained the Somali police to counter balance the Soviet influence. Somalia's relations with Britain after independence deteriorated to the extent that in 1962, it severed diplomatic relations in protest against latter's support to Kenya. It was only in 1981 that Somalia gave up its claims on the Kenyan territory.<sup>86</sup> The Somali relations with France also remained strained because of their presence in the Territory of Afars and Issas (later Djibouti).<sup>87</sup>

In 1969, General Siad Barre came into power through a military putsch. Barre believed in 'scientific socialism,' a concept similar to Mr. Bhutto's Islamic socialism that blended religion with secular thought. Barre's fascination with socialism motivated him to join the Soviet camp.<sup>88</sup> For the next eight years the Somali-Soviet relations prospered. In 1972, the Soviet defense minister Andrei Grechko signed an agreement to improve the port in Berbera so that it could be used for military purposes. The port facilities were improved to include missile storage site for the Navy, a 5000-meter-long runway to handle heavy bombers, and extensive radar and communication facilities. The port provided the Soviet Union a strategic presence in the region. In July 1972, all Soviet advisors expelled from Egypt were absorbed into the

<sup>84</sup> O. Igho Natufe, *Soviet Policy in Africa: From Lenin to Brezhnev* (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2011) 342.

<sup>85</sup> Catherine Besteman, *Unraveling Somali: Race, Violence and the Legacy of Slavery* (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1999), 197.

<sup>86</sup> Paul K. Huth & Todd L. Allee, *The Democratic Peace & Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 390.

<sup>87</sup> Somalia Foreign Relations, 1960-69. <http://countrystudies.us/somalia/17.htm> (accessed June 15, 2017).

<sup>88</sup> Somalia: Country Facts, Permanent Mission of the Somali Republic at the UN, <https://www.un.int/somalia/somalia/country-facts> (accessed April 5, 2017).

military team deployed in Berbera.<sup>89</sup> In 1977 Siad Barre launched an ill-advised war to free Ogaden from Ethiopia. General Aidid was placed in command of the expeditionary force. Until then Aidid had been rotting in Barre's prisons for six years. The military operation lasted for two years. It failed because Soviet Union switched sides and supported the Ethiopians with military supplies, advisors and Cuban troops. The US sided with the Siad Barre, who was obliged to ask the Soviets to leave.<sup>90</sup> Sensing a strategic vacuum, the US signed an Arms-For-Base-Access Accord with the Somalis to gain access to the port of Berbera.<sup>91</sup> Somalia remained a Cold War ally of the US from 1977 to 1988. In 1983, Somalia became part of the area of responsibility (AOR) of US Central Command (CENTCOM). This command extended from Somalia to Pakistan. These two nations at the farthest tips of the CENTCOM's AOR became inextricably involved in the UN peacekeeping operations in the early 1990s.

After the end of the Cold War, Somalia like Pakistan became a geostrategic discard. The global great game was over and the pawns on the international chessboard had no more utility. The Americans lost interest in Siad Barre's regime and their desire to maintain the port of Berbera as a strategic outpost waned.<sup>92</sup> In 1988, the US cut-off aid ostensibly to punish the Barre regime for the bombing of Hargeisa.<sup>93</sup> In 1989 all aid was suspended.<sup>94</sup> The same year, Somalia was disallowed to borrow from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The eruption of civil war in Somalia in 1988 coincided with the end of the Cold War in 1989 but the seeds of anarchy had been sown due to the great power rivalry of the past fifteen years.<sup>95</sup>

## The Civil War

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<sup>89</sup> Nina J. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Somalia: Issues, History and Bibliography* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002), 65.

<sup>90</sup> Andrzej Sitkowski, *UN Peacekeeping: Myth and Reality* (Westport CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 98.

<sup>91</sup> Jeffrey Alan Lefebvre, *Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953-1991* (University of Pittsburg Press, 1992), 197.

<sup>92</sup> Charles Mitchell, "U.S. Losing Interest in Military Bases in Somalia: Port, Airstrip no Longer are Key Part of Plans for Gulf of Aden Emergency," *Los Angeles Times*, March 17, 1985, [http://articles.latimes.com/1985-03-17/news/mn-35349\\_1\\_somalia](http://articles.latimes.com/1985-03-17/news/mn-35349_1_somalia) (accessed November 18, 2016).

<sup>93</sup> Hargeisa is the second largest city of Somalia and is the capital of the breakaway republic of Somaliland. AMISOM Short Mission Brief, <http://fletcher.tufts.edu/African-Peace-Missions/Research/Case-Studies/Somalia> (accessed November 24, 2016).

<sup>94</sup> Lefebvre, *Arms for the Horn*, 250.

<sup>95</sup> Brandon Grove, *Behind Embassy Walls: The Lifes and Times of an American Diplomat* (Columbia: The University of Missouri Press, 2005), 299.

The central government in Somalia began to unravel towards the end of the 1980s. By 1988–90, the Somali Armed Forces were fighting a losing battle against the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SDF) in the North East, the Somali National Movement (SNM) in the North West and the United Somali Congress (USC) in the South. The clan based armed opposition groups eventually overthrew the Barre government in January 1991. Barre went into exile in Lagos, Nigeria and died there.<sup>96</sup> The Somali Army disintegrated and the government armories were plundered. Weapons from government armories were looted and used by private militias first during the civil war and later against UN peacekeeping forces.<sup>97</sup> The breakdown of central authority created chaos and anarchy. The warring factions fought for spoils and influence. The most lucrative target was food aid being sent by international donors. The leading contenders for power in Mogadishu were Ali Mahdi Mohamed and General Mohamed Farah Aidid.<sup>98</sup> Aidid had vanquished the forces of Siad Barre and considered Ali Mahdi as a pretender to the throne. Mahdi, a businessman belonging to the Hawiye sub-clan was nominated as the interim president by the USC in the reconciliation conference held in Djibouti in 1991. This decision was not recognized by Aidid.<sup>99</sup> Thereafter, both Aidid and Ali Mahdi broke away from the USC and formed their own factions.

Aidid had been through the school of hard knocks. From his humble beginning as a lowly policeman he had risen in ranks to become a General. Along the way he had attended police training courses in Rome and the famous Frunze Military Academy in Moscow. As mentioned earlier, he fell out of favor and was detained as a political prisoner without trial from 1969 to 1975. In 1977 he was recalled to military duty and asked to lead the ill-fated military expedition in Ogaden. Later he served as Somalia's Ambassador to India (1984-89) with simultaneous accreditation to Singapore and Sri Lanka; before being appointed as intelligence chief by President Barre. In 1992, Aidid challenged the presence of US led UN troops and became the main target of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). A US\$ 25,000 bounty

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<sup>96</sup> George James, "Somalia's Overthrown Dictator, Mohammed Siad Barre, is dead," *New York Times*, January 3, 1995, <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/03/obituaries/somalia-s-overthrown-dictator-mohammed-siad-barre-is-dead.html> (accessed March 12, 2017).

<sup>97</sup> Somali Aid Worker quoted in Lee Feinstein, "Relief Forces in Somalia Facing Country awash in Small Arms," *Arms Control Today*, December 1992.

<sup>98</sup> Walter C. Soderlund, E. Donald Briggs, Kai Hildebrandt and Abdel Salam Sidahmed, *Humanitarian Crisis and Intervention: Reassessing the Impact of Mass Media* (Kumarian Press: 2008), 48.

<sup>99</sup> Sitkowski, *UN Peacekeeping*, 99.

was announced to capture Aidid “dead or alive” but he proved elusive.<sup>100</sup> Ten years later President Bush Jr. would use similar language to catch Osama bin Laden but the prize of US\$ 25 million for any kind of information leading to his apprehension was substantially higher. The hunt for Osama lasted ten years before he was located and killed by US Navy SEALS. In case of Aidid the US forces left him to his devices and beat a hasty retreat. By March 1994 they had withdrawn and left Somalia. The UN forces departed in 1995, leaving the ground clear for Aidid to declare himself the President of the country. He died of gunshot wounds in 1996. His assassins probably belonged to the camp of his archenemy Ali Mahdi Mohammed.<sup>101</sup>

Ali Mahdi was not a military commander and only controlled a small portion of the country. However, as interim President he enjoyed international recognition. Mahdi’s Government had a seat at the OAU, the UN and the AL. Factually Farah Aidid controlled a much larger area, as opposed to Ali Mahdi. The Ali Mahdi, Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) – Aidid (SNA) infighting cost Somalia dearly. The humanitarian crisis was compounded by famine. By the summer of 1991, the country had become a hopeless patchwork of conflicting militias, warlords, clan alliances and bandits. The armies of various warlords rampaged through the villages destroying water sources, burning crops and killing livestock. The agricultural produce dropped to alarming levels during the harvest season. Decreasing land under cultivation increased desertification. With no food and their livestock destroyed, people in the countryside began starving. Somalia became a desiccated wasteland, dotted by dried-up wells and bleached skeletons. Pictures of the dead and dying shook the international conscience.

The costs of conflict were horrendous. By 1992 an estimated 500,000 Somalis had died of starvation.<sup>102</sup> Another 5 million were on the verge of dying because of shortage of food. 50,000 had died in the armed conflict. 1 million people had been rendered homeless and countless were internally displaced or had fled the country altogether. Many refugees had travelled to Pakistan. Their population in Pakistan has decreased since the days of the civil war

<sup>100</sup> William G. Hyland, *Clinton’s World: Remaking US Foreign Policy* (London: Praeger, 1999) 56.

<sup>101</sup> “The faction leader who humiliated UN is laid to rest as hero,” *The Irish Times*, August 3, 1996, <http://www.irishtimes.com/news/the-faction-leader-who-humiliated-un-is-laid-to-rest-as-hero-1.73486> (accessed November 24, 2016).

<sup>102</sup> The People on War Report, ICRC, Geneva (1999): v, [https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc\\_002\\_0758.pdf](https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0758.pdf) (accessed April 13, 2017).

but there is still a place in Islamabad called little Somalia.<sup>103</sup> Many Somali refugees later relocated to the Europe and North America.<sup>104</sup>

Two sets of Aidid's immediate family also joined the mass exodus to North America. Asli Dhubat, the first wife, whom he had divorced, migrated to the US with five children. She and their children settled in Diamond Bar, eastern Los Angeles County, California, in 1988. Aidid had made cash payment of \$196,000 to purchase the house for them. Hussein Mohamed Farah, the second son from this wife was briefly installed as the President of Somalia in 1996. Farah had grown up in the US as a teenager and had later worked in San Gabriel Valley simultaneously as a municipal clerk on \$9 dollars an hour, a part-time college student and a corporal in the US Marine Reserve. He remained with the Marines from 1987 to 1995 during which time he served a tenure of duty in Somalia from December 1992 to January 1993 as an interpreter. In July 1995 he took 60 days leave and never reported back on duty.<sup>105</sup> He had got a better job in his native country. Two days after his father's death, the 34 year old Farah was appointed the new President by the Somali National Alliance (SNA).<sup>106</sup> He relinquished office on December 22, 1997, as a result of the arrangement announced in the Cairo Declaration.<sup>107</sup>

Aidid's second wife Khadiga Gurhan sought asylum with the couple's four children in Canada in 1989 after his tenure as his country's envoy ended in India. There were allegations that she had returned to Somalia for a five-month stay late in 1991, while still receiving welfare payments. To her good luck, official probes proved that she had been granted landed immigrant status in June 1991 and was thereby a legal resident of Canada. In 1993, she was still living on state welfare in a small town in Ontario.<sup>108</sup>

<sup>103</sup> Sher Ali Khan, "Islamabad's Little Somalia," *Herald*, December 1, 2016, <http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153225> (accessed April 25, 2017).

<sup>104</sup> Nayla Rush, "Somalis in the US: Terrorists have families too," *Center for Immigration Studies*, December 12, 2016, <http://cis.org/rush/somali-refugees-us> (accessed May 30, 2017).

<sup>105</sup> Peter Y. Hong and Nicholas Riccardi, "Clerk in U.S. Now Warlord in Somalia," *LA Times*, August 8, 1996, [http://articles.latimes.com/1996-08-08/news/mn-34019\\_1\\_somalia-warlord-clerk](http://articles.latimes.com/1996-08-08/news/mn-34019_1_somalia-warlord-clerk) (accessed August 7, 2017).

<sup>106</sup> James C. McKinley Jr, "How a U.S. Marine Became Leader of Somalia," August 12, 1996, *New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/12/world/how-a-us-marine-became-leader-of-somalia.html> (accessed July 4, 2017).

<sup>107</sup> Nina J. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Somalia: Issues, History and Bibliography* (New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 2002), 5.

<sup>108</sup> "Aidid's Wife Lives in Canada on the Dole," *The Deseret News*, October 7, 1993, <http://www.deseretnews.com/article/313874/AIDIDS-WIFE-LIVES-IN-CANADA-ON-THE-DOLE.html> (accessed May 30, 2017).

The current president of Somalia Mohamed Abdullahi ‘Faramjo’ Mohamed also holds US nationality. He was a petty official in Buffalo, New York before he became his country’s president.<sup>109</sup> Over the past few decades, Somalia has earned the reputation of being one of the largest refugee producing nation in the world. However, the days of mass immigration to the US may be over because the first thing that Donald Trump did after becoming the President of the US in 2017 was to impose a ban on the entry of refugees from seven Muslim countries that included Somalia.<sup>110</sup>

## Militancy

Somalia never recovered from the UN intervention during the early 1990s. The power vacuum, led to the phenomenon of Islamic Courts in north Mogadishu in August 1994. This was something akin to the Taliban movement taking place in Afghanistan around the same time to provide an alternate means of justice in the absence of a credible government. After nearly four years of persistent anarchy and political failures, Islamic clerics from the locally powerful Abgaal sub-clan of the Hawiye founded the first fully functioning sharia court to bring about some order in a lawless society. The enforcement of the Courts’ judgments depended on the militias recruited from the local clan. At root, the Islamic Courts were part and parcel of clan power in Mogadishu. They served specific Hawiye clans and earned the support of the Hawiye business class of Mogadishu by providing them security. The Islamic Courts were a huge success in dealing with criminality in north Mogadishu but their popularity had its negative consequences. When it became apparent that the charismatic chairman of the north Mogadishu Courts, Sheikh Ali Dheere, was becoming a rival source of authority to the Abgaal ‘warlord-entrepreneur’ Ali Mahdi, the latter demoted him and issued a ‘decree’ dismantling the whole Courts’ establishment. This was the first of many setbacks suffered by the Islamic Courts. The temporary success of the Courts in north Mogadishu was not initially replicated beyond the ‘green line’ into south Mogadishu. The primary obstacle was the political leader of

<sup>109</sup> Taylor Gee, “How an American Bureaucrat became President of Somalia,” *Politico Magazine*, February 19, 2017, <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/02/how-an-american-bureaucrat-became-president-of-somalia-214798> (accessed May 30, 2017).

<sup>110</sup> Michael D. Shear & Helene Cooper, “Trump Bars Refugees and Citizens of 7 Muslim Countries,” *New York Times*, January 27, 2017, [https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/us/politics/trump-syrian-refugees.html?\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/us/politics/trump-syrian-refugees.html?_r=0) (accessed May 30, 2017).

the Habr Gidr (the other dominant Hawiye clan), General Mohamed Farah Aidid, who was a sworn enemy of Islamism. His death in 1996 gave political space for an experiment with Islamic Courts in south Mogadishu. The first court there was established in May 1998 by the Saleban sub-clan of the Habr Gidr. The following year, two more Habr Gidr sub-clans - the Ayr and Duduble - also established their own courts. Other Hawiye sub-clans followed suit. Though rooted in local clan power, the south Mogadishu Courts were far more influenced by strands of political Islam and transnational Islamist and business finance networks than their predecessors in the north of the city.<sup>111</sup>

The al-Shabaab (the youth), militant organization was born out of the Islamic Court Union (ICU).<sup>112</sup> In February 2012, it merged with the Al Qaeda.<sup>113</sup> The rise of this new combine prompted international intervention; first by Ethiopia, and later by African Union (AU) forces. In 2007, the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was endorsed by the UN. Eight African countries (Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) provided troops and police. The task assigned to them is to support transitional governmental structures, implement a national security plan, train state security forces, and provide assistance in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid.<sup>114</sup> AMISOM troops are actively involved in supporting the government forces in their counter insurgency campaign but their mission is underfunded and they have neither been able to restore the state structure in Somalia nor eliminate Al Shabaab.<sup>115</sup> In October 2017 a truck bombing attack targeting a hotel in a crowded part of Mogadishu killed 300 people.<sup>116</sup> Battle

<sup>111</sup> Cedric Barnes & Harun Hassan, "The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts," *Journal of East African Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (July 2007), 151-160.

<sup>112</sup> Mukoma Wa Ngugi, "How al-Shabaab was born," *The Guardian*, October 4, 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/kenya-westgate-mall-attacks> (accessed February 14, 2018).

<sup>113</sup> Somali militant group al-Shabaab formally joins al-Qaida, *The Guardian*, February 9, 2012, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/09/somali-al-shabaab-join-al-qaida> (accessed February 14, 2018).

<sup>114</sup> Elizabeth Duckinson, "How much Turf does the Somali Government Really Control?" *Foreign Policy*, September 23, 2010, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/09/23/how-much-turf-does-the-somali-government-really-control/> (accessed October 3, 2016).

<sup>115</sup> Jason Burke, "Al-Shabaab fighters kill dozens in attack on military base in Somalia," *The Guardian*, June 8, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/08/al-shabaab-somalia-kill-dozens-attack-military-base> (accessed June 9, 2017).

<sup>116</sup> Hussein Mohamed, Eric Schmitt and Mohamed Ibrahim, "Mogadishu Truck Bombings Are Deadliest Attack in Decades," *New York Times*, October 15, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/15/world/africa/somalia-bombing-mogadishu.html> (accessed October 17, 2017).

fatigue is setting in for the AMISOM troops and after ten years they are planning a phased withdrawal of all its 22,000 troops from Somalia by 2020.<sup>117</sup>

AMISOM military intervention in Somalia has the active support of US forces in terms of training and strategic guidance.<sup>118</sup> The US Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) has 4000 soldiers and functions under the US African Command (AFRICOM).<sup>119</sup> About 200 to 300 soldiers of the US Special Operations Command (SOC) regularly carryout raids against suspected militant hideouts with soldiers from Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda. These involve a combination of ground attacks and drone strikes and are launched from Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. The Navy's classified SEAL Team 6 is also involved in these operations.<sup>120</sup> A US soldier was killed in May 2017 in one such attack – the first US casualty in Somalia since the infamous *Black Hawk Down* incident of October 1993.<sup>121</sup> US now regularly conducts air and drone strikes in Somalia against suspected Al Shabaab targets.<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> “African Union to withdraw troops from Somalia by 2020,” DW, July 7, 2016, <http://www.dw.com/en/african-union-to-withdraw-troops-from-somalia-by-2020/a-19387068> (accessed July 4, 2017).

<sup>118</sup> Craig Whitlock, “U.S. trains African soldiers for Somalia mission,” Washington Post, May 13, 2012, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-trains-african-soldiers-for-somalia-mission/2012/05/13/gIQAJhsPNU\\_story.html?utm\\_term=.df0af18d7b45](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-trains-african-soldiers-for-somalia-mission/2012/05/13/gIQAJhsPNU_story.html?utm_term=.df0af18d7b45) (accessed June 8, 2017).

<sup>119</sup> Adam Moore& James Walker, “Tracing the US Military’s Presence in Africa,” *Geopolitics*, Vol. 21, Issue: 3 (April 2016): 686-716, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14650045.2016.1160060?src=recsys&> (accessed June 15, 2017).

<sup>120</sup> Mark Mazzetti, Jeffrey Gettleman & Eric Schmitt, “In Somalia, U.S. Escalates a Shadow War,” *New York Times*, October 16, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/16/world/africa/obama-somalia-secret-war.html> (accessed January 12, 2017).

<sup>121</sup> “US military member killed by al-Shabab in Somalia raid,” *Aljazeera*, May 5, 2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/military-member-killed-al-shabab-somalia-raid-170505141441868.html> (accessed June 8, 2017).

<sup>122</sup> Barbara Starr & Ryan Browne, “US airstrike in Somalia kills more than 100 al-Shabaab militants,” *CNN*, November 21, 2017, <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/21/politics/somalia-us-airstrike-al-shabaab/index.html> (accessed December 29, 2017); “US drone strike targets al-Shabab after deadly Somalia attack,” Global News, October 20, 2017, <https://globalnews.ca/news/3815314/somalia-truck-bombing-drone-strike/> (accessed December 29, 2017).

## Piracy

Spanning approximately 3,300 kilometers, Somalia has the longest coastline in Africa. The Somali waters are as troubled as its terra firma. For many years now, pirates have been interfering with the movement of ships in the vicinity of the Somali coast. The acts of piracy began after the central government collapsed and did not have the means to stop illegal fishing in its national waters by trawlers from as far away as EU, Russia, and Japan. The trawlers would sweep and destroy the traps and fishing nets placed close to the shore denying the subsistence fishermen their meager catch and also destroying the ecology. To make matters worse advanced countries began depositing their toxic wastes by bribing influential locals. In the 1990s Somali fishermen retaliated by attacking vessels fishing illegally and those dumping harmful effluents near the shoreline. These acts of local self-defense mutated into criminal activity and caught the attention of the world.<sup>123</sup> The international merchant shipping was badly hit. They had to pay heavy ransoms to get crew member released, insurance costs peaked, and the cost of goods being shipped escalated because of delays caused en route. In 2008, UNSC Resolution 1816 condemned all acts of piracy and armed robbery against vessels off the coast of Somalia and authorized decisive measures to combat such crimes. Among other things it allowed states cooperating with the country's transitional Government to enter the territorial waters of Somalia and use "all necessary means" to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, in a manner consistent with relevant provisions of international law. This resolution was valid for six months but was subsequently renewed and a number of other resolutions were passed to reinforce this measure.<sup>124</sup>

Under the terms of UNSC Resolution 1816, a number of international naval task forces patrol the area. Three Combined Task Forces (CTFs) operating under US Naval Central Command (NAVCENT) are CTF 150 (maritime security and counter-terrorism), CTF 151 (counter piracy) and CTF 152 (Arabian Gulf security and cooperation).<sup>125</sup> Pakistan Navy (PN) forms part of both CTF 150 and 151 and has assumed command of these naval TFs a number

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<sup>123</sup> Christopher L. Daniels, *Somali Piracy and Terrorism in the Horn of Africa* (Plymouth, UK: Scarecrow Press, 2012), 33-35.

<sup>124</sup> "Security Council Condemns Acts of Piracy, Armed Robbery off Somalia's Coast, Authorizes for Six Months 'all necessary means' to Repress such Acts," *UNSC Press Release*, June 2, 2008, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2008/sc9344.doc.htm> (accessed April 22, 2017).

<sup>125</sup> Combined Maritime Forces, <http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/Combined-Maritime-Forces/> (accessed June 5, 2017).

of times.<sup>126</sup> An EU naval task force has been operating in the area as part of Operation Atlanta since December 2008. The objectives of this force are to: Protect vessels of the World Food Program (WFP) and other vulnerable shipping; deter and disrupt piracy and armed robbery at sea; monitor fishing activities off the coast of Somalia; support other EU missions and international organizations working to strengthen maritime security and capacity in the region. Non-EU countries like Norway, Montenegro, Serbia, Ukraine and New Zealand also form part of this Force.<sup>127</sup> The navies of China, Russia, India and Japan also regularly patrol the area to protect their vessels from pirates. As a result of aggressive naval patrolling, acts of piracy have substantially declined but after a gap of five years a resurgence of piracy was reported in March 2017.<sup>128</sup>

## A Failed State

Somalia is a typical failed state. As a result of prolonged war, the country's infrastructure has been systematically dismantled and destroyed.<sup>129</sup> Decades of famine, drought and wars has left it broken and devastated. According to UN estimates Somalia belongs to the category of least developed countries.<sup>130</sup> According to the UNDP data, Somalia has a 73 percent poverty rate and ranks among the world's poorest nations. The government's instability contributes greatly to this problem. It is unable to incessant threats to food and water security and its people have one of the lowest living standards in the world.<sup>131</sup>

Livestock sector is the largest contributor to Somali livelihoods. Over 65 per cent of the population is engaged in raising cattle and 80 percent of the exports in normal years are

<sup>126</sup> "Pakistan Navy assumes command of CTF 151," <http://navaltoday.com/2016/10/27/pakistan-navy-assumes-command-of-ctf-151/> (accessed May 30, 2017).

<sup>127</sup> Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, <http://eunavfor.eu/> (accessed May 30, 2017).

<sup>128</sup> Max Bearek, "Somali pirates just hijacked a commercial ship for the first time in five years," *The Washington Post*, March 14, 2017, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/14/somali-pirates-just-hijacked-a-commercial-ship-for-the-first-time-in-five-years/?utm\\_term=.135ee1b4c7ab](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/14/somali-pirates-just-hijacked-a-commercial-ship-for-the-first-time-in-five-years/?utm_term=.135ee1b4c7ab) (accessed June 8, 2017).

<sup>129</sup> Justin Schuster & Elizabeth Miles, "An Interview with Amb. Robert Gosende," *The Politic*, December 30, 2013, <http://thepolitic.org/interview-with-ambassador-robert-gosende/> (accessed October 6, 2017).

<sup>130</sup> List of Least Developed Countries (as of May 2016), UN Committee for Development Policy, [http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc\\_list.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_list.pdf) (accessed March 11, 2016).

<sup>131</sup> Saroja Koneru, "Ten Things You Need to Know About Poverty in Somalia," August 1, 2016, <http://www.borgenmagazine.com/10-facts-poverty-in-somalia/> (accessed January 4, 2018).

livestock and its products.<sup>132</sup> Subsistence farming is dependent on infrequent rainfall.<sup>133</sup> Somalia possesses no industry worth its name and produces only small quantities of gemstones, granite, marble, niobium (columbium), salt, sand, sandstone, and tantalum. It also has deposits of feldspar, iron ore, kaolin, limestone, natural gas, quartz, silica sand, tin, and uranium.<sup>134</sup> Large quantities of uranium in the country were first reported in 1968.<sup>135</sup> An IAEA report published in 1984 gave details of these uranium deposits.<sup>136</sup> A press report indicates that the government of Somalia was in contact with IAEA about the presence of uranium in their country in 2015.<sup>137</sup> The incidence of this nuclear bomb making material could be one reason for international interest in this poor country.<sup>138</sup> There are also reports of offshore oil and gas deposits in Somalia.<sup>139</sup>

Main problem in Somalia is weak government structures. State building is major challenge. In 2012, a new federal government was installed, but the authorities still face a major threat from Al Shabaab insurgents. The current UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSO) was established on 3 June 2013 by UNSCR 2102, in support of the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia.<sup>140</sup> Like Pakistan, where resumption of international cricket is considered a major indicator towards return to

<sup>132</sup> Somalia – Livestock: The Mainstay, FAO, <http://www.fao.org/somalia/programmes-and-projects/livestock/en/> (accessed March 12, 2017).

<sup>133</sup> Somalia – Agriculture, FAO, <http://www.fao.org/somalia/programmes-and-projects/agriculture/en/> (accessed March 12, 2017).

<sup>134</sup> 2012 Minerals Yearbook U.S. Department of the Interior U.S. Geological Survey SOMALIA, <https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2012/myb3-2012-so.pdf> (accessed March 12, 2017)

<sup>135</sup> “Big Uranium Find Announced in Somalia,” *Spokesman-Review*, March 16, 1968, p.21, <https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1314&dat=19680316&id=hbVWAAAIBAJ&sjid=gOkDAAAIBAJ&pg=7276,235261&hl=en> (accessed March 10, 2016).

<sup>136</sup> Surficial Uranium Deposits, Report of the Working Group on Uranium Geology Organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency, A technical document issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1984, [http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te\\_322\\_web.pdf](http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_322_web.pdf) (accessed June 8, 2017).

<sup>137</sup> “Somali Government in Contact with IAEA over Uranium Deposits,” June 10, 2015, <http://goobjoog.com/english/somali-government-in-contact-with-iaeа-over-uranium-deposits/> (accessed June 8, 2017).

<sup>138</sup> For technical details of uranium deposits in Somalia read “Uranium 2016: Resources, Production and Demand,” A Joint Report by the Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency, <https://www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/pubs/2016/7301-uranium-2016.pdf> (accessed March 11, 2017).

<sup>139</sup> “Prospect of Offshore Oil a Mixed Blessing for Somalia,” VOA, November 8, 2016, <http://www.voanews.com/a/reu-prospect-of-offshore-oil-a-mixed-blessing-for-somalia/3586073.html> (accessed March 11, 2017).

<sup>140</sup> Somalia, *UNDP Report*, <http://www.so.undp.org/content/somalia/en/home/countryinfo.html> (accessed January 4, 2018).

normalcy, Somali Football Federation (SFF) has announced plans to bring back international football to their country after an absence of 30 years.<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> Jose Pablo Diaz, “International football to return to Somalia after 30-year absence,” December 26, 2017, [https://en.as.com/en/2017/12/26/football/1514322136\\_316587.html](https://en.as.com/en/2017/12/26/football/1514322136_316587.html) (accessed January 4, 2018).

### Chapter III

#### International Intervention in Somalia

By the end of 1990 Somalia had slid into complete chaos and anarchy. International humanitarian aid wasn't reaching the starving millions because it was being looted by armed gangs. The law and order situation had become so bad that foreign embassies, aid agencies and expatriates had started leaving Mogadishu.

#### **Pakistanis in Somalia**

Foreigners working in Somalia included among others Pakistanis, Indians, Italians and Yemenis. Though small in numbers, the expatriates of Pakistani descent had a significant presence in Somalia. They were even given one seat in the state legislature in 1956.<sup>142</sup> About 200 families mostly belonging to the khoja community had businesses in and around Mogadishu and other southern urban areas. They were traditionally shopkeepers and goldsmiths. About 30 of them were working with UN and the EU or on government and non-government programs/projects. NESPAK, the Pakistani engineering firm had a consultant contract for Bardera dam construction in the South and was conducting feasibility studies. Bilateral relations had grown in the 1970s and the 1980s. There was collaboration in the fields of agriculture, education, industry and business and Pakistan was regular exporting rice and cotton yarn products to Somalia.<sup>143</sup>

To express solidarity with the Somali nation, Pakistan had sent a delegation to attend their Independence Day celebrations in 1960.<sup>144</sup> Diplomatic relations were established on 18 December 1960 and in 1969 Pakistan and Somalia became the founding members of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Pakistan opened an embassy in Mogadishu in July 1973.<sup>145</sup> The Somali embassy in Islamabad was set up in 1976 and an honorary consul is functioning in Karachi. Somalia still has as a diplomatic presence in Pakistan. The Pakistani embassy located in Kilo 5 area on Via Afgoye was shut down, when fighting broke out in the city in December 1990. The embassy hasn't re-opened ever since.

<sup>142</sup> Paolo Tripodi, *The Colonial Legacy in Somalia: Rome and Mogadishu: From Colonial Administration to Operation Restore Hope* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 80.

<sup>143</sup> Interview Nisar Malik, April 2017.

<sup>144</sup> Cabinet Division File No. 305/CF/60 of 1960, page no. 48.

<sup>145</sup> Cabinet Division, File No. 23/CF/64 of 1973, page no. 24.

Embassy staff and a number of Pakistani citizens were evacuated by air and sea. This evacuation was managed by the young Pakistani Chargé d'affaires Tahir Iqbal Butt in close cooperation and coordination of the Italian Embassy in Mogadishu. The first batch of the Pakistanis in Mogadishu was evacuated on the 5<sup>th</sup> of January 1991 on a C130 belonging to the ICRC. The aircraft flew from Mogadishu to Mombasa. Among the evacuees was the family of the CDA – his wife and two children, four expatriates working with World Bank, EU and from NESPAK projects. The remaining ten were elderly and sick Pakistanis from the local community.

Nisar Ahmed Malik, who was among those evacuated by air on 5 January recalls seeing many dead bodies lining the roadside as youngsters looted embassies, USAID offices and abandoned residences of the expatriates on his way to the airport. Shelling continued as the group reached the airport in a convoy starting from CDA residence located at Lido and passing through the main road leading to airport. Later a large numbers of Pakistanis including embassy staff, their families and local settlers were evacuated by ship.<sup>146</sup>

### **US Diplomatic Presence in Somalia**

During the Cold War, the US presence in Somalia grew exponentially. Initially a consulate general was opened in Mogadishu in 1957 as an offshoot of the US Embassy in Italy. On the eve of independence on July 1, 1960, the US recognized Somalia as a sovereign state, and established diplomatic relations. The consulate was upgraded to an embassy and a full time ambassador appointed. After the Somali government broke off diplomatic relations with the UK in 1963, the US embassy in Mogadishu served the British interests in Somalia. There were minor demonstrations in front of the US Embassy during the Six Day Arab Israel War in 1967 against the US support to Israel. During the Cold War, the main purpose of the US mission in Mogadishu was to counter the Soviet influence. In 1989, as the Soviet empire collapsed, the US embassy was moved from a dilapidated building in central Mogadishu to its new premises located on Afgoye Road next to Kilometer 7 roundabout. Space wise, it became the largest American mission in the world and was spread over 80 acres. It had 150 staff members and it had grown over the years as their interests in the region increased.

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<sup>146</sup> Information based on the emails exchanged with Nisar Ahmed Malik, resident of Mogadishu from 1981 to 1991, April 2017.

Once the law and order situation in the Somali capital took a turn for the worst in 1991, a number of diplomats and civilians from other embassies began taking refuge within its compound. As the situation began to deteriorate, Ambassador James K. Bishop ordered the departure of non-essential staff by December 5, 1990. On January 1, 1991, Bishop sent an urgent cable to the State Department asking for an immediate evacuation. Two ships USS Guam and Trent were waiting in the Indian Ocean to carry out a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO). At 0345 hours, a 60-man evacuation force lifted off from Guam and flew to the embassy compound and loaded the initial group of evacuees into its CH53 helicopters. The evacuation force secured the compound until the evacuation was complete that evening.<sup>147</sup> 250 people belonging to the US embassy and other foreign nationals were ferried across on the Super Stallion helicopters to the waiting ships in the Ocean as part of Operation Eastern Exit.<sup>148</sup>

One of the first things that the US troops did upon landing in Somalia in December 1992 was to re-occupy the Embassy compound. The embassy was again abandoned after the American forces withdrew from Somalia in March 1994. On September 19, 1995, the US closed its liaison office in Mogadishu. In May 2015, US Secretary of State John Kerry visited Somalia and stated that the US had plans to reopen its embassy. The Somali government presented him with the real estate deed for land reserved for the new US embassy compound in Mogadishu. Katherine Dhanani was nominated to the post of US ambassador to Somalia since 1991, but she withdrew three months later. Somalia is still without an American ambassador. Currently the US special representative for Somalia sits in its embassy in Nairobi, Kenya.<sup>149</sup>

### **Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia**

As the situation deteriorated in Somalia, a number of international relief agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF) became active in Somalia. Also active were Muslim relief agencies. In mid-December 1991, the first relief supplies reached war-torn Mogadishu, but the international relief agencies found

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<sup>147</sup> Glen M. Harned, *Stability Operations in Somalia 1992-1993: A Case Study* (United States Army War Course Press, 2016), 9.

<sup>148</sup> R.R. Keene, “Operation Eastern Exit: Night Mission to Mogadishu,” <https://www.mca-marines.org/leatherneck/operation-eastern-exit-night-mission-mogadishu> (accessed January 12, 2017).

<sup>149</sup> Information about the US Mission to Somalia is available at <https://so.usmission.gov/mission/somalia/>.

it difficult to get the food convoys past the marauding armed militias. To protect the food supplies, the UN decided to send a unit of 500 Pakistani soldiers to Mogadishu in September 1992. Later the international military footprint in Somalia expanded to include peacekeepers from two dozen countries.

To begin with the outgoing UN Secretary General (UNSG), the Peruvian diplomat Javier Pérez de Cuéllar engaged with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS) and the OIC and sought their help to resolve the crisis. Somalia is a member of all three organizations. He also sent a fact-finding mission to Somalia headed by James O.C. Jonah, the Sierra Leonean diplomat working as the Undersecretary General for Political Affairs. The UN team arrived in Mogadishu in early January 1992 with the aim of bringing about a cessation of hostilities and securing access for international relief to civilians. Except for General Aidid, the UN officials found general support for a ceasefire in Mogadishu and a role for UN in bringing about national reconciliation among all faction leaders. Based on the findings of the Jonah report, it was decided that in order to send humanitarian aid, the first step was an immediate ceasefire. Accordingly, on 23 January 1992, UNSCR 733 urged all parties to accept a ceasefire and asked all states to contribute towards humanitarian assistance.<sup>150</sup>

Egyptian diplomat Boutros Boutros-Ghali became the new UNSG on 1 January 1992. During his term in office, he wrote *An Agenda for Peace* and proposed that the UN should take a leading role in responding to civil wars.<sup>151</sup> His notion of hyperactive international peacekeeping had the backing of the US. Unfortunately, for Ghali he soon developed serious differences with the American administration and could not win a second term as UNSG.<sup>152</sup> As the first African Secretary General, Ghali wanted more attention to be paid to UN peacekeeping in Somalia instead of Europe. He was closely following the developments in Somalia based on the steady stream of accurate information coming in from the Egyptian embassy that had remained open in the war-torn country. On 24 July 1992, he chastised the

<sup>150</sup> UNSCR 733(1992), <https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/733.pdf> (June 8, 2016).

<sup>151</sup> Kofi Annan with Nader Mousavizadeh, *Intervention: A Life in War and Peace* (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), 35.

<sup>152</sup> John Goshko, "Boutros Boutros-Ghali, U.N. secretary general who clashed with U.S., dies," *The Washington Post*, February 16, 2016, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/boutros-boutros-ghali-un-secretary-general-who-clashed-with-us-dies-at-93/2016/02/16/8b727bb8-d4c1-11e5-be55-2cc3c1e4b76b\\_story.html?utm\\_term=.76f4bb1c25e0](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/boutros-boutros-ghali-un-secretary-general-who-clashed-with-us-dies-at-93/2016/02/16/8b727bb8-d4c1-11e5-be55-2cc3c1e4b76b_story.html?utm_term=.76f4bb1c25e0) (accessed March 23, 2017).

organization he was now heading for a European tilt and accused the Western leadership of racism.<sup>153</sup>

In order to prepare grounds for UN intervention in Somalia, an embargo was placed on all arms exports to Somalia vide UNSCR 733 of 23 January 1992.<sup>154</sup> On 31 January, Secretary General Ghali invited LAS, OAU and OIC, as well as the representatives of the warring factions of Interim President Ali Mahdi and General Aidid for consultations at the UN Headquarters in New York. During the talks held from 12 to 14 February, the parties to the conflict agreed to an immediate cessation of hostilities and imposition of a ceasefire. A joint delegation of the UN and the three regional organizations arrived in Mogadishu on 29 February 1992 to conclude a ceasefire agreement. On 3 March 1992, after four days of intensive negotiations, Ali Mahdi and Aidid signed the Agreement on the Implementation of a Ceasefire. Mahdi wanted a significantly large peacekeeping force to keep the ceasefire intact, while Aidid had just agreed to a UN security component for humanitarian aid. The Agreement had accepted the security component for convoys of humanitarian assistance and agreed to the deployment of 20 military observers on each side of Mogadishu to monitor the ceasefire. At the same time, the joint delegation undertook consultations regarding a national reconciliation conference to which all Somali groups would be invited.<sup>155</sup>

On 17 March 1992, UNSCR 746 proposed dispatching a technical team to Somalia to plan a ceasefire monitoring mechanism and to prepare a food distribution plan. The team visited Somalia from 23 March to 1 April and was able to obtain the signatures of Ali Mahdi and Aidid on the “Agreement on the Implementation of a Ceasefire.” This included the acceptance of a UN “security component for convoys of humanitarian assistance, and the deployment of 20 military observers on each side of Mogadishu to monitor the ceasefire.” The

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<sup>153</sup> Valerie J. Lofland, “Somalia: U.S. Intervention and Operation Restore Hope,” 55-56, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/pmi/somalia1.pdf> (accessed August 14, 2017).

<sup>154</sup> UNSCR 733, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/733> (accessed January 12, 2017).

<sup>155</sup> Christiane E. Philipp, “Somalia – A Very Special Case,” 527 in A. von Bogdandy and R. Wolfrum, (eds.), *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, Volume 9, 2005, Koninklijke Brill N.V. The Netherlands.

joint delegation also “undertook consultations regarding a national reconciliation conference to which all Somali groups would be invited.”<sup>156</sup>

The Agreement was followed by UNSCR 751 of 24 April 1992 that called upon the establishment of UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM).<sup>157</sup> This was a consent-based mission, mandated to monitor a ceasefire in the capital Mogadishu, provide protection for UN personnel and escorts to humanitarian convoys. UNSCR 775 of 28 August 1992 authorized an additional deployment of up to 3,500 security guards to protect food convoys and distribution of humanitarian aid. On 8 September, the UNSC approved the deployment of three logistic units to support the enhanced UNOSOM operation. Consequently, the overall strength of UNOSOM would peak to 4,219 all ranks, including the military unit of 500 personnel deployed in Mogadishu and 719 men of the logistic units.<sup>158</sup>

On 28 April 1992, Mohammed Sahnoun of Algeria was appointed the Special Representative of the SG (SRSG) in Somalia.<sup>159</sup> In March Sahnoun visited Mogadishu on a fact-finding mission before he assumed duties as the SRSG on 1<sup>st</sup> of May. Sahnoun found that he had limited resources for the huge task to help “supply food, provide administrative expertise and coordination for relief operations.”<sup>160</sup> The UN in Somalia had to maintain a delicate balance between the provision of humanitarian aid and the maintenance of ceasefire between warring groups.<sup>161</sup> In Sahnoun’s opinion his liberty of action was restricted and that the UN was fixated with food aid instead of preventive diplomacy.<sup>162</sup> He felt that even the humanitarian effort was hamstrung because of a lack of coordination between the UN management and the agencies on ground.<sup>163</sup> Sahnoun was also understaffed. It took several

<sup>156</sup> UNSCR 746 of 17 March 1992, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/746\(1992\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/746(1992)) (accessed January 12, 2017).

<sup>157</sup> UNSCR 751, 24 April 1992, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/751> (accessed October 3, 2016).

<sup>158</sup> Somalia – UNOSOM I, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1backgr2.html> (accessed June 7, 2017).

<sup>159</sup> Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Somalia, 1, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia %20S%2024343.pdf> (accessed October 3, 2016).

<sup>160</sup> Mohamed M. Sahnoun, *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities* (Washington D.C.: USIP, 1994), 16.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid, 17.

<sup>162</sup> John Terrence O’Neill & Nicholas Rees, *United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post Cold War Era* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 103.

<sup>163</sup> Sahnoun, *Missed Opportunities*, 37.

weeks before the HQ in New York sent him two assistants: Livio Bota from the UN office in Geneva and Leonard Kapungu from the Political Department.<sup>164</sup>

In hindsight Sahnoun is convinced that the UN mishandled the situation and Somalia was really a case of missed opportunities.<sup>165</sup> He had grave doubts about the impartiality of the world body because planes with UN markings were being used for providing illicit supplies to Ali Mahdi faction. A Russian plane chartered by the World Food Program and flying with UN markings had crashed on an illegal mission delivering currency and military equipment to troops loyal to Ali Mahdi in the north of Mogadishu. The UN had failed to take the advice of its Office of Legal Affairs to investigate the crash and clear its name. Another Russian plane with prohibited cargo crashed in late October and it was unclear how many other aircraft were operating in contravention to the arms embargo imposed under UNSCR 733 of 23 January 1992.<sup>166</sup> The trust in the UN was fast eroding and Ali Mahdi was the only one endorsing it for doing a ‘good job.’<sup>167</sup>

Increasingly frustrated, Sahnoun publically criticized the behavior of the UN agencies and the UN headquarters in New York and clashed with James Jonah, heading the UN delegation to Somalia. In the process he lost the support of the UNSG. In October 1992, he convened a reconciliation conference in Seychelles inviting Somali intellectuals belonging to all clans and representing the four zones. During the meeting, Boutros-Ghali sent a message to Sahnoun challenging the reasons for his presence there and ordering him to refrain from criticizing the UN agencies. Sahnoun resigned his post on 26 October 1992.<sup>168</sup> He was replaced by the Iraqi diplomat Ismat Kittani.<sup>169</sup> Kittani didn’t last long either because he couldn’t make

<sup>164</sup> Ibid, vii.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid, 6-11.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid, 39.

<sup>167</sup> “Fighting for Hope in Somalia,” *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Peacekeeping and Multinational Operations No 6, 1995, <https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/102> (accessed July 4, 2017).

<sup>168</sup> Sahnoun, *Missed Opportunities*, 40.

<sup>169</sup> Haralambos Lemonopoulos, “The United Nations & the Somalia Operation, 1991-1994,” <http://www.anistor.gr/english/enback/e982.htm> (accessed December 9, 2016).

any headway with the warring factions.<sup>170</sup> The UN intervention in Somalia was off to a bumpy start.

## American Interests in Somalia

After the Cold War, the US interest in Somalia declined considerably. During Operation Desert Shield (2 August 1990 – 17 January 1991), Somalia had merely served as a staging base for US troops buildup in Saudi Arabia for Operation Desert Storm.<sup>171</sup> The deteriorating humanitarian situation in Somalia provided the US Government (USG), another chance to play a leading role in an area that had always been geo-strategically important.<sup>172</sup> It dominated and continues to dominate all shipping activity in the Indian Ocean, Red Sea and the Persian Gulf and militarily it provided a launching pad for troop deployment in the Middle East and East Africa.

*Prima facie* Somalia was a low-risk operation. The Pentagon was convinced that a peacekeeping mission in Somalia to support the humanitarian effort could only strengthen the image of US as a benign superpower and showcase its military as the proverbial cavalry coming to the rescue of a dead and dying country. Gen. Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Staff's committee was convinced that a military intervention in Somalia was the right thing to do at that time in the American history.<sup>173</sup> Powell was in effect the author and executor of the military operations in Somalia.<sup>174</sup>

Nobody in the world was opposed to an international intervention in Somalia at that time. US was the sole superpower, and the UN was gladly doing its bidding. In Somalia, itself, the interim government had no qualms about UN observers monitoring the ceasefire and

<sup>170</sup> “Iraqi who served with 5 UN secretaries-general,” *The Irish Times*, November 24, 2004, <http://www.irishtimes.com/news/iraqi-who-served-with-5-un-secretaries-general-1.338936> (accessed January 27, 2017).

<sup>171</sup> Interview with James Bishop, the US Ambassador in Somalia by Charles Stuart Kennedy, SOMALIA COUNTRY READER, 154, <http://adst.org/Readers/Somalia.pdf> (accessed September 15, 2017).

<sup>172</sup> John G. Sommer, *Hope Restored? Humanitarian Aid in Somalia 1990-94* (Refugee Policy Group, 1994), 11.

<sup>173</sup> Colin Powell, “U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,” *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1992/1993), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1992-12-01/us-forces-challenges-ahead> (accessed February 14, 2018)

<sup>174</sup> Stephen F. Rosenfeld, “Colin Powell’s Somalia Operation,” *Washington Post*, December 11, 1992, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1992/12/11/colin-powells-somalia-operation/7711ed66-5d59-4f5a-ba4a-cc70e159f921/?utm\\_term=.80342afee6f6](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1992/12/11/colin-powells-somalia-operation/7711ed66-5d59-4f5a-ba4a-cc70e159f921/?utm_term=.80342afee6f6) (accessed February 14, 2018).

military guards protecting the aid convoys. The cost of the intervention was worth the money to project US power. Initially the US had expected that there would be voluntary contributions coming in from Saudi Arabia and other neighbors, but this didn't happen.

In late July 1992, President George H. W. Bush decided to intervene in Somalia, the costs notwithstanding. In the long term this strategic decision created more chaos than stability. There could have been some personal reasons for Bush to make this international move. It was in an election year and a bold humanitarian initiative to rescue and revive a dying and hungry African nation would enhance his stature as the leader of the so-called Free World and bolster his chances to win a second term.

There is a conspiracy theory that suggests that the Americans went to Somalia to apportion its large mineral wealth comprising oil and uranium. The Bush family had business interests in the oil industry. In 1954, Bush had become president of a subsidiary company by the name of Zapata, which developed offshore drilling equipment used in oil exploration.<sup>175</sup> Twenty-five years there is little evidence to suggest that oil was the primary interest for the US intervention in Somalia.

The US policy in Somalia had two strands – the humanitarian effort to enhance their political influence in the region. At the tactical level this policy included deliveries of food and medicine, reconciliation among clans and warlords, and funding the deployment of UN food guards. The military intervention would naturally increase the American power in the Horn of Africa.

This large-scale military deployment eventually overshadowed the humanitarian effort. An open confrontation with Aidid's faction resulted in the death of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers in June 1994. This paradigm shift in the nature of the mission ultimately led to its failure. The American forces landed in full force in December 1994 but after failing to enforce law and order in the lawless country and after suffering heavy human losses in October 1994, they beat

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<sup>175</sup> Stephen Knott, "George H. W. Bush: Life before the Presidency," <https://millercenter.org/president/bush/life-before-the-presidency> (accessed April 18, 2018).

a hasty retreat. This, however, did not reduce their national appetite for military adventures in overseas expeditions in the twenty first century.

The US military planners were aware of the lurking possibility of escalation of violence, once military boots were put on ground and, therefore, advised ‘extreme caution.’ They had been warned by Smith Hempstone, US Ambassador to Kenya, who had opposed military intervention in Somalia. He was extremely wary and wanted the US administration to think over the consequences of such an intervention “at least three times.” He advised the State Department not to “embrace the Somali tar baby” and risk casualties at the hands of “natural-born guerrillas.”<sup>176</sup> Hempstone’s dark prophecy would come true and *Black Hawk Down* would become a permanent scar on the American psyche.

On August 14, 1992, a White House spokesman announced that US military transport would be used to support the multinational peace effort in Somalia and to airlift five hundred Pakistani peacekeepers to Somalia. These handful of men were to guard the food supplies that were to be distributed within Somalia. The spokesman also stated that the US Administration would seek a UN Security Council resolution to authorize the sending of the armed guards, as well as any additional ones that might be needed. Officials at the Pentagon weren’t sure, when the air operation was likely to begin, how long it was to last, and how many planes would be involved. Much of the airlift, they were sure would involve transporting the supplies from Kenya to Somalia.<sup>177</sup> US military planners were concerned that by agreeing to fly the Pakistanis soldiers the Bush administration had signed a *carte blanche* and surmised that the peacekeeping bill would become a “bottomless pit.” US politicians like Senator Sam Nunn (Dem. Georgia) suggested that issues like nuclear proliferation, democratization and liberalization in East Europe were more central to US security than humanitarian crises in Somalia and Bosnia but the die had been cast.<sup>178</sup>

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<sup>176</sup> Envoy to Kenya had opposed Somali Mission, [http://articles.latimes.com/1992-12-06/news/mn-3586\\_1\\_somali-mission](http://articles.latimes.com/1992-12-06/news/mn-3586_1_somali-mission) (accessed May 31, 2017).

<sup>177</sup> Michael R. Gordon, “With U.N.’s help, U.S. will Airlift Food to Somalia,” *New York Times*, August 15, 1992, <https://www.nytimes.com/1992/08/15/world/with-un-s-help-us-will-airlift-food-to-somalia.html> (accessed April 18, 2018).

<sup>178</sup> Chioki Aoi, *Legitimacy and the Use of Armed Force: Stability Missions in the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 67.

## The US led Humanitarian Mission Begins

On 18 August 1992, the first tranche of 145,000 tons of emergency food supplies was flown in from Kenya into Somalia as part of Operation Provide Relief. The distribution of food supplies was to be done by INGOs such as the ICRC and the World Food Program (WFP).<sup>179</sup> Four C141s and eight C130s were made available for the relief operations. Two C130s arrived at Wajir on 21 August and four made the first flight into Belet Uen seven days later.<sup>180</sup> On 5 September, C130s from Kenya began delivering supplies to Baidoa. Nine days later, USAF C5A and C 141 aircraft transported the first Pakistani soldiers to Mogadishu. An Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) carrying about two thousand Marines provided cover to the disembarking peacekeepers, twenty-five nautical miles off Mogadishu.<sup>181</sup>

On 4 December 1992, President Bush in his address to the nation announced that he was expanding the scope of US humanitarian and military intervention in Somalia by launching Operation Restore Hope. He informed that the UN had authorized 35,000 food guards out of which 500 Pakistani soldiers had already been deployed. The military component in Somalia was being augmented with I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).<sup>182</sup>

For the enlarged presence in Somalia, a new military force the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was assembled under the command of US CENTCOM. Its mandate was to provide protection to the humanitarian effort.<sup>183</sup> I MEF was the main component of this force. The military force was to work together with the aid distribution agencies but there were problems and the latter continued to complain of lack of coordination.<sup>184</sup> On the political front, the UN

<sup>179</sup> Col. Dennis Mrockowski, US Marine Corp Res, "Full Text of Restoring Hope: In Somalia with the Unified Task Force 1992-93," [https://archive.org/stream/restoringhopeins00denn/restoringhopeins00denn\\_djvu.txt](https://archive.org/stream/restoringhopeins00denn/restoringhopeins00denn_djvu.txt) (accessed August 14, 2017).

<sup>180</sup> Walter S. Poole, *The Effort to Save Somalia: August 1992-March 1994* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005), 9, <http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Monographs/Somalia.pdf> (accessed November 25, 2016).

<sup>181</sup> Poole, *Save Somalia*, 10.

<sup>182</sup> George Bush, Address to the nation on Somalia, December 4, 1992, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=21758> (accessed June 5, 2018).

<sup>183</sup> John L. Hirsch & Robert Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Washington DC: USIP, 1995), 40.

<sup>184</sup> Major Geoffrey T. Gorsuch, United States Army, *Breaking Barriers: A Case Study of UNITAF and NGO Cooperation during Operation Restore Hope, 1992-1993*, Master of Military Studies Research Paper, September 2011 - April 2012, <file:///C:/Users/tyamin.cips/Downloads/ADA601162.pdf> (accessed August 15, 2017).

began a peace process among the warring parties in Addis Ababa. The first meeting was held on January 1993. After an acrimonious debate, 14 Somali political movements including the factions of bitter rivals Ali Mahdi and Farah Aidid agreed to a ceasefire. The UNSG Boutros Ghali inaugurated the talks and the Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi intervened on a number of occasions to iron out differences of opinion. A US team monitored the proceedings of the talks from the background.<sup>185</sup> In the second meeting of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia held in Addis Ababa on 27 March 1993, resulted in an Agreement. The four main clauses of the Agreement were Disarmament and Security; Rehabilitation and Reconstruction; Restoration of Property and Settlement of Disputes; and Transitional Mechanisms. Under sub clause I-5, the parties to the conflict reaffirmed their “commitment to comply with the requirements of the Ceasefire Agreement signed in January of 1993, including the total and complete handover of weapons to UNITAF/UNOSOM.”<sup>186</sup> This clause became the basis for carrying out weapon inspection on 5 June 1993.

On 5 March 1993, in deference to the US wishes, the UNSG appointed Jonathan T. Howe, retired admiral of the US Navy as his new Special Representative (SRSG) for Somalia for an initial period of three months, effective 9 March 1993. The new SRSG was asked to oversee the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, in addition to the tasks of “promoting political reconciliation, coordinating humanitarian assistance and paving the way for rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country.”<sup>187</sup> The UN Secretary General had earlier earmarked his friend Ambassador Lansane Kouyate, the Guinean permanent representative at the UN as his SRSG. US, however, demanded that as the principal paymaster they should have their choice as the head of the mission in Somalia. Kouyate was made his deputy. The Guinean diplomat could not pull along with Howe and was replaced by April Glaspie.<sup>188</sup> He did eventually become the SRSG in June after Howe resigned. Kouyate played an important role in

<sup>185</sup> Jennifer Parmalee, “Somalis reach accord on Peace Process,” *Washington Post*, January 9, 1993, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/01/09/somalis-reach-accord-on-peace-process/c380bbb3-5aea-440d-9f8d-70a7fd330e90/?utm\\_term=.149d9015c1cf](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/01/09/somalis-reach-accord-on-peace-process/c380bbb3-5aea-440d-9f8d-70a7fd330e90/?utm_term=.149d9015c1cf) (accessed January 12, 2017).

<sup>186</sup> Addis Ababa Agreement concluded at the first session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia, 27 March 1993, UCDP, <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/downloads/fullpeace/Som%2019930327.pdf> (accessed April 25, 2017).

<sup>187</sup> UNSCR 814 (1993), <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Chap%20VII%20SRES%20814.pdf> (accessed January 12, 2017).

<sup>188</sup> Richard Connaughton, *Nature of Future Conflicts* (London: Lee Cooper, 1995), 184-186.

brokering a peace accord between the warring Somali parties in Nairobi in March 1995. The accord like many other agreements before did not last beyond handshakes for the cameras.<sup>189</sup>

Howe came in for severe criticism for mishandling the situation on ground and for focusing his attention on Aidid and allowing a guerrilla war to start between the UN troops and the SNA. He was also blamed for singling out Aidid's arms dumps and radio station for inspection by UN forces. SNA had warned that the inspection would be taken as an act of war. The inspectors were ambushed, 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed and over 50 injured. Howe placed a 25,000 dollar bounty for capturing Aidid. The US military officers in Somalia were opposed to the use of AC130 spectre gunships because they caused disproportionate civilian causalities and made the Black Hawk helicopters moving close to the ground vulnerable to shoulder fired rocket propelled grenades. This could have been one reason that led to the *Black Hawk Down* incident. Howe's single-minded campaign against Aidid diverted the attention of the UNOSOM from their main mission.<sup>190</sup> At the end, his misplaced policies became the main cause for US/UN failure in Somalia. Howe resigned from his position in February 1994. American forces withdrew from Somalia on March 3, 1994.

### **UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM) 1992 - 1995**

UNOSOM had a lifespan of roughly four years. It began with the arrival of the military observers in August 1992 and ended with the withdrawal of all multinational forces in March 1995. Its mandate was to monitor ceasefire and provide protection and security to UN personnel, equipment and supplies at seaports / airports in Mogadishu.<sup>191</sup> It was expanded to include the protection of humanitarian convoys and aid distribution centers throughout Somalia. UNOSOM was to operate under chapter VI of the UN charter i.e. using peaceful means of conflict resolution.<sup>192</sup>

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<sup>189</sup> Dogar, *Operation Somalia*, 10-22.

<sup>190</sup> Patrick Cockburn, “Briefcase admiral” blamed in Somalia crisis: American UN envoy lambasted for ‘personal vendetta’ against Aideed and for deploying gunships over Mogadishu,” *Independent*, October 8, 1993, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/briefcase-admiral-blamed-in-somalia-crisis-american-un-envoy-lambasted-for-personal-vendetta-against-1509327.html> (accessed January 27, 2017).

<sup>191</sup> UNSCR 751 of 24 April 1992, available at <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/751>.

<sup>192</sup> UNSCR 775 of 28 August 1992, available at <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/410/10/IMG/N9241010.pdf?OpenElement>.

The task of the UN forces included monitoring the ceasefire in Mogadishu; and protection and security of UN personnel, equipment and supplies disembarking at the sea and airport in Mogadishu. The UN guards were to escort food deliveries to food distribution sites (FDS) in the city and its immediate environs. The peacekeepers were also employed for distribution of food. The situation at these FDS was a heart-rending sight. Starving people would gather before daybreak and would wait impatiently for the distribution of rations. Most of them were hungry old people, women and children with bloated bellies.<sup>193</sup>

Four operational zones were approved in Berbera, Bossasso, Mogadishu and Kismayo for the UN forces in Somalia vide UNSCR 767 (27 July 1992).<sup>194</sup> On 12 August 1992 the deployment of five hundred Pakistani soldiers as food guards in Somalia was approved.<sup>195</sup> The mandate and strength of UNOSOM were expanded through UNSCR 775 (28 August 1992), to enable the protection of humanitarian convoys and distribution centers throughout Somalia.<sup>196</sup>

Since the US administration wanted an early involvement in the humanitarian efforts in Somalia, they employed USAF aircraft not only to ferry food supplies but also to transport the Pakistani peacekeepers to Somalia.<sup>197</sup> The USAF aircraft were first employed in UN operations in Korea (1950-53). During this time, they had also airdropped Indian army medics into the war zone.<sup>198</sup> In 1960 USAF planes were used to airlift Indian soldiers for peacekeeping duties in Congo.<sup>199</sup> In 1992, the scope of air operations included movement of troops and supply of food aid. There were 40 airfields in Somalia with usable runways of more than 1,969 feet. C130 military aircraft could land at 10 of them. Three other airfields could be used with

<sup>193</sup> Lt Col Mateen, *Yaad Ayaam*.

<sup>194</sup> UNSCR 767, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/767> (accessed January 7, 2018).

<sup>195</sup> Walter S. Poole, *The Effort to Save Somalia August 1992-March 1994* (Washington D.C: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005), 8.

<sup>196</sup> Somalia - UNOSOM I, <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm> (accessed January 12, 2016)

<sup>197</sup> George H.W. Bush, "Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia," December 4, 1992, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21758> (accessed October 3, 2016).

<sup>198</sup> S. Muttiah, "Medical aid from the skies," *The Hindu*, March 23, 2012, <http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-features/tp-metroplus/medical-aid-from-the-skies/article3202106.ece> (accessed March 23, 2017).

<sup>199</sup> Bruce Riedel, *JFK's Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and the Sino-Indian War* (India: HarperCollins Publishers), 67.

restrictions. Six of the ten C130-capable airfields could also accommodate C141s. C5 aircraft could land only at Berbera and Mogadishu.<sup>200</sup>

## **Obtaining Regional Environment**

At the time of the international intervention in Somalia, Pakistan was beset by internal and external problems. The *Jihad* in Afghanistan was over, and the Soviet Union had been defeated. The US did not need Pakistan any more as a strategic ally. In September 1990, President George H.W. Bush had refused to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear bomb. The annual certification was necessary under the Pressler Amendment of 1985 for uninterrupted aid.<sup>201</sup> As a result all economic and military aid negotiated in 1987 under a four-year package worth 4.02 billion dollars was cut off.<sup>202</sup> Pakistan lost delivery of F16 aircraft for which it had already paid US dollar 300 million as the first installment.<sup>203</sup> Pakistan Navy's five years lease of the eight Brooke and Garcia class frigates wasn't renewed. The ships were returned only to be scrapped.<sup>204</sup>

Pressure was ramped up and US diplomats brazenly arm-twisted Pakistani officials to stop their nuclear program and their alleged support to terrorists. Abida Hussain, Pakistan's ambassador designate to the US on a pre-departure call on President Ghulam Ishaq Khan witnessed one such blatant show of coercive diplomacy. She saw US Undersecretary for Political Affairs, Reginald Bartholomew demanding from President Khan to roll back his country's nuclear program if he wanted the resumption of aid. When the President demurred, Bartholomew left in a huff banging the door behind him.<sup>205</sup> In Washington DC, she

<sup>200</sup> Part II Operation Restore Hope, [http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Restoring%20Hope%20In%20Somalia%20with%20the%20Unified%20Task%20Force%201992-1993%20PCN%2019000413500\\_2.pdf?ver=2012-10-11-164110-123](http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Restoring%20Hope%20In%20Somalia%20with%20the%20Unified%20Task%20Force%201992-1993%20PCN%2019000413500_2.pdf?ver=2012-10-11-164110-123) (accessed January 27, 2017).

<sup>201</sup> An alternative view on the Pressler Amendment was made in the op-ed by Rabia Akhtar, "The Correct narrative on Pressler," *Dawn*, May 29, 2017, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1335979> (accessed June 8, 2017).

<sup>202</sup> Tehmina Mahmood, "Pressler Amendment and Pakistan's Security Concern," *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 47, No. 4 (October 1994): 104.

<sup>203</sup> Major Forest B. Wortman USAF, *Equipping Foreign Air Forces: How far should the US Government Go?* A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements, April 1999, 12, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&docname=GetTRDoc.pdf&docid=GetTRDoc&GetTRDocID=a398882> (accessed June 8, 2017).

<sup>204</sup> James Goldrick, *No Easy Answers: The Development of the Navies of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 1945-1996* (New Delhi: Lancers Publishers and Distributor, 1997), 148.

<sup>205</sup> Syeda Abida Hussain, *Power Failure: A Political Odyssey of a Pakistani Woman* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2015), 415-416.

experienced firsthand American pressure and threats. Bartholomew's successor Arnold Kantor warned her that her country was not only producing nuclear weapons it was also harboring deadly terrorists such as Osama bin Laden.<sup>206</sup> Similar message was given by Deputy Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger.<sup>207</sup> She was told in clear terms that her country was on the watch list of states supporting terrorism.<sup>208</sup> Secretary of State James Baker repeated the message to the visiting minister of state for foreign affairs Siddiq Kanju and foreign secretary Shaharyar Khan and told them that Pakistan was letting terrorists infiltrate into Indian held Kashmir. The US Secretary of State warned that their country would remain on the terror watch list for the time being.<sup>209</sup>

Just then fate and Pentagon intervened. Irrespective of the ups and downs in their countries bilateral relations, the US and Pakistani militaries had enjoyed traditionally good relations right from the 1950s, when they were part of the so-called Northern Tier Allies to contain the Soviets. The Afghan war had brought the two militaries still closer. Now the Pentagon wanted Pakistan to lend a hand with the UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia.<sup>210</sup> The offer seemed almost too good to be true. This was provided a way out of a difficult situation. The Pakistani Army Chief General Asif Nawaz was on the best of terms with his American counterparts and was favorably inclined to accept the American offer.

Asif Nawaz's predecessor General Mirza Aslam Beg had not been popular with the US security establishment because he was suspected of having promised Iran with the supply of nuclear technology.<sup>211</sup> Beg had also opposed the participation of Pakistani troops deployed in Saudi Arabia to take part in active combat operations in the first Gulf War. He had sponsored the idea of 'strategic defiance.'<sup>212</sup> Gen Beg was defiantly pursing an independent policy in the Middle East, while Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was toeing the Saudi/US line. This would happen once again in 2015, when Nawaz Sharif in his third tenure as Prime Minister wanted to oblige the Saudis by sending troops to participate in their war against the Houthi tribesmen in

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<sup>206</sup> Ibid, 433.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid, 435.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid, 473.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid, 474.

<sup>210</sup> Vali Nasr, *The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat* (Anchor, 2014), 93.

<sup>211</sup> Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan Army the Wars Within* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008), 448.

<sup>212</sup> Brian Cloughley, *A History of Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections* (Karachi: OUP, 2014) 323.

Yemen. This didn't happen because the popular sentiment was against such an involvement. The Army was stretched thin fighting the long running counter insurgency campaign in the unruly tribal areas in the North West of the country, so the parliament sensibly rejected the idea of getting involved in somebody else's war in a distant land with no real political dividends.<sup>213</sup>

### **Civil Military Divide and the Domestic Politics**

At this time of changing world order, the domestic situation was extremely turbulent. The prime minister was finding it difficult with to pull along with the President and the Army chief. The retirement of the powerful Army Chief Gen. Beg did not improve his relations with the military brass. His new Army Chief kept his own council and was alarmed by the prime minister's brazen approach to cultivate gullible generals by offering them swank cars. An embarrassing situation was created when he was at the receiving end of the prime minister's unsolicited largesse in the shape of the car keys of a brand-new BMW. His vintage Toyota staff car, he was told did not befit his status. The offer was politely declined. Unable to charm him, the prime minister considered his new army chief headstrong and not respectful of his authority.<sup>214</sup> It didn't help matters, when dissidents within prime minister's cabinet started visiting the army chief to complain against their boss.

Gen. Asif Nawaz had information that the wily Intelligence Bureau (IB) chief Brigadier Imtiaz was advising Prime Minister Sharif to sack him. Asif Nawaz shared his fears of being removed unceremoniously with his corps commanders. These ruminations were reported to the prime minister. Another cause of friction was the appointment of Lt Gen Javed Nasir as the chief of ISI, without the consultation with the army chief. The main criterion for Nasir's selection was that he was member of the proselytizing Tablighi Jamaat.<sup>215</sup> The Jamaat was patronized by the patriarch of the Sharif family.

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<sup>213</sup> Jon Boone, "Pakistan's parliament votes against entering Yemen conflict," *The Guardian*, April 10, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/10/pakistans-parliament-votes-against-entering-yemen-conflict> (accessed May 30, 2017).

<sup>214</sup> Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army and the Wars Within* (Karachi: OUP, 2009), 450.

<sup>215</sup> Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 449-452.

The suspicions were mutual. The prime minister on his end was worried that his Army Chief was planning to overthrow him through a military coup.<sup>216</sup> There were temptations for the Army Chief because he thought the Americans were giving him a nod and a wink during his visit to the US in January-February 1992. In fact, he pointblank asked the CIA, if they wanted him to intervene because those were the signals he was receiving. Of course, nobody gave him a clear answer to his query.<sup>217</sup> The only person clearly suggesting a military intervention was Yusuf Haroon, a scion of a well-known Pakistani business house residing in New York.<sup>218</sup> Haroon was regularly adding grist to the rumor mill about an impending coup. Credence to such speculations was strengthened, when banners appeared in Rawalpindi and Islamabad calling upon the army chief to save the country.<sup>219</sup>

Amidst this season of mutual mistrust, Gen Asif Nawaz suddenly died of cardiac arrest. His wife suspected that the prime minister had poisoned her husband. The matter was investigated but the medical report did not corroborate the claim.<sup>220</sup> Corps Commander Quetta, Gen Abdul Waheed aka Waheed Kakar became the new chief.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif did not survive long in his job. On April 18, 1993, he was fired by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan on charges of corruption under the dubious Article 58 (2b) of the constitution. Nawaz Sharif would later create a record in Pakistan's patchy political history by losing his job thrice. On 26 May 1993, the Supreme Court restored Nawaz Sharif to the position of the prime minister.<sup>221</sup> This was a short-lived reprieve because he was unable to co-exist with the President. The logjam refused to resolve and on 18 July, the Army chief Gen Abdul Waheed asked both to resign and leave.<sup>222</sup> In order to resolve the tricky political situation at home, the army chief cancelled his scheduled visit to Somalia.<sup>223</sup>

<sup>216</sup> Ibid, 456-457.

<sup>217</sup> Ibid, 452.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid, 453.

<sup>219</sup> Ibid, 457.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid, 599-600.

<sup>221</sup> "Nawaz reinstated," *Dawn*, May 27, 1993.

<sup>222</sup> "Ishaq, Nawaz agree to step down," *Dawn*, July 18, 1993.

<sup>223</sup> Anwar Iqbal, "Pakistani Crisis deepens as govt, opposition digs in," *UPI*, <http://www.upi.com/Archives/1993/07/03/Pakistani-crisis-deepens-as-government-opposition-dig-in/3819741672000/> (accessed August 31, 2017).

The next general elections were held in October and Benazir Bhutto became the prime minister for a second time. In between there were two caretaker prime ministers (Balkh Sher Mazari and Moeenuddin Qureishi). Thus, the deployment of the Pakistani peacekeepers in Somalia was spread over the tenures of two elected and two unelected prime ministers. Naturally the political ownership of these operations remained weak and fragmentary.

The civil-military relations may have been lopsided in Pakistan, but its Army had very steady relationship with Pentagon. At the personal level, it was actually good e.g., Gen Asif Nawaz was known to have “strong and informal relationship” with Commander CENTCOM Marine General Joseph P. Hoar.<sup>224</sup> Hoar was also able to cultivate personal links with his successor Gen. Waheed, when the latter hosted him for a shooting trip as Corps Commander Quetta. This strong military to military relationship helped, when the US Pentagon wanted Pakistani troops for the peacekeeping duties in Somalia. Asif Nawaz was willing but wanted his troops to be properly equipped for the task. He also wanted the matter to be officially routed through the office of the prime minister.<sup>225</sup>

### **US wants Pakistan to be part of the Somalia Operations**

Shuja Nawaz mentions that he was approached by Under Secretary of State Frank Wisner and Ambassador Robert Oakley in this regard. Wisner wanted to know, if Pakistani troops were available for peacekeeping duties and Oakley wanted to discuss modalities of such participation. Oakley knew both Somalia and Pakistan well, as he had been the US ambassador to Mogadishu (1982-84) and Islamabad (1988-1991). During his stint in Islamabad as his country’s envoy, Oakley was given the disparaging title of ‘Viceroy’ for his blunt and brash attitude.<sup>226</sup> After retiring from the State Department he became the US President’s special representative for Somalia. According to Shuja Nawaz, he had suggested that US reserves left behind in Saudi Arabia after Desert Storm could be used to equip Pakistani peacekeepers, but

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<sup>224</sup> Ibid, 447.

<sup>225</sup> Ibid, 448.

<sup>226</sup> Nasim Zehra, *From Kargil to the Coup: Events that shook Pakistan* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2018), 374.

the compromise solution was US stocks lying in Italy. Shuja asserts that he had prompted the American president to talk directly to the Pakistani prime minister on the subject.<sup>227</sup>

There is some disconnect in the account given by Shuja Nawaz because the equipment for Pakistani peacekeepers did not come from Italy.<sup>228</sup> 7 FF took all its stores and Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) from Pakistan Army stocks.<sup>229</sup> Later these were handed over to 15 FF, upon rotation back to Pakistan. 80 APC M113 were shipped to Mogadishu for Pakistani peacekeepers from US Army reserves stocks in Germany in March 1994, once the Americans departed from Somalia.<sup>230</sup> The first squadron of 19 Lancers got eight obsolete M48A2 tanks from Turkey in July 1993. These vintage tanks had petrol engines and 90 mm main gun. It took a great deal of effort to make four of these functional. One of was destroyed after being hit by an anti-tank rocket. These tanks were returned, once the mission closed.<sup>231</sup> Ten M48A5 tanks were shipped to Mogadishu from Karachi from Pakistani stocks in October 1993. When the US troops withdrew from Somalia, they left behind 30 M60s for the Pakistani armor regiment.<sup>232</sup>

33 Combat Aviation Squadron had received eight vintage AH-1S Cobra attack helicopters from old stocks in the Hawaii National Guard under a \$40-million rental agreement. These old helicopters were at the center of a bitter diplomatic row, when the Pakistani Foreign Minister Sardar Assef Ahmed Ali visited Somalia in March 1994.<sup>233</sup> More about it will appear later in the book. The aviation squadron also got four scout helicopters, after the Americans departed.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid, 448.

<sup>228</sup> The author probed Shuja Nawaz on the issue of the equipment during his visit to Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) in early 2017, to brief the audience about the new administration of Donald Trump. Nawaz found it difficult to recall that in his book he had mentioned suggesting to the Americans to transfer weapon and equipment for peacekeepers from leftover US stocks of Desert Storm, but they had not agreed to it. He told the author that most of his information had come from General Anthony Zinni.

<sup>229</sup> The author was involved in the handing /taking over of APCs bound for Somalia.

<sup>230</sup> Rick Atkinson, "U.N Force in Somalia Changes Guard," *Washington Post*, March 20, 1994, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/03/20/un-force-in-somalia-changes-guard/5eb0375d-f324-47ba-a8f8-193c75d9e497/?utm\\_term=.6aab8221820e](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/03/20/un-force-in-somalia-changes-guard/5eb0375d-f324-47ba-a8f8-193c75d9e497/?utm_term=.6aab8221820e) (accessed August 14, 2017).

<sup>231</sup> Interview with Lt Gen Sikander Afzal, CO 19 Lancers, 2017.

<sup>232</sup> 19 Lancers in Somalia.

<sup>233</sup> "Pakistan asks newer gear for U.N. force in Somalia," *Los Angeles Times*, March 14, 1994, [http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1994-03-14/news/1994073159\\_1\\_somalia-united-nations-pakistani](http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1994-03-14/news/1994073159_1_somalia-united-nations-pakistani) (accessed August 14, 2017).

Pakistan Army was no stranger to Somalia. In the late 1970s it had helped build Somali armed forces. Lieutenant Colonel (later Lieutenant General) Moinudin Haider had headed the Military Advisory Group (MAG) in Somalia from 1978 to 1981. Haider would revisit Somalia in 1993 as a major general to inspect Pakistani troops deployed on UN mission and review their needs and logistical requirements.<sup>234</sup> From their earlier experience of the Pakistani soldiers, Somalis had developed a feeling of trust for them. Therefore, it was quite understandable that they agreed to accept them as peacekeepers. Compared to those relatively peaceful times, the Pakistani peacekeepers in the 1990s were confronted with a country bent on destroying itself.<sup>235</sup>

Brigadier Imtiaz Shaheen (later lieutenant general) was selected as the first Chief Military Observer (CMO). At that time he was serving in the Combat Development (CD) Directorate in the General Headquarters (GHQ). On 29 June 1992, the Military Secretary (MS) Major General Amin Burki personally took Shaheen to the office of the Army Chief General Asif Nawaz, where he was informed that he was to go to Somalia. He was given no formal briefing for the complex mission that he was embarking upon. He would only learn about the intricate challenges of his new task after getting a briefing at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York.<sup>236</sup>

Brigadier Shaheen reached New York in the evening of 1<sup>st</sup> July. His briefers told him in no uncertain terms that it he was about to embark on an extremely difficult mission. The Somali warlords had accepted peacekeepers from Pakistan because it had supported them in their war in Ogaden in the 1980s and had helped build their armed forces. The mandate given to Shaheen was to establish the mission and obtain a ceasefire among the warring factions. He was provided adequate funds to begin his work. Before leaving for Kenya on a commercial flight, Shaheen met with UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali in New York. Mr. Ghali re-emphasized the dangers inherent in the mission and told him to abort anytime he felt it was becoming too dangerous. Before his departure from New York, funds were released to Shaheen

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<sup>234</sup> Nawaz, *Crossed Sword*, 466.

<sup>235</sup> Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire*.

<sup>236</sup> Information based on a series of telephonic interviews and emails exchanged with Lt Gen Imtiaz Shaheen 25 April 2017.

to establish the mission in Somalia. Shaheen's team of military observers comprised of three men: Colonel Ticoka from Fiji and an officer from Austria and one from Finland. Armed with the money and advice Shaheen and his team flew to Kenya. On 6 July the team departed from Wilson airport in Nairobi on a small, chartered plane they'd booked from Abercrombie & Kent flight operators. The pilot, an Irishwoman by the name of Iris dropped them off on a desert strip outside K4 without switching off the engines. They were met by the personal of the UNOSOM and some armed Somali men, who took them first for a meeting with Ali Mahdi and then with Farah Aidid. Imtiaz Shaheen and his team of observers were housed in a compound hired by the 12 members of the UNOSOM team of civilian staffers that was already present in Mogadishu. The team was totally dependent on the goodwill of the local fighters. The only means of communication with UN was a satellite phone.<sup>237</sup> They were using the UNICEF communication system for sending official cables.<sup>238</sup> The remaining forty-seven men of the ceasefire monitoring team would arrive on 23 July.<sup>239</sup>

From his arrival in Mogadishu till 12 August, Imtiaz Shaheen worked with the SRSG Muhammad Sahnoun to make the two main warlords Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed and sixteen other factions and 362 tribes to agree to the terms and conditions of the ceasefire. The CMO and the SRSG concentrated on the political agenda given to them by the UN. On 12 August Shaheen personally went to Bardera, further south in the Juba valley, to get the ceasefire document signed by Farah Aidid. Aidid personally drew a line with a marker on a small map that Brig Shaheen was carrying to demarcate the ceasefire line dividing North Mogadishu from the South. The first step of the peacekeeping mission had been achieved.<sup>240</sup>

The Headquarters of the UN mission in Somalia was authorized 50 military observers, 3,500 security personnel and up to 719 military support personnel, supported by international civilian and local staff. The troops were contributed by Australia, Austria, Bangladesh,

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<sup>237</sup> Ibid.

<sup>238</sup> Personal interview with Lt Gen Imtiaz Shaheen on 12 November 2017 in Lahore.

<sup>239</sup> Kenneth R. Rudderod, *Humanitarianism under Fire: The US and UN Intervention in Somalia* (Sterling VA: Kumariam Press, 2008), 40.

<sup>240</sup> Telephonic interview with Lt Gen Imtiaz Shaheen, 25 April 2017.

Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan and Zimbabwe.<sup>241</sup>

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<sup>241</sup> UN Operations in Somalia, <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm> (June 8, 2016).

## Chapter IV

### **Pakistani Peacekeepers Arrive in Somalia – The Beginning of UNOSOM**

The advance party of 40 soldiers of the elite 7 Frontier Force (FF) Regiment of the Pakistan Army arrived in Somalia on 14<sup>th</sup> of September 1992 on board US military aircraft.<sup>242</sup> They were part of the 500 strong unit sent in to test the turbulent waters of Somalia. The authorized strength of UNOSOM troops was 3500 troops.

#### **Movement to Somalia**

The flight path of the planes carrying the Pakistani peacekeepers from Chaklala airbase (now Nur Khan Base) in Rawalpindi to Mogadishu's dilapidated international airport spanned roughly 23000 miles. Almost the entire journey was over the ocean. The move of the main body began on 21 September and was completed by 29 September. It required 27 flights to transport the remaining battalion as part of Operation Impressive Lift. The air movement lasted 17 days.<sup>243</sup>

An American naval task force of four ships led by the amphibious assault ship USS Tarawa waited off the coast of Mogadishu to provide seaborne command, control and communications support for US Air Force (USAF) transport planes bringing in troops from Pakistan. The Task Force was equipped with helicopters and landing crafts; and comprised about 2,400 Marines. This included five USAF combat control specialists equipped with radar and radios. These air traffic controllers were briefly put ashore at Mogadishu's airport to direct the incoming flights. The task force remained in position for nearly two weeks to cover the period of deployment.<sup>244</sup>

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<sup>242</sup> Jane Perez, "Armed U.N. Troops arrive in Somalia," *New York Times*, September 14, 1992, <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/15/world/armed-un-troops-arrive-in-somalia.html> (accessed October 3, 2016).

<sup>243</sup> Fredrick J. Shaw Jr. & Timothy Warnock, *The Cold War and Beyond: Chronology of the US Air Force, 1947 to 1997* (Washington D.C.: Air University Press, 1997)143, [https://media.defense.gov/2010/May/25/2001330276-1/1/0/cold\\_war\\_and\\_beyond.pdf](https://media.defense.gov/2010/May/25/2001330276-1/1/0/cold_war_and_beyond.pdf) (accessed July 4, 2017).

<sup>244</sup> Mellisa Healy, "U.S. Downplays Deployment of Marines off Somalia Coast," *Los Angeles Times*, September 17, 1992, [http://articles.latimes.com/1992-09-17/news/mn-787\\_1\\_air-force-personnel](http://articles.latimes.com/1992-09-17/news/mn-787_1_air-force-personnel) (accessed January 12, 2017).

7 FF was given little time for preparation. On 22 August 1992, the CO Lt Col Azam Effendi was summoned to General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi and given the move orders.<sup>245</sup> From Mogadishu, Brigadier Imtiaz Shaheen faxed the tasks that the unit was required to perform i.e.

- a. Ensure protection of Mogadishu seaport to ensure safe offloading of relief supplies.
- b. Escort relief convoys from Mogadishu seaport to distributions centers, in the town from where the distribution agencies will take them on.
- c. Provide protection at Mogadishu Airport, on arrival of relief supplies whenever required.
- d. In cases of emergency, be prepared to provide security / protection to UN personnel and installations located in Mogadishu city.<sup>246</sup>

To get things moving, one officer was sent to GHQ to complete the pre-deployment paperwork. This included release orders for the vehicles, equipment and stores that were to be taken along. A board of officers selected 500 men out of the posted strength of approximately 800 all ranks. Due diligence was done to handpick the best from among those present. On 28 August, the Advance Party consisting of 90 men moved from the home base in Multan, to the airhead in Rawalpindi. Meanwhile, various parties were sent out to collect stores and vehicles from Karachi, Bahawalpur and Okara as per instructions of GHQ.

The preparations began on a hectic pace. All vehicles earmarked for the mission and thirty M113 armored personal carriers (APCs) for three companies from the unit garage were painted white with UN markings. In midst of all this intense activity, on 1 September 92, precisely a fortnight before the move, the unit got a new CO. Lt Col Kamal Aziz had commanded the battalion earlier and was serving on the operational staff of an infantry division. The battalion also got additional officers from other infantry units to bring up its strength of officers to 22. A standard infantry battalion has 17 officers. All platoons were to be commanded by officers. Traditionally, platoon commanders are Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) or Warrant Officers in Pakistan Army. Three logistic officers were attached from the

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<sup>245</sup> Pakistani Army HQ is known as GHQ.

<sup>246</sup> 7 FF War Diary Somalia.

Corps of EME, Signals and Engineers. Ten more officers joined the battalion for the move to Somalia. They were part of UNOSOM HQ and included one lieutenant colonel, three majors and six captains.

The main body of 7 FF departed from Multan in the predawn hours of 3 September 92 and reached Rawalpindi during the night of 4/5 September. A makeshift bivouac was struck in Old Haji Camp Chaklala. The pre-departure days were filled with happiness and good cheer, as everybody looked forward to thrill and adventure in an unknown land. The prevailing optimism couldn't be dampened by late monsoon thunderstorm and showers that gave the camp a bedraggled look. The weather gods had sent the first warning to the unsuspecting peacekeepers of the storms that were to buffet their journey. More tangible warning came from US Embassy officials, who had hosted a dinner in honor of the peacekeepers in a local hotel in Islamabad. The Americans referred to the grave situation in Mogadishu and asked if they were ready for it. The Pakistani officers were confident that would be able to surmount all problems.<sup>247</sup> The American also provided them with some high-resolution photographs of the city.<sup>248</sup>

The Advance Party under the unit's second in command (2IC) Major Muqeem Shah boarded a US Air Force (USAF) C141 Starlifter for Mogadishu in the evening of the 13<sup>th</sup> of September 1992. The party comprising four officers, two JCOs and 34 soldiers was seen off by DG Infantry Maj. Gen. Zaheer ul Islam Abbasi. The plane departed at 10 minutes past 9 in the evening from Chaklala air base and made a stopover at Djibouti. Here the party was transferred into two C130s for onward journey to Mogadishu. The first C130 with Major Afridi as the senior officer landed in Somalia at 43 minutes past midday local time on 14 September 92. Second Lieutenant Imran made history by being the first person to step down on the soil of Somalia. The SRSG Ambassador Mohammad Sahnoun and the Chief Military Observer Brigadier Imtiaz Shaheen received them. The Advance Party established itself at the Airport. They had no other choice. Mogadishu was an unknown city and there was no local liaison or guide. No maps of the city had been provided and no Google maps could be accessed because it was the pre-Internet age. Initially they had to learn about the layout of the city through physical reconnaissance. The aerial photographs that the Americans had provided were of great

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<sup>247</sup> Conversation with Maj Tariq Mahmood, 7 FF (retired) on 3 October 2017.

<sup>248</sup> Conversation with Lt Col Farrukh Hussain Bhatti, 7 FF (retired) on 4 December 2017.

help. The Pakistani peacekeepers would inherit the entire stock of American maps, when they withdrew in April 1994.

On 21 September 92, the main body started arriving in Somalia. The air movement lasted ten days. USAF C 141 Starlifters and C5 Galaxy, one of the world's biggest cargo planes, were used for the transportation of the unit. On 29 September, the last flight arrived in Mogadishu at around midday. All 500 men had arrived safely. In the morning of 3 October, the CO spoke to the first collective assembly of his men after reaching the new location. Brigadier Imtiaz Shaheen also took the opportunity to address the troops. On 4 October, the ship carrying 41 vehicles and 851 cargo pellets docked in Mogadishu seaport. The stores were swiftly unloaded. All men and materiel were now in place.

The unit occupied Afisone camp, the half destroyed Somali Air Force headquarters near the airport. The buildings were without roofs, door and windows. To escape the blazing sun, regulation 180 1bs tents were stretched across the roofless structures to erect a makeshift awning. On a rainy day, the canvas would sag from rainwater and it would become the full-time occupation for the soldier to keep the ammo dry. Apart from the few cloudbursts, water in the dry and arid country was in short supply. To solve the chronic problem, a well was dug with the assistance of UN but it proved to be an exercise in futility. Construction of bathrooms was done on self-help basis under the supervision of Capt. Moazzam Ejaz, from the Corps of Engineers. The first letter from home was received on 17 October and it raised the morale of troops manifold.

## **7 FF in Mogadishu**

Mogadishu had been systematically destroyed during the civil war and not one single structure had survived the ravages of war. Food was scarce but weapons and ammunition were abundant. Food supplies were the most obvious targets of the armed militias that robbed the aid that was being sent for the starving masses. 7 FF lost no time in securing the airport and seaport and clearing it from armed gangs. The food supply was soon restored through unhindered relief flights and off-loading of ships bringing in grain and other food stuff. Through their selfless service and humane behavior, the Pakistani soldiers were soon able to win the hearts and minds of the local population. They not only distributed the aid that was coming in, they also shared

their rations with the hungry population. The streets of Mogadishu were soon echoing with the slogans of *Pakistani-Somali Walal-Walal* (Pakistanis and Somalis are brothers).

7 FF known as the Pakistan battalion (PAKBATT) for the UN peacekeeping operations had a completely different experience in Somalia as compared to its previous operational deployments. There was a lot of operational ambiguity. They knew they were on a humanitarian mission in a Muslim country, but the prevailing situation was tense, and the rules of engagement were unclear. They weren't very sure of how to deal with the crowd that was rowdy and impatient to get its share of food. Nobody had prepared them for the situation they found themselves in but like good soldiers they quickly adapted to their new circumstances. The rank and file picked up a smattering of English to converse with the international media that was converging into Mogadishu. They had their first exposure of seeing live international celebrity in a conflict zone, when famous Hollywood actress of yesteryears Audrey Hepburn visited Mogadishu on 21 September as UNICEF's goodwill ambassador.<sup>249</sup> She met the UN soldiers and shook hands with them.<sup>250</sup>

After spending a week in Mogadishu, the men got used to the sight of menacing young men barely out of their teens, high on khat (a mild narcotic) roaming the streets on their Technicals (Vehicle carrying an anti-aircraft or an anti-tank gun). The locals also gradually accepted the presence of the Pakistanis amongst them. As their attitude became friendlier, local notables started visiting the Pakistani military camp. It was during one such visit that a gentleman introduced himself as a retired Colonel of the Somali Army and offered his service to arrange vegetables from the local market. This helped break the monotony of eating tinned spinach and dhal that the unit had brought along from Pakistan.

The city was divided into two sectors. General Farah Aidid controlled the southern sector, while Ali Mahdi was the master of the northern sector. Reconnaissance of both sectors was carried out in consultation of the two strongmen. It was quite clear to the officers that they were not in Somalia to fight but to provide humanitarian aid. So, they embarked on the exercise

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<sup>249</sup> "Audrey Hepburn visits Mogadishu," *Independent*, September 21, 1992, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/audrey-hepburn-visits-mogadishu-1552880.html> (accessed August 14, 2017).

<sup>250</sup> UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador Archive: Audrey Hepburn, [https://www.unicef.org/videoaudio/PDFs/gwa\\_audreyhepurn3\\_brolldscript.pdf](https://www.unicef.org/videoaudio/PDFs/gwa_audreyhepurn3_brolldscript.pdf) (accessed August 14, 2017).

of winning the hearts and minds of the locals and tried to solve their problems with the meager resources at their disposal. The Somali elders were frequently invited over for meals and food was often shared with the teeming hungry masses. To win the hearts and minds footballs were distributed among the youth and friendly matches were played with the local teams. Apart from the main task as mentioned earlier, the duties of Pakistani Force inter alia involved checking of unauthorized weapons in a city flush with all kind of armament. It was during one such task 24 Pakistani peacekeepers lost their lives. Unit's activities in Mogadishu also revolved around:

- a. Escorting food convoys from Seaport/Airport to distribution centers.
- b. Escorting UN Officials and NGOs.
- c. Protection of UN Compound against outside aggression.
- d. Food distribution at selected places.
- e. Providing medical facilities to locals.
- f. One additional task that the Pakistani battalion provided was helping the aircraft land at night by lighting up the runway by improvised means.

At most times, the situation remained tense due to sporadic small arms and mortar fire. False and exaggerated reports by locals of likely attacks took its toll because many times the unit would remain awake the entire night. The famous orders by HQ Company Commander Major Javed Nasir Chaudhry were given on one of these nights. The O group included the cobbler, tailor, clerks and the head sweeper. In November 1992, a group of 21 persons belonging to NGOs were attacked by Somalis, while they were having a picnic at Jazeera Beach. The rescue operation mounted by the Pakistani troops was successful.

### **Unified Task Force (UNITAF)**

Within a few months of their arrival, 7 FF had stabilized the situation and the local environment was now conducive for the US to get directly involved in Somalia. In November 1992, the US government offered to organize and lead an operation to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The UNSC accepted the offer and authorized the use of "all necessary means" to establish a secure environment for the relief effort. On 3 December 1992, UNSCR 794 authorized the formation of UNITAF. The role assigned to it was to establish a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance in the southern half of the country. On

December 3, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted Resolution 794, endorsing the US offer to lead an international force for the purpose of protecting humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.<sup>251</sup> UNITAF comprised approximately 37,000. 25,000 of them were American soldiers. UNITAF was to support the humanitarian intervention Operation Restore Hope. UNITAF was to operate independently under US command, much like the US-led force for Korea in 1950 and the US-led force for Kuwait in 1991. Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, USMC, Commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) was placed in command of UNITAF. He in turn reported to General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC, Commander in Chief, US Central Command (CENTCOM).<sup>252</sup> UNITAF operated in Somalia from 5 December 1992 to 4 May 1993.<sup>253</sup> Initially it operated side-by-side and in coordination with UNOSOM to secure major population centers and to deliver and distribute humanitarian assistance. It was subsequently subsumed into UNOSOM under Resolution 814 with a Chapter VII mandate. UNITAF was authorized 37,000 troops out of which 25,000 were US soldiers. Within the framework of UNITAF operations greater reliance was placed on the use of offensive air support (OAS) and large component of gunship helicopters and aircraft was dedicated for this purpose.<sup>254</sup>

The UNITAF operations began with a dramatic amphibious landing by US Marines on the beaches of Mogadishu in the early hours of December 9, 1992.<sup>255</sup> The Hollywood type shock and awe action was designed to showcase the US military might by a security establishment fearing budget cuts in the post-Cold War era. The Pentagon actually encouraged press coverage of the amphibious landing by indicating the time and place of the military operations and quietly advised some television network correspondents, where to set up their cameras. The landing troops were actually surprised by the large presence of reporters and

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<sup>251</sup> George Bush, 41<sup>st</sup> President: Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia, December 4, 1992, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21758> (accessed January 12, 2017).

<sup>252</sup> Robert Oakley, "An Envoy's Perspective," *JFQ* (Autumn 1993): 46, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1993/jfq0802.pdf> (accessed June 8, 2017).

<sup>253</sup> William T. Dean III, "Air Operations in Somalia: 'Black Hawk Down' Revisited," in A. Walter Dorn, Ed., Chapter 12 of *Air Power in UN Operations: Wings for Peace* (Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, UK, 2014) 215-230.

<sup>254</sup> UNOSOM I Mandate, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1mandate.html> (accessed November 18, 2016).

<sup>255</sup> U.S. Marines storm Mogadishu, Somalia, *This Day in History: December 09*, <http://www.history.com>this-day-in-history/u-s-marines-storm-mogadishu-somalia> (accessed November 24, 2016).

worried that the camera flashlights would blind their night vision devices.<sup>256</sup> US Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) General Colin Powell was happy with the media coverage because he wanted to send across a tough political message i.e. “I wanted the Somalis to see nasty, ugly-looking people coming ashore so they’d decide ‘We’d better sit down and talk with Brother Oakley’ (the US special envoy and political negotiator).”<sup>257</sup> Powell’s intentions notwithstanding, Robert Oakley from his previous experience in Somalia was able to establish fairly good relation with the warlords. On 7 and 8 December 1992, he had met with both Mohammed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohammed to enlist their cooperation during the landing operation.<sup>258</sup> Oakley had also rented an apartment from Aidid’s deputy Atto, so it was quite obvious that he was acceptable to SNA. The relations only soured after Howe became the SRSG.<sup>259</sup>

In the early hours of 9 December 1992, the first group of six to eight navy frogmen landed on the beach outside Mogadishu under a full moon. This was followed by three rubber boats and around 24 troops walked up through the dunes into the full glare of television lights. US Marines in armored amphibious tractors set about establishing beachheads for arrival of around 1,800 troops. The Somalis waited and watched. There was no fighting, the city streets remained deserted and the militia men stayed away from the port and airport.<sup>260</sup> After the beachhead had been secured, more than 1,000 marines landed in amphibious vehicles, hovercrafts and waves of transport helicopters. They had come onboard amphibious ships USS Tripoli, Rushmore and Juneau and expected stiff resistance instead they were mobbed by a bevy of reporters occupying their secret landing sites. The overall commander Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston arrived later in the day with his top aides to establish his command

<sup>256</sup> Michael R. Gordon, “MISSION TO SOMALIA; TV Army on the Beach Took U.S. by Surprise,” *New York Times*, December 10, 1992, <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/10/world/mission-to-somalia-tv-army-on-the-beach-took-us-by-surprise.html> (accessed January 12, 2017).

<sup>257</sup> John J. Sommer, *Hope Restored? Humanitarian Aid in Somalia 1990-1994*, 33, [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNABZ357.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABZ357.pdf) (accessed January 8, 2018).

<sup>258</sup> Richard Bowden, “Media greet US marines: Armed mercy mission starts under moonlight with seizure of Mogadishu airport,” *Independent*, December 9, 1992, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media-greet-us-marines-armed-mercy-mission-starts-under-moonlight-with-seizure-of-mogadishu-airport-1562573.html> (accessed June 15, 2017).

<sup>259</sup> Alex de Waal, U.S. War Crimes in Somalia, *New Left Review*, 30, 1998, 131-144, [http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/de\\_Waal3/printable.html](http://hornofafrica.ssrc.org/de_Waal3/printable.html) (accessed August 14, 2017).

<sup>260</sup> “1992: American marines land in Somalia,” *BBC News*, December 9, 1993, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/9/newsid\\_4013000/4013143.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/9/newsid_4013000/4013143.stm) (accessed November 24, 2016).

post. As per plan the US military was to push on to Baidoa, 250 miles west of Mogadishu in the next couple of days.<sup>261</sup>

Pakistani peacekeepers learnt about the impending US military operations from the Force Commander in the afternoon of 8 December 1992. As per his verbal instructions, the leaders of the local clans were to remove all armed persons and vehicles from the airport before the arrival of US marines. The Somalis obeyed the instructions in letter and spirit and by last light 8 December 1992, there was no armed person present in the airport or the surrounding area. Also as per instructions of the Force Headquarters, all possible assistance and guidance was extended to the scores of journalists and reporters converging on to the airport with their equipment to cover the impending event.

The account of the US landing on the beaches of Mogadishu as recorded in the 7 FF War Diary is as under:

An hour before midnight on 8 December 1992, Lieutenant Colonel Milton (USAF), arrived at the airport and sought a meeting with the battalion and force commanders through the company commander deployed there. The aim was to share passwords and identification procedure for establishing contact with the Reconnaissance and Liaison party of the US Marines due to arrive some time past midnight. The follow on forces were to arrive four hours later. The Airport Company was suitably reinforced and special arrangements were made to ensure smooth and safe landing of US troops.

At 0025 hours on 9 December 1992 first contact was made with the reconnaissance team at the landing site but the pre-determined code words and recognition signals were of no use in establishing identities. The landing troops had no knowledge of these, meanwhile they were quite unprepared to be swarmed by the men and women of the international press. The peacekeepers managed to rescue the reconnaissance team led by Captain Carhart from the reporters and brought it to the Company Headquarters. Carhart briefed the CO about the landing plan with the help of a map overlay, which revealed that

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<sup>261</sup> Eric Schmitt, "Mission to Somalia; Ready for a Battle, Troops Storm Beach but find no Enemy," *New York Times*, December 9, 1992, <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/09/world/mission-to-somalia-ready-for-a-battle-troops-storm-beach-but-find-no-enemy.html> (accessed October 3, 2016).

most of their objectives were localities already occupied by PAK BATT. The reconnaissance team was then briefed about the battalion deployment plan and some areas of potential threat were also identified. This information was conveyed to the Commander of the Expeditionary Force. Two mounted patrols deployed at the southern end of the runway were pulled back at the request of the US marines but there were no more changes in the deployment at the airport terminal and rest of the localities.

The first wave of armored amphibious vehicles landed at the beach opposite the airport terminal under the cover of gunship helicopters in the early hours of 9 December. One company with heavy armored amphibious vehicles made for the main terminal building and towards the facilities immediately to the south of the terminal building. Subsequent waves of light armored vehicles fanned towards the southern end of the runway and masked Halane camp next to the airport. At 0440 hours one marine company landed at seaport and at 0542 hours, a heliborne company landed at northern end of the runway near the Military Airbase. One company was deployed as reserve near the landing site. Armed helicopters provided air cover during the entire operation. Colonel Gregory S. Newbold Commander of the 15<sup>th</sup> Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) approached the company deployed at the airport and sought assistance in securing the high buildings to the west of the Airport.

Upon reaching the Airport Terminal, US troops rounded up some unarmed Somali Airport workers sleeping in one of the hangars. They were forced to lie face down on the floor at gunpoint and were roughly treated as photographers took pictures of the ‘suspected’ fighters. It took the best negotiating skills of the Commander of the UN troops to convince the gung ho American marines to let the innocent workers go. One of them was so tightly handcuffed that his wrists started to bleed and had to be provided medical treatment.

At 0600 hours, a heliborne platoon carried out search of the Afisone air base next to PAK BATT Camp. No weapons were discovered except one belonging to Elme Ali, a contractor preparing sites for pre-fab accommodation. At 0730 hours US Special Envoy Robert Oakley addressed a press conference at the Airport. Brigadier General Frank

Libutti, the Commander of Operation Provide Relief was in attendance. At 0850 hours two helicopters carrying troops landed in PAK BATT camp by mistake. They were guided to their actual landing site near the seaport. Quite a few marines were disorientated and had lost their way. It seems that they did not possess detailed information about the ground, deployment of our troops and built-up areas around the Airport.

At 1400 hours Colonel Newbold met with CO 7 FF and thanked him for the assistance and guidance rendered by his battalion during the landing operations. Further he wanted help in providing security to the northern sector of the runway and the surrounding area. After approval from the Force Headquarters, the Company already deployed at the Military Airbase reinforced its position. Consequently, US Marine Company deployed in this sector was able to pull out and move out to secure the former US Embassy compound.

Initially one company of the Marines was deployed in the south east around Halane camp. Company plus comprising 200 persons was deployed at the seaport. One company was sent to the US Embassy compound and some mixed combat teams were located at the Airport terminal building. Artillery battery was deployed at the southern end of the runway but was planned to be shifted to the northern end. The Task Force Headquarter was established in the double story flats next to the building of the now defunct Somali Airline Kitchen. Logistics elements were located along the beach towards the south. In addition some mobile check points were established on the roads leading from the Airport towards the former US Embassy compound. A total of 1500 Marines had landed initially. The air and helicopter elements kept operating from three ships deployed close to the coastline.<sup>262</sup>

Large aircraft including C5 Galaxy and C141 Starlifters started landing at the Airport by midday on 9 December 92. They brought in communication gear and logistic stores. No additional troops were expected to arrive till next two days. Some sniping took place at the US Embassy compound on night 9/10 December 92. In retaliation gunship helicopters threw flares

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<sup>262</sup> 7 FF War Diary.

to illuminate the shooters. Apart from some stray firing at the seaport and from area north of it, the landing party met with no armed resistance. No casualty was reported. Local population reacted cautiously to the deployment of US troops but was dismayed by their aggressive behavior.

After the Americans, troops from other nations started arriving. At 1500 hours a company of the French foreign legion comprising 200 legionnaires landed at the Airbase. They were surprised to find Pakistani soldiers at the airport because they were under the impression that it had been secured by the US troops. The Pakistanis provided them necessary guidance and transport to reach their company headquarter in Kilo 4 area. The French were subsequently tasked to secure the airport in Baidoa and Uddur. One French journalist covering the landing operation dubbed it a farce staged for the world media<sup>263</sup>. One Marine officer informed the Pakistani peacekeepers that they had been practicing the landing operation on a beach in California for the past three months<sup>264</sup>.

The 1<sup>st</sup> Belgian Parachute battalion arrived in Mogadishu on 13 December was sent to secure the airfield in Kismayo with the American troops on 22 December. The commander of this Task Force was Brigadier General Lawson Magruder, the assistant commander of 10 Mountain Division.<sup>265</sup> In March the Belgians were made responsible for all relief operations in Kismayo. During their stay in the city, they were involved in a number of running battles and killed between 50 to 200 Somalis. The Belgians were also accused of grave violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) such as throwing children, who could not swim into the Juba River.<sup>266</sup> Photographs released by the CNN in 1997 showed a Belgian soldier urinating on the face of a dead Somali and his comrades ‘roasting’ a Somali child over an open grill.<sup>267</sup> In a well-publicized incident, on the night of 21 August 1993, two soldiers of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Para

<sup>263</sup> 7 FF War Diary.

<sup>264</sup> Ibid.

<sup>265</sup> Chapter IV: Coming Ashore in *Restoring Hope in Somalia*, 44,

[https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Restoring%20Hope%20In%20Somalia%20with%20the%20Unified%20Task%20Force%201992-1993%20PCN%2019000413500\\_3.pdf](https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Restoring%20Hope%20In%20Somalia%20with%20the%20Unified%20Task%20Force%201992-1993%20PCN%2019000413500_3.pdf) (accessed June 8, 2018).

<sup>266</sup> Richard Bowden, “UN soldiers accused of atrocities in Somalia: Human rights group urges adherence to Geneva Conventions,” *Independent*, July 29, 1993, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/un-soldiers-accused-of-atrocities-in-somalia-human-rights-group-urges-adherence-to-geneva-1488005.html> (accessed August 14, 2017).

<sup>267</sup> Photos reveal Belgian paratroopers’ abuse in Somalia, [http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9704/17/belgium\\_somalia/](http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9704/17/belgium_somalia/) (accessed August 14, 2017).

Commando Battalion shot and injured a 12 year old girl sneaking through the barbed wires in the vicinity of their bunker. The soldiers were tried by a Belgian military court for violation of IHL but were acquitted. The court proceedings have been cited as a case study by the ICRC.<sup>268</sup> Another incident of violation of IHL took place in the southern city of Belet Uen. It achieved notoriety as the ‘Canadian national shame.’ It involved the beating to death of a Somali teenager at the hands of two Canadian soldiers. The act was documented by photos, and brought to light internal problems in the Canadian Airborne Regiment. Military leadership was sharply rebuked after a CBC reporter received altered documents, leading to allegations of a cover-up. A public inquiry was called, which was controversially cut short by the government. The Inquiry cited problems in the leadership of the Canadian Forces. The affair led to the disbanding of the elite Canadian Airborne Regiment and greatly besmirched the image and reputation of Canadian soldiers. It also led to the immediate reduction of Canadian military spending by nearly 25 percent from the time of the killing to the inquiry.<sup>269</sup>

Three weeks after the Americans landed in Mogadishu, President Bush visited Somalia to spend the New Year with the troops. He stayed onboard the USS Tripoli and made his onshore visits on a military helicopter. During these two days that marked his last days in office, Bush visited the capital city of Mogadishu and the town of Baidoa.<sup>270</sup> He did not meet the peacekeepers from other countries.

On January 3, 1993, the UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali visited Mogadishu. He was provided security by the Pakistani peacekeepers. He visited a feeding center being run by the ICRC and spoke to aid workers and UN and US military officials. There were widespread demonstrations against his visit. Gen. Aidid accused him of favoring rival Ali Mahdi

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
<sup>268</sup> How does Law Protect in War: Belgium, Belgian Soldiers in Somalia, *ICRC*, <https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/belgium-belgian-soldiers-somalia> (accessed August 14, 2017).

<sup>269</sup> Martha Armstrong, *A Tale of Two Videos: Media Event, Moral Panic and the Canadian Airborne Regiment*, Graduate Program in Communications McGill University Montréal, December 1997, [http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape11/PQDD\\_0005/MQ43829.pdf](http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape11/PQDD_0005/MQ43829.pdf) (accessed August 30, 2017).

<sup>270</sup> Alison Mitchell, “President Visits Center of Crisis In Somali Town,” *New York Times*, January 2, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/02/world/president-visits-center-of-crisis-in-somali-town.html?mcubz=3> (accessed August 14, 2017).

Mohammed and for being close to former dictator Siad Barre during his time with the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<sup>271</sup>

### The Pakistani Brigade – UNITAF and Transition to UNOSOM II



In February 1993, a military delegation led by Maj Gen Moeenuddin Haider visited Mogadishu for reconnaissance prior to the deployment of a full-fledged brigade as part of UNOSOM II. The other members of his team were Brigadier Shaukat Qadir and Colonel Asif Doraiz Akhtar. Akhtar stayed behind as the senior liaison officer (SLO) in UNOSOM HQ. He would become the deputy brigade commander, once the brigade arrived.<sup>272</sup> Also in February, another 322 men of 7 FF arrived in Somalia to make up the regular complement of a standard infantry battalion. 7 FF became part of 6 Independent Brigade upon its arrival. Other units included 6 Punjab, 10 Baloch and 1 Sind. The incoming units were ferried on chartered

<sup>271</sup> Alison Mitchell, “Angry Crowd of Somalis Disrupts Visit to Mogadishu by U.N. Chief,” *New York Times*, January 4, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/04/world/angry-crowd-of-somalis-disrupts-visit-to-mogadishu-by-un-chief.html> (accessed October 11, 2017).

<sup>272</sup> Interview Maj Gen Asif Doraiz Akhter (retired), 16 December 2017.

commercial flights and had limited rations because they weren't as yet on the UN system of logistics. Few days after 6 Punjab landed in Mogadishu, a commercial ship bringing in supplies for them anchored in the harbor. Col Asif Doraiz Akhter was asked by the ship's captain to offload the rations as early as possible because there were only 24 to 36 hours before the ship resumed its journey to the US. Before arrangements could be made to unload, Marines operating the port refused to allow the offloading of the cargo because Pakistan was a sanctioned nation under the Pressler Amendment. The problematic situation was resolved after the Pakistani SLO brought it to the notice of Lt Gen Johnston, the MEF Commander. The American general called home to get necessary political clearances. It goes to his credit of the American general that after the matter was sorted out he directed all his commanders in Mogadishu to have the supplies delivered in location to the Pakistani unit. A grave situation had been averted but it goes to show the kind of tightrope Pakistan was walking.<sup>273</sup>

The Pakistani Brigade had an average strength of 5000 troops and was given the responsibility of the Central Sector with its Headquarters in Mogadishu. It was tasked to undertake cordon and search operations, anti-hijacking operations and establish medical camps. After the 5 June 1993 incident, the Pakistani Brigade was reinforced with a tank regiment and an aviation squadron. Its strength would eventually grow to roughly 7000 troops. Brigadier Ikram ul Hassan took over as the Brigade Commander in April 1993. A very competent and thorough officer he had expected a 'substantive meeting' to integrate the military, humanitarian and diplomatic plans but none took place and he had to make his own interpretation to deal with the situation.<sup>274</sup> Nonetheless, there was no lack of enthusiasm, when he spoke to the press upon taking charge to announce that it was "a great honor and privilege" for him and his soldiers to be in Somalia to rebuild a nation.<sup>275</sup>

Not only did the Pakistani contingent provide escorts for the humanitarian convoys and distribute food, it also provided medical aid. A tier two hospital was established in the soccer stadium in April 93 to provide free medical and surgical outpatient services. The hospital had a

<sup>273</sup> Ibid.

<sup>274</sup> Dr. Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations* (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2002), 212, <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/books/SIPRI02Findlay.pdf> (accessed October 6, 2017).

<sup>275</sup> Mark Fineman, "Regional Outlook: Now it's their Turn: When the U.N. takes control of Somalia today, it begins a \$1.5-billion experiment. 'We are here to re-establish a nation,' says the new commander," *LA Times*, May 5, 1993, [http://articles.latimes.com/1993-05-04/news/wr-31265\\_1\\_united-nations](http://articles.latimes.com/1993-05-04/news/wr-31265_1_united-nations) (accessed January 16, 2016).

laboratory and X-ray facilities. It pursued an Expanded Program of Immunization (EPI) in collaboration with UNICEF. It also provided anti-TB cover under an anti-tuberculosis program. According to a World Health Organization (WHO) report of that period noted that:

TB is endemic in Somalia and one of the main causes of morbidity and mortality. Aside from security TB in Somalia is reported as the greatest barrier to stability and economic development. The civil war caused an unprecedented collapse of the national TB Control Programme.<sup>276</sup>

A Dental Centre at the Pakistani hospital provided oral care. Over 100,000 Somali men, women and children benefited from the services provided by 8 specialist doctors, 12 general duty medical officers and 180 paramedics from Pakistan. In addition, the Pakistan UNOSOM Hospital provided indoor treatment to the Somalis, a facility, which had ceased to exist after the withdrawal of US and Swedish troops. This Pakistani hospital had 26 doctors and 6 ICU trained nurses and was fully equipped to undertake advanced treatment in surgical, neurological, ophthalmic, ENT, gynecology, skin, child specialization and dental ailments.<sup>277</sup>

### **Organization of UNOSOM HQ**

UNOSOM HQ consisted of military and political wings. The latter was supposed to provide the political direction and the military wing was to execute it. The military wing was required to provide protection to not only the civilian staff of UNOSOM in their peacekeeping efforts but also extend support to the humanitarian agencies on ground. The dependence of the political wing on the military for their safety and security had drastically eroded their primacy. The extremely hostile environments, sense of superiority of the military leaders and the uninterrupted and independent operations by the US Special Forces had created a strategic imbalance within the political and military wings of the UNOSOM.

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<sup>276</sup> Dr. Firdosi R Mehta, MO STB & Dr. N. Mojadidi WR, WHO Somalia, DOTS implementation in complex emergencies –Somalia’s experience, [www.who.int/disasters/repo/5865.doc](http://www.who.int/disasters/repo/5865.doc) (accessed June 12, 2018).

<sup>277</sup> United Nations Operations in Somalia, (UNOSOM, UNITAF, UNOSOM II), Pakistan Army website, <https://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=57> (accessed January 12, 2017).

The SRSG, retired US Admiral Jonathan Howe was the political head of UNOSOM II. Howe believed in the use of force and in doing so greatly restricted the use of diplomacy to bring peace. His muscular approach brought grief to UNOSOM.

The UNOSOM HQ was divided into several branches. Political officers, regular / non regular UN employees, were distributed into these branches:

- a. Political Branch
- b. Personnel Branch
- c. Logistics / Supplies
- d. Legal Branch
- e. Humanitarian Branch
- f. Media cell.
- g. SRSG Information Operation Cell (SIOC)
- h. Finance Branch
- j. Security

The main branches of the military wing were: -

- a. U-1 (Personnel Branch)
- b. U-2 (Intelligence Branch)
- c. U-3 (Operations Branch)
- d. U-4 (Logistics, Engineers, Medical)
- e. U-5 (Civilian Military Affairs Office)
- f. U-6 (Signals)

The FHQ consisted of multinational military personnel from twenty-eight different countries. It was headed by Turk Lieutenant General Çevik Bir. At the end of his term, he was later replaced by Malaysian Lieutenant General Aboo Samah bin Aboo Bakr. The deputy force commander throughout the tenure was US Major General Thomas Montgomery. It was quite well known that he wielded the real power. The FHQ had a multinational staff including officers from Pakistan, India and a number of other nations. The chief of staff (COS) was a

Pakistani officer, Brigadier (later Major General) Anis Ahmed Bajwa. He was succeeded by another Pakistani officer Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) Ghulam Muhammad.

The UNOSOM forces included troops from Pakistan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, France, Bangladesh, Nepal, Egypt, Sweden, Norway, Italy, Romania, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Tunisia, Turkey, Morocco, India, USA and Botswana. Each contingent had a national liaison officer (LO) at the FHQ. The LO acted as the interface between the FHQ and the national contingent. The Joint Operations Center (JOC) was the nucleus of all the military activities in Somalia. It was manned 24/7 by a team of multi-national officers without any break. It was also linked with the operations room in UN HQ in New York and HQ CENTCOM in Tampa, Florida. For the purpose of operational communications, the JOC had two separate means of communications i.e., the Motorola wireless set and telephone. All other administrative activities were routed through the LOs. The contingent commanders had the option of raising important issues directly with the Force Commander in the morning briefs. All operational plans were cleared by the FHQ.

Initially UNITAF and UNOSOM operated parallel to each other. UNITAF deployed some 37,000 personnel over forty percent of southern and central Somalia. The commander of UNITAF Major General Thomas Montgomery was simultaneously the deputy force commander of UNOSOM II. In March 1993, UNITAF was merged into UNOSOM II in accordance with UNSC Resolution 814 of 26 March 1993 with a mandate to operate in the entire country with more force and resources.<sup>278</sup> The American contingent remained outside the UNOSOM command. UNOSOM II had an authorized strength of 28,000 military and police personnel and approximately 2,800 international and local civilian staff. 4,761 Pakistani soldiers formed part of UNOSOM II. Their strength would rise to over 7000 troops. After the Americans left in 1994, the Pakistani contingent was the largest among those left behind. UNOSOM II was withdrawn in early March 1995.

The task of UNOSOM II was to establish a secure environment throughout Somalia, to achieve national reconciliation so as to create a democratic state. It was to complete, through

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<sup>278</sup> UNSCR 814, adopted by the UNSC in its 3118<sup>th</sup> meeting on 26 March 1993, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Chap%20VII%20SRES%20814.pdf> (accessed November 23, 2016).

disarmament and reconciliation, the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. The revised mandate included *inter alia*, assisting the Somali parties in implementing the Addis Ababa Agreements, aiding in the reorganization of the Somali police and judicial system, and helping in various aspects of the country's political process.<sup>279</sup> As per Resolution 814, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNOSOM II was given eight broad tasks:

- Monitoring the factions to maintain peace.
- Preventing and responding to outbreaks of fighting.
- Controlling heavy weapons.
- Confiscating small arms from those who were unauthorized to possess them.
- Securing all ports and lines of communication.
- Protecting UN personnel and installations.
- Continuing mine-clearing efforts.
- Repatriating refugees and displaced persons.<sup>280</sup>

At the Secretary General's guidance, military operations consisted of four phases:


- Assuming operational control from UNITAF.
- Deploying and assuming operational control across Somalia.
- Scaling down military activity and turning greater authority over to civil officials.
- Redeploying or reducing UNOSOM II forces.<sup>281</sup>

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<sup>279</sup> UNSCR 897, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/065/62/PDF/N9406562.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed Oct 3, 2016).

<sup>280</sup> Robert F. Baumann and Lawrence A. Yates with Versalle F. Washington, "My Clan Against the World" US and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992-1994 (Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth), 99.

The area of operation of UNOSOM was divided into four sectors. Pakistani Brigade was given the central sector of Mogadishu, which was the very hotbed of conflict. The North Eastern Sector (Bosaaso) was under the Canadians, the North Western Sector (Berbera) was under the Germans and the Southern Sector (Kismayo) was under the Egyptians. The units of the Pakistani Brigade were deployed in southern Mogadishu. This area was the stronghold of the supporters of General



Aidid. 7 FF was deployed in and around Mogadishu airport. 10 Baloch was deployed in the stadium and its area of responsibility included the Bakaara market area. 6 Punjab was deployed in the Military Academy. The green line separated the North and South Mogadishu administrative districts within the Banadir region. It also served as the de facto boundary and no man's land between the warring factions. North Mogadishu included the North Banadir districts of Karan, Abdul-Aziz, Shibus, Wardhiigley, Bondhere, Shangani, Heliwa, and Yaqshid and had a population of up to 500,000. It was dominated mainly by the Abgaal clan, but also had a fair sprinkling of Murusade, Ujejen and Hawadle clans, all under Ali Mahdi's political leadership. Majority of the population residing there comprised businesspeople, selling and trading in food, fuel, clothing, and cigarettes.

Under the Addis Ababa agreement all parties to the conflict had agreed to voluntarily deposit their weapons, arms and ammunition at designated as Authorized Weapons Storage Sites (AWSS). These arsenals were to be used to equip the security and law enforcement agencies of the country, whenever they came into being. These sites were to be guarded by the warring factions themselves. The inventories of the AWSS were to be regularly checked by

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<sup>281</sup> Ibid, 100.

UNOSOM inspectors to prevent pilferage. The inspection of one of the AWSS would become the main cause of the infamous 5<sup>th</sup> of June tragedy.

### **The 5 June Incident: A Very Sad Day**

After their dramatized entry into Somalia, the US forces adopted a very tough stance. The situation began to get tense and relations between Aidid and the UN/US forces deteriorated leading to the massacre of two dozen Pakistani soldiers on 5 June 1993. This incident changed the nature of peacekeeping in Somalia from a humanitarian effort to open war with Aidid and his faction.<sup>282</sup> Aidid was given the status of Public Enemy Number One, and the mission profile changed to target him.<sup>283</sup>

From available accounts, it is known that the UNOSOM HQ had planned an inspection of the AWSS located in Mogadishu on 5 June under the Addis Ababa Accord. South Mogadishu was Aidid's territory and was in the area of responsibility of the Pakistani brigade. The Italians were looking after northern Mogadishu under the control of the friendly warlord Ali Mahdi. In hindsight the mission to inspect SNA weapon caches was ill advised and ill planned; and was like touching a hornet's nest.<sup>284</sup> The intrusion into the radio station actually backfired and set into motion events that spiraled out of control and led to the ultimate demise of the peacekeeping operations in Somalia.

The 4 June inspection of the SNA AWSS was authorized by April Glaspie, the political advisor to the SRSG Jonathan Howe.<sup>285</sup> Glaspie was known to be openly hostile to Aidid and favored Mahdi.<sup>286</sup> Two US officers were to accompany the Pakistani peacekeepers for the

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<sup>282</sup> Ambush in Mogadishu, Interview with Robert Oakley, [www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/oakley.html](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/oakley.html) (accessed January 12, 2017).

<sup>283</sup> Papicek, "15 Years ago today...," *European Tribune*, April 6, 2009, <http://www.eurotrib.com/?op=displaystory;sid=2009/4/6/346/31275> (accessed August 14, 2017).

<sup>284</sup> Interview of Col (retired) Qadeer Ahmed (GSO III Intelligence in the Brigade HQ) on 14 November 2017.

<sup>285</sup> As the US Ambassador in Baghdad, Glaspie had earned notoriety for giving the green signal to Saddam Hussein to attack Kuwait in 1990. She had denied charges in an inconclusive congressional hearing of her role in letting the Iraq attack Kuwait. For a brief time, she became an ambassador-in-residence at a San Diego university. In 1993, she returned to active duty at the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs and became embroiled in the controversy of provoking Somali warlord Mohammed Aidid's hostility.

<sup>286</sup> Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995), 304.

inspection that had been refused by SNA.<sup>287</sup> Mohammad Hasan Awale known informally as Abdi Qeybdiid; Aidid's interior minister had not only rejected the idea but also warned that weapon inspection would mean 'war.'<sup>288</sup> Qeybdiid would remain in the news in times to come. On 12 July 1993 his house was raided (refer to raid on Abdi's house). This presaged the infamous 3<sup>rd</sup> of October US Special Forces operation in which he was apprehended. This event has been depicted in the *Black Hawk Down* film. Later in life, he became the police chief of Mogadishu in 2001. In 2006 he fought with the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT) against the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). In 2012 he became the President of the semi-autonomous zone of Galmudug.

The SNA was particularly sensitive about the weapon storage site co-located with their radio station.<sup>289</sup> Pakistanis were not informed about SNA's rejection of the inspection. The Pakistani Chief of Staff (COS) at the Force HQ Brig Anis Bajwa blames Thomas Montgomery, the deputy commander, who was actually calling the shots in the Force Headquarters, for his callous attitude in sending the soldiers to their deaths without taking necessary precautions. Brig Bajwa was not present on that fateful day. He would join the HQ on 10 June.<sup>290</sup> One wonders if things had been any different, had he been around and had been part of the decision making? It is one of the great 'ifs' of history.

As per program eight AWSS in Mogadishu were to be inspected. Five belonged to Aidid and three to Ali Mahdi, as follows:

1. AWSS 1 and 4. These were located in the AOR of 6 Punjab north of the 21 October Road opposite the Somali Military Academy. The AWSS were guarded by company strength of SNA fighters.
2. AWSS 3. This was largest weapon storage site and was located two kilometers from Somali Army's 5<sup>th</sup> Tank Brigade camp. 400 Somalis guarded it at all times. It was the responsibility of 10 Baloch to check it.

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<sup>287</sup> Brian Cloughley, *A History of Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2014), 522.

<sup>288</sup> James S. Sutterlin, *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Security: A Challenge to be Met* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 71.

<sup>289</sup> Cloughley, *A History of Pakistan Army*, 522.

<sup>290</sup> Interview with Major General Anis Bajwa, Chief of Staff in the Force HQ.

3. AWSS 4 and 5. This included the broadcasting station of Radio Mogadishu being used by SNA for propaganda purposes. Two APCs were stationed there to defend it. 7 FF was given the task to inspect it.
4. AWSS 9. This was located at Mogadishu – Afgoye Road in the training center of the Special Forces of the former Somali Army. There were few if any arms stored here. 1 Sind was tasked to inspect it.
5. USC AWSS. The Italian contingent located within the Italian Embassy was given the task of checking Ali Mahdi's weapon sites. They declined by informing the authorities that they had already conducted the inspections a month ago and there was no need for another one now. This worked well with the Somalis and naturally Aidid was annoyed why Pakistanis were inspecting their weapon sites, when the Italians weren't.<sup>291</sup>

Although Pakistani peacekeepers had no inkling regarding the underlying tensions with SNA, as per SOP they did carry out reconnaissance of the weapon sites but did not notice anything out of the ordinary that could have alerted them of the impending disaster. So, they went for the inspection without any additional firepower or extra security precautions and travelled in soft skinned vehicles.<sup>292</sup> Only 7 FF, a mechanized unit, had brought along its APCs and had loaned four each to other infantry units. These vehicles could only protect the soldier from small arm fire. Protection in real terms was in any case scarce. Not everyone, who went out on the mission that day was wearing body armor. Flak jackets were in short supply.<sup>293</sup>

The units were tasked to simultaneously carryout weapon inspections and distribute food at the designated food distribution sites (FDS). Had they known that some mischief was afoot they could have suspended one activity and kept some men as ready reserves. There were no operational reserves at the brigade level. 1 Sind was located in Afgoye, 25 kilometers outside Mogadishu; and was not in a position to reinforce the other elements of the brigade in quick time.

The inspectors faced problems at AWSS 4 and 5, where the radio station of Gen Aidid forces was located. The Pakistani peacekeepers entered the radio station compound accompanied by two Americans in plainclothes. The Somali guards told the inspectors that

<sup>291</sup> Abdul Mateen Mahsood, *Yaad-i-Ayaam* (unpublished manuscript), 120.

<sup>292</sup> Brian Cloughley, *A History of the Pakistan Army Wars and the Insurrection* (Karachi: OUP, 2014), 518-523.

<sup>293</sup> Interviews with peacekeeping veterans of UN operations in Somalia.

there were no weapons at that site. The Americans insisted and broke down the locks with hammers but found no weapons inside. The forced entry into the weapon stores was broadcast on the radio. The news spread like wildfire and a crowd gathered outside. Shots were fired in the air to disperse the angry people. A Somali tried to snatch a rifle from a Pakistani soldier. In the ensuing scuffle the Somali was shot dead. The situation aggravated and the unrest spread to other parts of the city. Gunshots could be heard in various areas as Aidid supporters vented their anger.<sup>294</sup> Pakistani and Turkish soldiers guarding the UN headquarters were attacked with automatic weapons and hand grenades. The brunt of the Somali anger was borne by a Pakistani convoy that was caught in a “carefully prepared three-sided ambush” on 21 October Road. The trapped soldiers returned fire and took casualties as they waited for tank and gunship support that was late in coming. Those blamed for the ambush were identified as members of SNA.<sup>295</sup>

As per the events recorded in 7 FF war diary:

B Company was assigned the task of inspecting the AWSS located in the Radio Station. Two platoons of C Company were kept in reserve at strong point 1. The operation commenced at 0700 hours with the inventory check. Entry into the area was smooth but soon thereafter a crowd began gathering outside the building. There was visible agitation against the Americans, accompanying B Company. The crowd became hostile and Pakistani troops fired in the air to keep them at bay. One Somali was shot dead as he tried to snatch a rifle from a soldier. At about 0945 hours the crowd started thinning out and approximately 200 people were left, who were effectively stopped from forcing their way into strong point 37 located opposite the Radio Station. The news about the incident spread like wildfire and firing incidents took place all over city.

At 1050 hours D Company was given standby orders to go for the protection of UNOSOM HQ as the situation was worsening. At 1100 hours D Company was ordered to move to UNOSOM HQ. At 1120 hours, C Company was tasked to rescue the men of 10 Baloch trapped in FDS 20. The rescue party came under heavy fire and couldn't make any headway. Subedar (warrant officer) Saleh Khan was critically wounded in the

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<sup>294</sup> Interview Maj Tariq Mahmood 7 FF (retd) October 17, 2017.

<sup>295</sup> Paul Lewis, “U.N. asks arrests of Somalia Killers,” *New York Times*, June 7, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/07/world/un-asks-arrests-of-somalia-killers.html?mcubz=3> (accessed August 14, 2017).

rescue attempt and was evacuated to the Swedish Hospital inside the US embassy compound. He later died of his wounds. Others, who lost their lives that day were Naik (Corporal) Muhammad Ghalib attached with 6 Punjab and Naik (Corporal) Imtiaz attached with 10 Baloch. All three had been hit standing in the commander's cupola. One wounded soldier Muhammad Amin was transferred to Germany for medical treatment.

Later in the afternoon, three officers of 7FF alongwith an officer of 6 Punjab as guide were sent to secure five US engineers, who had gone to inspect AWSS-3 housing heavy weapons. They recovered 52 Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) from this site, which were brought back on 7 FF APCs alongwith the US personnel. 11 personnel of 10 Baloch were still missing, so a search operation was launched. C Company Commander was ordered to take his men on 3 APCs. They were to be supported by Italian tanks. Marrying up was to take place at strong point 50. The Italians did not turn up at the appointed time and the mission was called off.

At 1858 hours CO Lt Col Kamal Aziz was fired upon once he was coming back from the 6 Punjab location at University Compound, where he had gone for inter-unit coordination. His driver Naik Ghulam Abbas was shot in his neck and had to be evacuated for medical treatment. He fortunately survived. The 2IC Maj Muqeem Shah, in the following vehicle fired and killed all three shooters.

At 1850 hours mortar rounds were fired at the battalion location but missed the target and fall into the sea. 5 June was very sad day for the unit, as it lost three brave men.<sup>296</sup>

Captain Hasnain was manning the duty room in New York and was regularly updating Mack McLarty, the Whitehouse COS as the events unfolded in Mogadishu.<sup>297</sup> Maximum casualties were suffered by 10 Baloch. The unit was hit at two places. A convoy returning after inspecting the AWS was ambushed on 21 October Road, a mile away from the abandoned stadium, where it was garrisoned. 50 troops were trapped in a virtual free-fire zone,

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<sup>296</sup> 7 FF War Diary.

<sup>297</sup> Personal email Brig Hasnain.

as they were picked up by pre-positioned snipers occupying dominating places such as rooftops on both sides of the road. The ambushed men fought back bravely, while waiting for reinforcements. Italian tanks backed by US helicopters arrived more than an hour later, as they steadily lost men under an unrelenting hail of fire.

The second incident occurred at FDS 20 in a crowded market area, where early morning distribution of food was being organized as per standard drill. 11 soldiers were guarding the site, when a sound truck began broadcasting instructions to attack the UN troops. Militiamen took up positions on rooftops around the distribution area, and women and children threw stones at the troops and provided cover to the attackers. The beleaguered troops fired back but ran out of ammunition after half an hour. Some of them were killed and others were made prisoners. Two rescue parties failed to reach the spot because of barricades erected to block the roads leading to the FDS. Two men were killed in these futile rescue attempts. Major Riaz, 10 Baloch was posthumously awarded Sitara-i-Jura'at (Star of Courage) for his bravery beyond the call of duty. Fifty-four Pakistani soldiers were wounded. After the attacks five men were reported to be in critical condition, while at least six had gone missing believed held by Aidid's militiamen.<sup>298</sup> At least one of the hostage was released through the efforts of Ambassador Alim, who had been Somalia's envoy in Islamabad and was favorably disposed towards Pakistan.<sup>299</sup>

After the bloody shootout, the streets of Mogadishu belonged to the looters. The UN immediately ordered the evacuation of non-essential staff members. More than 70 UN personnel were escorted by armored military vehicles to the airport to be flown to Nairobi. Also evacuated were about 50 UNICEF employees, about 50 from the German Technical Aid Agency (THW) and 50 relief workers from private agencies. Most aid flights were suspended and the entire relief and rehabilitation effort ground to a standstill.<sup>300</sup> This marked a victory for Aidid, who had effectively halted the UN and US operations to disarm his faction as a prelude to rebuild the country's social and political structures.

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<sup>298</sup> Lt Col Abdul Mateen Mehsud (retired), *Yaad-i-Ayyam*.

<sup>299</sup> Interview with Maj Gen Asif Doraiz Akhtar (retired), December 16, 2017.

<sup>300</sup> Keith B. Richburg, "Aid Staffs Pull out of Mogadishu: Violence that Killed 22 Soldiers Called 'Organized Ambush,'" *Washington Post*, June 7, 1993, <https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-950026.html> (accessed September 19, 2017).

The bone of contention was the radio station. The SNA blamed the peacekeepers for forcibly occupying it, while the UN accused the broadcasting station for spewing propaganda.<sup>301</sup> Despite the bloodshed, the radio station continued to operate. Aidid spoke from it and alleged that the Pakistani peacekeepers had tried to seize the radio station compound and had fired on peaceful protesters. UN military and diplomatic officials denied any attempt were made to take the station but one UN military official told reporters that troops did enter the compound as part of an authorized inspection of five designated weapons storage sites in the city. In an interview with a wire agency, Gen Aidid regretted the deaths of the Pakistanis but maintained that “innocent civilians had been massacred.”<sup>302</sup>

Violence continued to grip Mogadishu over the weekend. Pakistani peacekeepers were forced to fire back on stone throwing crowds and active shooters using women and children as human shields. Three people were killed on Saturday and twenty on Sunday. Although the Rules of Engagement (ROE) weren’t very clear, the commander of the Pakistani troops, Brig. Ikram ul Hassan, said his soldiers had fired at armed gunmen hiding in the crowd, after issuing warnings over loudspeakers and shooting into the air.<sup>303</sup>

In New York, Pakistan’s permanent representative to the UN Ambassador Jamsheed Marker requisitioned a special session of the Council to discuss the developments in Somalia. The 3229<sup>th</sup> meeting of the UNSC was convened on Sunday, June 6. Before the vote, Marker told the Council that Pakistan had been part of the UN peacekeeping efforts since its inception and was committed to the concept of collective security and to the UN Charter. He stressed that since the Pakistani casualties were by far the highest in the history of UN peacekeeping operations, therefore merely admonishing those behind the attack was not enough and that the

<sup>301</sup> Richard Bowden, “UN troops died ‘trying to take Somali radio station’: Security Council gropes for a response to peacekeepers’ death,” Independent, June 7, 1993, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/un-troops-died-trying-to-take-somali-radio-station-security-council-gropes-for-a-response-to-peace-1490300.html> (accessed June 8, 2017).

<sup>302</sup> “Operation restore truth,” The Free Library. 1994, American Humanist Association, <https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Operation+restore+truth.-a015493646> (accessed January 12, 2017).

<sup>303</sup> Donatella Lorch, “20 Somalis Die When Peacekeepers Fire at Crowd, *New York Times*, June 14, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/14/world/20-somalis-die-when-peacekeepers-fire-at-crowd.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed October 3, 2017).

perpetrators had to be swiftly brought to justice for the “murderous defiance” of the Council’s authority.<sup>304</sup>

On the sidelines of the special session, British journalists asked Marker, if his country would reconsider sending troops to Bosnia Herzegovina. Marker replied, “We do not run away from our commitments.”<sup>305</sup> There was good deal of sympathy for Bosnia in Pakistan and the public opinion wanted the government to firmly stand by the Muslim brothers and sisters in the Balkans in their hour of need. The parliament had echoed the public sentiment by passing a resolution condemning the attack on Bosnia Herzegovina. Government of Pakistan had recalled its ambassador from Belgrade and expelled the Serbian envoy in Islamabad. It had participated in the OIC foreign minister’s conference meeting held in Istanbul in which Serbian aggression had been roundly condemned. The Bosnian foreign minister Haris Silajdžić had visited Pakistan in August 1992 to a rousing welcome. Government of Pakistan had announced US \$ 10 million as grant and had extended a credit line of US \$ 20 million to the Government of Bosnia. It had also announced Pak Rs. 1 crore worth of humanitarian assistance and launched the Prime Minister’s Relief Fund for Bosnia Herzegovina.<sup>306</sup> Two official statements had come out of Islamabad in October 1992 regarding sending peacekeeping troops to Bosnia. On October 21 the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had stated that the Government of Pakistan was willing to commit troops for peacekeeping duties in Bosnia Herzegovina. On October 29, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Siddique Kanju, had said that his government attached great importance to the sovereignty and integrity of Bosnia Herzegovina and the preservation of the character and identity of its predominantly Muslim population.<sup>307</sup>

After the special session in New York, UNSCR 837 was unanimously passed the very next day strongly condemning the killing of the Pakistani peacekeepers and demanding the “arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment” of those responsible. It called upon the commander of the UN forces in Somalia to take action against those who had incited the

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<sup>304</sup> Situation in Somalia, *Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security*, 425, [http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/93-95/Chapter%208/AFRICA/93-95\\_8-6-SOMALIA.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/93-95/Chapter%208/AFRICA/93-95_8-6-SOMALIA.pdf) (accessed November 22, 2017).

<sup>305</sup> Masood Haider, “Killing of Pakistani soldiers: UN Council calls for appropriate measures,” *Dawn*, June 7, 1993, p 1.

<sup>306</sup> Statement of the Minister under Rule 87, reg. Aggression against Bosnia Herzegovina, *The National Assembly of Pakistan Debates: Official Report* (12 August 1992): 890-891.

<sup>307</sup> Pakistan and the World (Chronology: October-December 1992), *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (January 1994): 113.

attacks and who had killed, wounded and kidnapped Pakistani soldiers. It called upon an urgent inquiry into the “incident with particular emphasis on the role of those factional leaders involved.” The resolution also urged member states to provide the peacekeepers in Somalia with better arms, including “armored personnel carriers, tanks and attack helicopters” so that they could “confront and deter armed attacks.”<sup>308</sup> The Russian representative called for the creation of an international tribunal to try those accused of committing crimes against the UN peacekeepers and banishing those found guilty to the British-owned Atlantic island of St. Helena, the site of Napoleon’s final exile.<sup>309</sup> UNSCR 837 did not directly name Farah Aidid as the person behind the attack but in due course of time he became the prime target of the US and UN forces.

It is a moot point whether coercive methods like forcible disarmament should have been used in a tribal society, where parting with one’s weapon is a matter of dishonor and disgrace. Similar attitudes exist in different forms in other parts of the world e.g., in the tribal areas of Pakistan personal weapon is an essential accoutrement of the male dress and in the cities and towns move about with armed guards to flaunt their power and prestige. The Americans themselves are also well-known for their fondness of guns. Their obsession with the First Amendment that allows them the right to bear arms can be traced back to the pioneering days, when the white man was trying to ‘settle’ the Wild West. In the US, the National Rifle Association (NRA), the biggest advocate of personal weapons is so strong that even elected governments are fearful of taking up the issue of gun control with them, despite the all too frequent killing sprees by armed to the teeth fringe lunatics. Had the Pakistanis known that the Somalis were averse to being disarmed they would have been more careful and wary of the consequences of such an exercise.

One thing is, however, quite clear that 5 June incident was the first step in the unravelling of the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia. The Americans only realized the pain when they lost eighteen men in a futile mission on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of October to catch the ever-elusive Aidid. That incident would prove to be the last coffin in the nail of the UNOSOM II.

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<sup>308</sup> UNSCR 837 (6 June 1993), available at <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/837>.

<sup>309</sup> Paul Lewis, “U.N. Asks Arrests of Somalia Killers,” *New York Times*, June 7, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/07/world/un-asks-arrests-of-somalia-killers.html> (accessed September 6, 2016).

## Raid on Aidid's House and Atto's Garages

After the 5<sup>th</sup> of June incident, Howe and senior UN military officials embarked on a highly personalized manhunt for Aidid.<sup>310</sup> On 13 and 14 June 1993, AC 130 gunships attacked what was believed to be illegal arms and ammunition caches in Aidid's Enclave. Osman Atto's Garage was struck on 13 June and Aidid's Garage the following day. In addition to the AC 130 strikes, a BM–21 rocket launcher was observed, engaged and destroyed by a QRF attack helicopter in Aidid compound on 14 June.<sup>311</sup> On 17 June, a raid was launched to catch Aidid from his house located in front of Digfer Hospital. The hospital constructed by the Soviets in the 1960s and was a familiar landmark of the city.<sup>312</sup> The hospital has been recently revived by the Turks and renamed Erdogan Hospital. The attack on Aidid's enclave began past midnight, as Cobra helicopters and AC 130H Spectre gunships pounded it with cannon fire and missiles. Helicopters swooped in low over the streets, illuminating them with powerful searchlights. At one point, aerial bombardment was halted for about 30 minutes, and announcements were made on loudspeakers in Somali and English warning people to leave their homes. The warning was repeated twice before shelling resumed. At dawn, UN troops stormed Aidid's home and Atto's garage but found the houses deserted. Neither Aidid nor his top aides Atto and Omar Jess were there. Pakistani, Moroccan, Italian, and French troops participated in the ground operations and the Italian and Moroccan tanks had laid out the outer cordon. The targets included Aidid's house, the house of his ally Col. Omar Jess and Atto's garage. 6 Punjab and 7 FF of the Pakistani brigade had led the ground attack. The operation proved to be an exercise in futility as the high value targets were not found there.<sup>313</sup>

By evening, hospitals reported that more than 60 Somalis had been killed and an estimated 100 wounded. At least 5 UN peacekeepers – 4 Moroccans and a Pakistani – were also killed and 44 UN troops were wounded. After the battle, the UNOSOM leadership

<sup>310</sup> Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (CCRP Publication Series), 17, [http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Allard\\_Somalia.pdf](http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Allard_Somalia.pdf) (accessed November 21, 2016).

<sup>311</sup> United States Forces, Somalia After Action Report and Historical Overview: The United States Army in Somalia, 1992–1994, (Center of Military History United States Army Washington, D.C., 2003), 130, <https://history.army.mil/html/documents/somalia/SomaliaAAR.pdf> (accessed February 13, 2018).

<sup>312</sup> Hussein Mohamed Adam & Richard Ford, *Mending Rips in the Sky: Options for Somali Communities in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (Red Sea Press, 1997), 184.

<sup>313</sup> 7 FF War Diary.

officially called for the arrest of Aidid blaming him for the June 5 killing of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers. It was hoped that Aidid would give himself up willingly. A rather forlorn expectation from a warlord that had refused to accept defeat.<sup>314</sup>

On 17 June, Adm. Howe announced a reward of US dollars 25000 for capturing Aidid. The money was to come from the UN.<sup>315</sup> Within days, the Somalis issued a wanted poster of their own. The walls of Mogadishu were plastered with rough photocopied handouts offering \$1 million to anyone who handed over the UN special envoy in Somalia, Adm. Jonathan Howe, referred to in posters as ‘Animal Howe.’ The retired Navy officer, like his Somali nemesis, was rarely seen. The civilian UN staffers were getting the impression that military was fast losing control over the capital and that the mission was unraveling because Admiral Howe had been outmaneuvered and outwitted in the battle of wills with the Somali General.<sup>316</sup>

Raids were also conducted on Atto’s garages on 24 and 28 June without much luck.<sup>317</sup>

### **Raid on Abdi’s House (12 July 1993)**

The mission to catch Aidid continued apace. Another high-profile attack was launched on 12 July against a Habr Gidr clan gathering scheduled to be held in the so-called Abdi house. This place was suspected of being SNA HQ. The meeting at Abdi Hassan Awale aka Abdi Qeybdiid’s house in Mogadishu was to discuss the peace offer made by Adm. Howe. This was a well-publicized meeting bringing together important civilian clan members and militia leaders to consider the prospects of peace in the country. Those attending the conference included businessmen, lawyers, college graduates, religious leaders, traditional elders and the clan’s best-known poet. Many clan members were supporting the peace initiative and were ready to abandon General Aidid’s warlike policies. The meeting was considered a fair target and Howe got the approval from Washington to launch a military strike against it. Once the

<sup>314</sup> Donatella Lorch, “Troops Storm Somali Chief’s House but He’s Gone; U.N. Attack in Mogadishu Follows Hours of Bombing by U.S.,” *New York Times*, June 18, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/18/world/troops-storm-somali-chief-s-house-but-he-s-gone-un-attack-mogadishu-follows.html?pagewanted=all&mcubz=1> (accessed August 29, 2017).

<sup>315</sup> Ambush in Mogadishu: Interview with Admiral Howe, *Frontline*, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/howe.html> (accessed August 14, 2017)

<sup>316</sup> Donatella Lorch, “THE SOMALIA MISSION: United Nations; Envoy, With Glass Half Full, Toasts Operation in Somalia despite Critics,” *New York Times*, October 9, 1994, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/09/world/somalia-mission-united-nations-envoy-with-glass-half-full-toasts-operation.html> (accessed October 3, 2017).

<sup>317</sup> Col Abdul Mateen Mehsud, *Yaad-i-Ayam*, 140.

Somalis had assembled, helicopter gunships blew up the place with sixteen missiles. Helicopters fired their machine guns to decimate the survivors. Casualty estimates vary but mostly likely 73 died and 175 were wounded. Those killed were mostly civilians and included women and children. The Somalis took this attack as the ultimate breach of faith. They could not trust the Americans any longer.<sup>318</sup>

### **The Commission of Inquiry**

A commission of inquiry was instituted pursuant to UNSCR 885 of 16 November 1993 to investigate into the 5 June armed attacks that had resulted in unusually high number of casualties among the peacekeepers. The chairman of the Commission was Mathew M.S.W. Ngulube, former chief justice of Zambia. Lt. Gen. Gustav Hägglund of Finland and Lt. Gen. Emanuel Erskine (retd.) of Ghana were its members. The executive secretary of the commission was Winston Tubman, former justice minister of Liberia. The report was published on 24 February 1994.<sup>319</sup> From the composition of the Commission it is quite clear that it was a fairly neutral body. There were three Africans and one European in it.

The report candidly admitted that the opinion of the Commission was divided on the question of whether the weapon inspection of 5 June was genuine or a cover up for reconnaissance and seizure of Radio Mogadishu. The radio station had been declared an AWSS by USC/SNA themselves. Under the plan prepared by UNOSOM, Aidid was to be given 12 hours' notice and four Pakistani units were to carry out the inspection. The inspecting teams were to be of a company strength each. Three of the teams were to inspect one sites each, while one was to inspect two sites.

At AWSS 5 (Radio Mogadishu), US Special Forces technicians were to make a survey of the radio broadcast and transmission equipment. This last instruction clearly indicates that the inspecting team at AWSS 5 was exceeding its mandate. Whether Pakistanis were aware of

<sup>318</sup> William P. Meyers, "A Massacre in Mogadishu: July 12, 1993," November 14, 2013, [http://www.iipublishing.com/blog/2013/11/blog\\_11\\_04\\_2013.html](http://www.iipublishing.com/blog/2013/11/blog_11_04_2013.html) (accessed December 28, 2017).

<sup>319</sup> Report on the Commission of Inquiry Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885 (1993) to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II Personnel which led to causalities among them, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/SOMALIA%20S%201994%20653.pdf> (accessed November 23, 2017).

this is not clear. However, the inspecting teams were told in no uncertain terms that if they were denied access they would have to force an entry and that they could expect “hostile reaction” and “lack of cooperation from its leadership.” In view of the risk involved, the Pakistanis had recommended that SNA reaction to the proposed inspection should be communicated to them. The letter notifying the SNA leadership about the inspection was delivered at the residence of Aidid at 1700 hours on a Friday, a holiday.<sup>320</sup> The letter was addressed to Ambassador Alim, an advisor to Aidid. Since the action addressee was not present, the letter was handed over to Abdi Qeybdiid, Aidid’s close associate and minister of interior and security. The minister read the letter in the presence of the UNOSOM officers and told them that time was needed for a response and if an inspection was forced upon them “it would lead to war.” Lt Col McGovern noted USC/SNA objections in a draft memo that was signed by Col Giuseppe Pirotti, UNOSOM’s chief of intelligence. The memo was delivered to Maj Gen Thomas Montgomery, the acting commander in absence of Gen Bir, who was on leave.<sup>321</sup> Either by design or due to an oversight, the Pakistani brigade commander Brig Ikram ul Hassan was not kept in the information loop. The COS Brig Anis Bajwa joined the FHQ on 10 June after the incident, so he also did not know about the planned visits.<sup>322</sup>

According to the report, Pakistani inspection teams arrived simultaneously at all five inspection sites at 7 in the morning of 5 June. At around half past eight, a hostile crowd gathered at AWSS 5. Thirty minutes later the crowd increased to 200 men, women and children. Several men were seen inciting the crowd. A man was shot and killed trying to snatch a rifle from a Pakistani peacekeeper. Notwithstanding this incident, the inspection was completed and the inspecting party withdrew safely at 0930 hours. Meanwhile, another hostile crowd gathered at Feeding Point 20 on National Street and started pelting stones at 12 Pakistani soldiers deployed there. Men hiding behind women and children started firing small arms and rocket propelled grenades. Three soldiers were killed and six taken prisoners, out of whom one died in captivity. Four Pakistani APCs were rushed to retrieve the besieged men but were blocked and fired upon from the surrounding buildings. Some soldiers died and the APCs had

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<sup>320</sup> Ibid, 22.

<sup>321</sup> Ibid, 23.

<sup>322</sup> Exchange of email with Maj Gen Anis Bajwa (retd.), 2017.

to withdraw.<sup>323</sup> More APCs sent from the opposite direction were similarly blocked. At 1100 hours, the Pakistani Brigade asked UNOSOM HQ for Italian tanks as reinforcements, which they understood to be on half an hour's notice. The tanks did not reach the Feeding Point till 1600 hours. A Pakistani company returning from the inspection was ambushed on 21 October Road on its way to the Brigade HQ in the stadium. Barriers had been erected to hinder their progress and gunmen mingling with the crowd sprayed them with a hail of bullets. The fire became intense as they reached near the cigarette factory. Simultaneously strong points 42 and 50 also came under attack. The Pakistani Brigade again rushed reinforcements that were fired upon from shooters hiding in the Saudi Relief Agency building on 21 October Road. They were finally able to enter the area in the vicinity of strong point 89, near the cigarette factory, where the inspection team returning from AWSS 3 was trapped. Most of the soldiers including those from the QRF took shelter inside the cigarette factory. At 1320 hours US reconnaissance and Italian attack helicopters arrived on the scene. Unable to locate the hostile elements, the Italian helicopters fired their machine guns and killed three Pakistani soldiers. The helicopters withdrew after this error. The SNA machine gunners remained in position and continued to fire for the rest of the afternoon. By the end of the fighting, 24 Pakistanis were dead, 57 injured and six were missing. One died in captivity and five were released.<sup>324</sup> The Commission was of the view that on 5 June, UNOSOM learnt two lessons the hard way i.e., disarming hostile factions was a huge challenge and the militias on the 21 October Road were well armed and well prepared.

Responding to the Commission of Inquiry queries about being late in sending reinforcements, the Italian brigade commander insisted that his helicopters had been sent shortly after 1100 hours and that they were employed there for most of the afternoon. He claimed that he had moved an armored platoon and Tank Company on his own initiative from Balad although this was the job of the QRF. The permission to use tanks by UNOSOM HQ was given at 1400 hours. The tanks were moved for briefing to the port area, where they arrived at 1500 hours before proceeding to FP 20.

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<sup>323</sup> Ibid, 23.

<sup>324</sup> Ibid, 24.

The Commission very categorically declared UNSCR 837 faulty for hurriedly declaring SNA guilty of the incident the very next day and demanding punitive action without holding a proper inquiry.<sup>325</sup> In the Commission's view, UNSCR 837 aggravated the situation and created a virtual war like situation between UNOSOM II and SNA. In the next four months, the hostilities between the two parties unfolded in three distinct phases. In the first phase the UN launched offensive operations; in the second the SNA took the initiative; and in the third the US Special Forces independently took up the offensive. The Commission noted that UNSCR 837 had acknowledged UNOSOM II's lack of resources to meet a major confrontation and had urged the "rapid and accelerated deployment of all UNOSOM II contingents to meet the full requirements of 28,000, all ranks, as well as equipment." UNSCR 837 set the stage for a massive show of force by UNOSOM against the SNA. The military operations against the SNA could not begin immediately because it could jeopardize the safety of the Pakistani soldiers held in captivity and that of the international civilian staff, who had to be re-located to Nairobi. The UNOSOM II headquarters was also moved from the vicinity of the K4 traffic circle to the more secure premises formerly used by the US Embassy.

Before the onset of the counter offensive by UNOSOM forces, contradictory statements emerged from the USC/SNA camp. It praised the valor of the Somali people in resisting the UNOSOM forces but there was no direct admission of responsibility for the attacks. Instead, there was condemnation of 'wanton' attacks by the UNOSOM forces on peaceful Somali demonstrators. At the same time, Aidid called for an impartial inquiry into the causes of the attacks and offered to use his influence to calm the situation in Mogadishu. He also called on the UN to use peaceful means in handling the crisis. UNOSOM II felt nothing was acceptable short of Aidid and his top lieutenants submitting themselves to a judicial process to determine whether they were guilty or not. Airstrikes by UNOSOM II, followed by ground sweeps and arms searches in the heart of the so-called "Aidid enclave" in southern Mogadishu, marked the beginning of the war between UNOSOM II and the USC/SNA forces. UNOSOM II offensive started on 12 June 1993, with aerial bombardments and destruction of SNA weapons sites, including Radio Mogadishu. The Somalis reacted by staging a demonstration involving women and children near the Pakistani Strong Point (the former Egyptian Embassy) at K4. A shootout

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<sup>325</sup> Ibid, 24.

resulted in the deaths of civilians, as they marched towards the Pakistani unit's position. Later reports corroborated Pakistani accounts that the Somali gunmen had fired into the crowd in a deliberate attempt to give the impression that the Pakistanis were shooting unarmed civilians. This incident revealed the tactical dilemmas faced by UNOSOM II forces in conducting combat operations in the midst of a hostile civilian population.

On 17 June UNOSOM II launched a major cordon and search operation in the SNA enclave. The operation had been carefully planned and rehearsed. Action began at 0130 hours, with AC-130 gunships attacking residences of the SNA leaders. Before each strike the targeted building was illuminated, and occupants asked through loudspeaker announcements to move out. Before sunrise the area was cordoned off by Moroccan and Italian forces and Pakistani forces carried out the weapons search. Moroccan forces came under intense fire and had to be rescued by the French. Five Moroccan soldiers, including the battalion commander were killed and 40 wounded. The Moroccan blamed lack of information about SNA's strength and disposition, loss of surprise through several rehearsals and the vulnerable location of the cordon for the high number of casualties. Thereafter UNOSOM did not carry out any multinational search operations of this magnitude.

The Pakistani operation on Atto's Garage on 28 June had to be abandoned because they had come under heavy fire. Two soldiers were killed, and two others injured. On 2 July, Italian forces carried out a major search operation in Helivaa Village, one kilometer south of the Pasta Factory. The Italian Brigade commander got prior clearance for this operation from Rome but when confronted by hostile stone throwing crowd, he abandoned the mission. On their way back the Italians were ambushed on Imperial Road and suffered three dead and 29 wounded. They managed to extricate their forces and evacuate them to Strongpoint 42. The incident brought to head the simmering controversy between the UNOSOM II Force Command and the Italian Brigade. The Italians favored a softer approach and emphasized discussion and negotiation instead of the strict enforcement policy of UNOSOM II Command that had caused heavy casualties to the Pakistani forces. On 22 June, the Italians had protested against a QRF sweep of SNA weapons sites carried out in the Italian sector, without prior consultation. The Italians said the QRF sweep had left them to face the consequences.

UNOSOM II Force Command wished to teach the SNA a lesson by attacking Pasta Factory in full force on 2 July. They felt this goal was frustrated and the SNA morale boosted, when the Italians decided to disengage from the battle and withdraw from Strongpoint 42. The UNOSOM II force command also blamed the Italians for not returning fire, when attacked on 2 July. The Force Commander ordered the Italians to retake Strongpoint 42 by 10 July. On 9 July the Italians reoccupied Strongpoint 42 through negotiations with the SNA instead of using force as instructed. The Force Commander felt that the Italian approach reduced the effectiveness of UNOSOM II's punitive action against the SNA. The Italians were even accused of leaking information, letting arms pass through and paying bribes to the SNA so that their forces could be spared the militia's attacks. The Italians denied these accusations and maintained that in accordance with common UNOSOM II practice, they only gave food and paid for services rendered, and that their policy of negotiation had helped them maintain peace in their sector. The controversy received considerable publicity and contributed to the change in the pattern of the conflict during the first part of July. After 2 July the SNA gradually took the initiative and UNOSOM II initiatives were limited to a few search and sweep operations conducted mainly by the QRF. On the contrary the SNA increased its attacks dramatically from 6 July onwards and UNOSOM II fragmentary orders (fragos) after 8 July began referring to the adversaries as "enemy forces" instead of "hostile forces."

The bombing of Abdi house on July 12 may also have contributed to the change in the pattern of the conflict. In earlier operations like the one on 17 June, UNOSOM II had taken great pains to ensure that residents had time to abandon a house before it was bombed. In the 12 July attack no advance warning was given. The Somali casualties caused in this operation were considerable. UNOSOM II estimated the number of dead at 20; the ICRC gave figures of 54 dead and 161 injured, while the SNA declared 73 dead. Some accounts contradicted information given by UNOSOM II about the nature of the meeting held at the Abdi House on the day it was bombed. These accounts maintained that the meeting was of Habr Gidr elders, to discuss peace with UNOSOM II. From the date of this incident, the SNA closed its ranks and Somalis stopped giving information to UNOSOM II.

In June the SNA had used mainly small arms, hand grenades, RPGs and machine guns but from 6 July their mortar attacks became more frequent and more accurate. This kept both military and civilian personnel in a state of constant alert and fear. One person lost his life and nineteen were wounded because of mortar attacks. Ambushes against UN vehicles became more diversified. In addition to small arms and RPGs, mines and command detonated explosives were also used. To avoid being targeted, a fleet of UN vehicles was kept in Mogadishu harbor and unmarked leased cars with Somali numberplates were used in southern Mogadishu. Somali and national flags were flown on vehicles instead of the UN flag to avoid being attacked. Total number of casualties suffered in ambushes between 2<sup>nd</sup> July and 3<sup>rd</sup> October was 21 killed and 46 wounded.

In the absence of consensus, no political solution seemed at hand. SNA which considered itself as the leading force in the overthrowing the former government and the main building block of any future government in Somalia had been marginalized through UNOSOM actions on a wide front i.e. the Galcayo Conference, the Penal Code, the court appointments, the interpretation of the Addis Agreements and the control of Kismayo. Under the circumstances, the inspection of Radio Mogadishu on 5 June was ill advised but the Commission felt it did not justify the “viciousness of the SNA reaction.” UNOSOM Forces were unprepared for such kind of fighting and were taken completely by surprise. Several key personnel were away on the morning of 5 June, particularly the Force Commander, the Chief of Operations (COS) and the top political advisers. Some members of the Ceasefire and Disarmament Committee were completely unaware of the inspection exercise and were in a meeting in South Mogadishu when the attacks began. The bulk of the QRF, the main Force reserve for military challenges, was in Kismayo which was considered a more volatile place. Secondary reserves were not alerted from other contingents to assist the Pakistanis in case of emergencies. That's why, the Italian tanks could not be mobilized early to go to the assistance of the Pakistani troops under attack at FP20. Most importantly the report highlighted the fact that:

The failure to inform the Pakistanis about the SNA's hostile reaction to the inspection notification letter is also a relevant factor in assessing the number of casualties from the 5 June attacks.

The Pakistani commanding officer in his operational plans for the inspection recommended that he be informed of the SNA's response to the notification. The Pakistanis testified that they would have reorganized their inspection teams and equipped them with stronger fighting and protective vehicles to enhance their military posture had they been aware of the SNA's response.

In the absence of this information, the inspection teams kept to their soft-skin vehicles which made the men intensely vulnerable, resulting in heavy casualties.

Better information on attackers' preparation and military capabilities for sustained but limited armed hostilities could have helped Pakistani inspection teams to have been better prepared to withstand the attack with minimum casualties.

Even though the staff of the Force Command and the Pakistani contingent expected some opposition to their inspection, they could not assess the possibilities of armed confrontation, which came as a surprise to the entire UNOSOM command, both in magnitude and ferocity. The achievement of surprise on the part of the SNA militia partly accounted for the high level of casualties on the Pakistan inspection troops.<sup>326</sup>

According to the report, there was a serious lack of coordination between UNOSOM II's Military Planning Division and the Political Division, responsible for coordinating ceasefire and disarmament matters. Being fully aware of the sensitivity of Radio Mogadishu, the head of the Political Division conceded that he would have advised against the impracticality of inspection of the weapon site next to the radio station. Unfortunately, not only did UNOSOM II not have sufficient trained and experienced civilian advisers to assist in the decision making process, those experienced enough were mostly not consulted. Lack of coordination between the military and political divisions and inappropriate political advice contributed to the misjudgment of the sensitivity and timing of the inspections. There were no

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<sup>326</sup> Ibid.

seasoned peacekeepers among UNOSOM military leadership to render advice on the modalities of disarmament inspections based on established best practices. The use of force to achieve one's objective is at the heart of the military profession but in peacekeeping this is the option of last resort after all peaceful means have been exhausted.

UNSCR 814 had emphasized the need for disarmament.<sup>327</sup> This meant using military means. False assessment of SNA capabilities in comparison to own assets, made them believe it was safe to do so. Deficiencies in information gathering and converting it into actionable intelligence was the primary cause for the wrong appreciation of the situation. The worst case scenario envisioned for the inspections on 5 June did not expect anything beyond large demonstrations.

UNSCR 837 was interpreted as the authorization to not only hunt for Aidid and other SNA leaders but also to destroy their power sources i.e. the Radio Station and weapon stores. Although the UNOSOM offensive began gradually and initially avoided collateral damage but SNA responses expanded it into virtual urban warfare. It is arguable whether resolution 837 really envisaged bombing of houses, garages, radio stations and meetings.

The report contended that UNOSOM II operations were handicapped because US QRF and the Rangers were not under its control. Some UN commanders felt constrained in hunting down Aidid and suppressing the SNA resistance because they couldn't resort to equally inhuman practices as their adversaries. The flip side of the UNOSOM offensive was that it served to rally the Habr Gidr clan behind Aidid and his lieutenants. UNOSOM II's enforcement action in South Mogadishu among a civilian population traumatized by war quickly morphed into a nightmare. As a result UNOSOM II evacuated most of its civilian personnel to Nairobi but the Somali civilians had nowhere to go. The authors of the report felt that UNOSOM II contention that women and children were used by SNA as human shields would have carried greater weight had their forces not resorted to using modern and powerful weapons within an urban area after the 5 June incident. The attacks on Digfer Hospital, Abdi house and other sites in Mogadishu caused collateral damage apart from raising concerns whether these were legitimate military targets. The impression that the Commission got was

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<sup>327</sup> UNSCR 813 of 26 March 1993, available at <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/814>.

that UNOSOM II had embarked on a war of retaliation not just against the militia, who could not be adequately isolated, but against all Somalis, in South Mogadishu.

To its credit, UNOSOM II on many occasions warned the civilian population of impending military action to avoid noncombatant casualties but in the process lost surprise and exposed own troops to retaliation. Caught in a dilemma UNOSOM II erected a wall between its political and military personnel and civil authorities were often kept in the dark about military actions. This dual role, exercised simultaneously, caused harmful confusion within UNOSOM II and made it possible to depict them as an enemy of the Somali people. Since SNA became targets of UNOSOM II attacks after 5 June their counter attacks prolonged the war. After 2 July UNOSOM II bunkered down in its positions, whereas SNA activities and attacks multiplied. UNOSOM assessments, however, show repeatedly unfounded optimism. No reconciliation attempts were made by UNOSOM nor the UN in New York before the October 3, disaster.

UNOSOM lacked time, expertise and real-time intelligence to accurately pinpoint the dispositions, strength and capabilities of the SNA. UNOSOM failed to appreciate that Somali attackers were well armed men, reasonably skilled and commanded by well-trained former military officers. They had driven out Siad Barre and his national armed forces, with all their heavy war equipment and trained manpower resources. Clearly, the Somali armed men were not a bunch of rag-tag armed militia but were reasonably well organized and trained group under good command structure. To fight these groups, UNOSOM forces required better, well-coordinated command and control mechanism; and fighting vehicles that provided both firepower and protection, good communication system and adequate knowledge of terrain. UNOSOM's deficiency in all these areas resulted in its inability to respond effectively to the armed hostilities of 5<sup>th</sup> June and thereafter.

The UNOSOM II Force commander was not in effective control of several national contingents, which in varying degree sought approvals from their home authorities. This created immense problems for UNOSOM commander. This practice accounted for the long delay in arrival of reinforcements to support the besieged Pakistani inspection teams. Delays in execution of important tasks bordering on emergencies to support units in distress contributed

to increased loss of lives of troops. Where reaction from home authorities was in conflict with UNOSOM II instructions, the contingent commander was compelled to disobey the Force commander's instructions. Thereby creating political confrontation between the contributing government and the UN. Such situations were not helpful for the cohesiveness of UNOSOM II command. On the contrary, the quick response by the Malaysian and Pakistani contingents to join the QRF to rescue the Task Forces Ranger on their 3 October 1993 operation helped to save lives, clearly demonstrating the efficacy of unified command.<sup>328</sup>

Maj Gen Anis Bajwa (retired) claims that he had read the report of the international commission of inquiry and had confronted Maj Gen Montgomery about his role in planning the mission. The American general had shrugged it off as an error of judgment. In Bajwa's view, Montgomery was an extremely callous person and he had given his opinion about him to late Lt Gen Farrukh Khan, the CGS during a visit home. He says that he had also asked the COAS Gen Waheed Kakar to have Montgomery replaced. Gen Waheed had spoken to Commander CENTCOM Gen Hoar but nothing came off it because of Montgomery's strong links in Washington.<sup>329</sup>

## **Reaction in Pakistan**

The wanton killing of the peacekeepers in Mogadishu was reported a day late in the Pakistani papers. The means of communication with Somalia in the pre-Internet age were poor and there was no instant reporting. There was such a paucity of news that *Dawn*, the leading English daily published a report at the bottom of its front page in its 6 June issue quoting AFP/Reuters that three Pakistanis soldiers had been killed in Mogadishu. The report was largely based on the press conference held by UN military spokesman Major David Stockwell.<sup>330</sup> The *News* reported that 26 Pakistani soldiers had been killed on 6 June. The report was datelined Rome and carried information distributed by Reuters. The wire agency had copied a highly exaggerated report of the Italian news agency ANSA of an operation by 12 Italian tanks and APCs in which 80 Pakistani and 10 Americans trapped in the tobacco factory were rescued. It also reported that Italian helicopters had ferried 15 wounded Pakistani soldiers

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<sup>328</sup> Ibid.

<sup>329</sup> Based on exchange of emails and telephonic interviews with Maj Gen Anis Bajwa during 2017.

<sup>330</sup> "3 Pakistanis killed in Mogadishu," *Dawn*, June 6, 1993, p 1.

to safety.<sup>331</sup> On the contrary wounded Pakistani soldiers returning home complained that Italian tanks took five hours to cover a distance of just two kilometers, while they fended for themselves under intense fire. They also talked of a dearth of armored reinforcements and lack of helicopter cover, while on a patrol, a facility that was routinely made available to the Americans.<sup>332</sup> At that time there were neither any Pakistani reporters in Mogadishu nor a representative of the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) to feed the international press the correct perspective or keep the media back home informed about the happenings in Somalia. Some journalists attached with the ISPR and media teams of PTV, the state television were sent to Somalia after this incident.

At that time, the attention of the domestic press was completely focused on the confrontation between the prime minister and the president. The prime minister had been restored by the Supreme Court only ten days back after being sacked by the president in April. Obviously, the relationship between the two was extremely strained. One journalist recorded in his syndicate column that the two had sullenly shaken hands and muttered greetings under their breadth, when the two were forced to come together on the funeral of the soldiers who had fallen in the peacekeeping operations in Somalia.<sup>333</sup>

After their bodies were flown into Chaklala airbase on special PIA plane; the flag draped coffins were buried with full military honors. The entire civil and military leadership was at hand to pay their respects. Chairman of Pakistan People's Party (PPP) Benazir Bhutto registered her condolence on the deaths of the Pakistani soldiers.<sup>334</sup> The only political leader that called for the Pakistani troops to be called back was the Ameer (head) of Jamaat -i- Islami (JI) Qazi Hussein Ahmed. He was of the opinion that the Pakistani troops had been sent to Somalia to fulfil American designs and now that the Somalis were struggling to free themselves of the Americans it was against the national honor to have Pakistani troops there.<sup>335</sup>

<sup>331</sup> "26 Pakistani soldiers killed in Mogadishu: Italian news agency says 10 Pakistani troops missing, 50 wounded; reports rescuing 15 Pak Army soldiers," *News*, June 6, 1993, p 1.

<sup>332</sup> Shahzada Alam Khan, "Bodies of Martyrs Arrive Home," *The News*, June 9, 1993, p.1.

<sup>333</sup> "Of a Sullen Handshake and Horse Trading," in Zulfiqar Iqbal Mirza, *Last Man In: Selected Columns by Lahori* for Dawn 1984-2005 (Lahore: New Line, 2005), 122.

<sup>334</sup> "Benazir expresses her condolence on the martyrdom of Pakistani soldiers," *Jang*, June 7, 1993.

<sup>335</sup> "Pakistani troops should be recalled from Somalia: In the current situation it is against the national honor to have our troops there, Qazi Hussain Ahmed," *Jang*, June 7, 1993.

The *Dawn* in its editorial of 8 June lamented the tragedy but recommended that “the operation in Somalia should continue and voices calling for the withdrawal of the Pakistani contingent should be rejected as the call of cowards.”<sup>336</sup> This was a very powerful statement by the editor of a main stream newspaper.

On Monday, 7<sup>th</sup> of June, the proceedings of the National Assembly began on a somber note. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Muhammad Siddiq Kanju asked all members to join him in offering fateha prayers for the 22 officers and men, who had laid down their lives in Mogadishu. He announced that he would be making a short statement giving details of the incidents during the course of the day’s proceedings.<sup>337</sup> After a lengthy question and answer session, a point of order was raised by Liaquat Baloch, the representative of JI expressing his desire to speak on the issue of the Mogadishu killing through a call attention notice but before him the Speaker first allowed Member National Assembly (MNA) Malik Ghulam Muhammad Khan Tiwana to speak on a call attention notice. MNA Tiwana wanted the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs to address the urgent matter of the killing of 26 soldiers in Mogadishu Somali gunmen that had caused “grave concern amongst the people.”<sup>338</sup>

Minister Kanju responded by expressing the government’s shock and grief on the tragic incident in Mogadishu in which according to his information 23 and not 26 Pakistani peacekeepers had been “martyred and 54 others were wounded” because “of an unprovoked attack by the forces” belonging to Somali warlord Aidid. As per information received from the Pakistani High Commission in Nairobi, two injured soldiers out of the ten missing had been recovered. 5 more had been located and were in the process of being handed over to the Commander of the UN forces. The latest message from the Pakistani Commander in Mogadishu had expressed the hope that the remaining three missing soldiers, who were reportedly alive were expected to be recovered soon. The Minister said it was “clear that this attack was calculated and premeditated, instigated and conducted by the criminals commanded by Al-Adid (sic).” He said till then Pakistani troops had enjoyed relations of trust and confidence with the Somali people, as they were sharing their food with them and the Pakistani

<sup>336</sup> *Dawn*, Editorial, 8 June 1993.

<sup>337</sup> THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF PAKISTAN, DEBATES, OFFICIAL REPORT, Monday, the 7<sup>th</sup> of June, 1993 (17th Session), (Volume II contains Nos. 1 to 6): 67-68, available on National Assembly website

<http://www.na.gov.pk/>.

<sup>338</sup> Ibid, 182.

military hospital had provided medical treatment to 5000 local people suffering from malnutrition and disease. Therefore, it was logical to assume that the attack on Pakistani troops did not reflect any enmity on the part of the local population “rather it was the work of a group of criminals who in their own narrow interest are bent on blocking efforts to restore peace in Somalia.” Thereafter, the Minister briefly narrated the events of that had taken place in the morning of 5 June in Mogadishu. That day Pakistani troops under orders of UNOSOM headquarters had, pursuant to the Addis Ababa Accord signed by all warring parties, proceeded to check military equipment in the possession of the forces of Somali warlord Aidid. The operations were proceeding smoothly until Aidid’s forces suspected that “their illegal ammunition stores would be taken over by the UN.” A rumor was spread that Pakistani troops had captured the Somali Radio Station next door. The Radio Station broadcast false and mischievous information that it was under threat inciting the local people to come out on the streets. While returning to their base our troops came under heavy fire from Aidid’s forces. The Pakistani soldiers fought bravely but in suffered many casualties in the process. The House was informed that the Foreign Office had summoned the Somali envoy and a protest lodged at the unprovoked attack on the troops of a brotherly Muslim country operating under the UN flag. The Government had also set up an Emergency Cell in the Foreign Ministry to coordinate all actions pertaining to the situation. The relatives of the soldiers killed, or wounded were being kept informed by the Ministry of Defense. The permanent representative at the UN had been directed to call an emergency meeting of the Security Council to consider this grave incident. The Security Council had met on Sunday, in which Pakistan had called for investigation into this serious incident, punitive action against the perpetrators of the unprovoked attack and demanded full compensation for those killed or wounded. At the same time Pakistan had sought the UN’s commitment to supply the Pakistan’s contingents with additional equipment such as armored personnel carrier and helicopter gunships. The Security Council had adopted a resolution, which had strongly condemned the attack and asked for all necessary measures against those responsible for the dastardly act including those responsible for publicly inciting the attack. The resolution had also called for investigation, arrest, prosecution, trial and punishment for all those responsible for the attack. The resolution had asked member states to contribute on an emergency basis armored personnel carriers, tanks and attack helicopters to

enhance the capability of UNOSOM to effectively confront and deter armed attacks against them. Three most critically wounded Pakistani soldiers had been sent to a military hospital in Germany and 20 other injured troops were flying back on 9<sup>th</sup> June, accompanied by the German Medical Team. The bodies of the fallen soldiers were being flown back and were to be received with full honor. There was public outpouring of sympathy and grief by the international community. Messages of condolence had come from among others, the UN Secretary General Mr. Ghali and US President Clinton. Mr. Ghali who is visiting Tunisia had personally called on the Pakistani Ambassador to offer his condolences. All members of the Security Council had offered condolences with the Government and the people of Pakistan and had paid glowing tributes to the soldiers serving in Somalia. In his report to the Security Council, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) had expressed his appreciation and admiration for the courage and discipline exhibited by the Pakistani troops in very difficult circumstances. These sentiments had been clearly reflected in the UNSC resolution. The Minister stated that despite this tragic incident, Pakistan's commitment to the UN peacekeeping operations remained 'unshakable' and that it would maintain its traditional and firm support for an active role by the UN for the preservation and promotion of international peace and security. The Minister reminded the House that Pakistan was home to the UN Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), the oldest UN peacekeeping operation. Pakistan had contributed forces the UN peacekeeping duties in numerous situations. Presently Pakistani troops were deployed in Cambodia and Somalia under the UN Flag. Pakistan was also prepared to contribute forces for peace keeping in Bosnia Herzegovina. The Minister said that Pakistan had always enjoyed close and brotherly relations with Somalia and had assisted the Somali people in gaining independence. Pakistan had helped them in their war against foreign aggression and had given them generous assistance when their country was afflicted by drought and famine. Pakistan's participation in UN peacekeeping operation was prompted by the plight of Somali brethren facing the twin curse of civil war and hunger. He reiterated that the UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia was undertaken in response to UN Security Council decisions, which had been fully endorsed by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The Somali people had repeatedly requested the international community for continued and sustained help in restoring peace and stability to their country

and the majority of them had wholeheartedly welcomed the presence of UN forces. The attack on the Pakistani troops had been perpetrated by group of criminals, who feared the return of normalcy in Somalia. Though Pakistan had paid a heavy price, it was not about to abandon the Somali people in their hour of need. Before concluding the Minister again paid “a special tribute to the brave sons of Pakistan who lost their lives in a distant land.” He said, the entire nation was mourning the loss of its valiant sons and shared the grief of their families. It was a matter of great pride and solace that these men had laid down their lives for the noble cause of restoring peace and saving the lives of thousands of people in a fraternal Muslim country.<sup>339</sup>

After the Minister’s statement, MNA Tiwana asked whether the purpose of sending troops to Somalia was to distribute food or the rehabilitation of peace. The minister replied that the basic purpose was peacekeeping but since local population wasn’t getting food, so distribution of food was part of the peacekeepers’ duties.<sup>340</sup> Exercising his right to speak on the issue under the call attention notice MNA Liaquat Baloch of JI said that he recognized the sacrifice of the Pakistani military contingent and saluted the fallen heroes. He said he understood that the UN contingent had been sent to Somalia in response to the famine and appeals for the supply of food aid. However, a completely new scenario has emerged after Americans landed in Somalia. He said that twice or thrice, the attention of the House had been drawn to the fact that a formal approval should have been sought before deploying the troops for UN duties in Somalia. He feared that that there was a danger that Sudan, a Muslim country that had been declared a terrorist state was being surrounded. In his assessment Pakistani troops had become unwittingly involved in this game. The UN commander had ordered them to make an arms depot non-operative with assurance that they will not be attacked but they were attacked. It was time that the government disengaged itself from what was happening in Somalia and withdrew its troops.<sup>341</sup>

The Minister reiterated that the aim of peacekeeping was not to become party to the conflict. He said, the troops had gone to the ammunition depot as part of peacekeeping duties and not for war fighting. This was an activity authorized within the framework of the Addis Ababa Accord signed by all warring parties under the auspices of the UN. All parties had

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<sup>339</sup> Ibid, 183-186.

<sup>340</sup> Ibid, 186.

<sup>341</sup> Ibid, 186-187.

allowed inspections of weapon dumps and to make inventories of the arms deposited there. The accident took place because of rumor mongering. As a member of the UN, Pakistan was obliged to contribute troops for peacekeeping and it was proud to be part of these duties in Cambodia and Somalia, and it was actually looking forward to participating in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia Herzegovina. The UN was currently running low on funds and therefore the request for participation in peacekeeping operations Bosnia has not been accepted so far. The Minister felt that there was no point in withdrawing troops because they were not party to the conflict and the accident had taken place because of the machination of the forces of evil (his words) and the local population was not involved. The world at large has been very appreciative of the fact that Pakistani soldiers were first to land in Somalia as part of the UN forces and that they had done an excellent job there.<sup>342</sup>

The minister's response did not stop other MNAs to pose questions. MNA Raja Zaheer Khan wanted to know, whose love or fear had forced Pakistan, a Muslim country and one that stood for the unity of the Ummah to become embroiled in a fight involving two Muslim factions in a Muslim country. The minister repeated what he had said in response to Liaquat Baloch.<sup>343</sup> MNA Khaliqdad wanted to know what could be done to raise the morale of our young people so that they did not shirk their responsibility to the nation's international responsibility. He also wanted to know the strength of the American forces in Somalia and that of other Muslim nations. The Minister said that the national forces comprised brave men and that the government were providing all the necessary incentives to its soldiers. He said he would provide the details of international forces in Somalia after getting the necessary information.<sup>344</sup>

The Speaker Gohar Ayub Khan pointed out that much before this incident he had alerted MNA Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, the Chairman of the Defense Committee to take a delegation and visit the troops in Somalia. This visit had the approval of the Army but unfortunately the National Assembly had been unconstitutionally dissolved and the visit could not take place. He said that a delegation would be sent now to assess the deficiencies being experienced by the troops and a report would be given to the National Assembly. The Speaker stressed that whenever troops are sent abroad, whether it was

<sup>342</sup> Ibid, 187-188.

<sup>343</sup> Ibid, 188.

<sup>344</sup> Ibid, 189-190.

Cambodia or Somalia, National Assembly should be provided details such as the mandate, role and duration of the peacekeeping mission.<sup>345</sup>

MNA Syed Zafar Ali Shah was not ‘quite satisfied’ with the statement of the Minister and asked the Speaker to share the report of the parliamentary delegation visit to Somalia, whenever it took place. He expressed his dismay at the practice of not consulting the National Assembly before putting the lives of the troops in danger. A terrible tragedy had taken place and no words can compensate for this grave loss. He found it strange that no precaution had been taken to avoid the incident. He feared that there had been a ‘strategic failure’ on the part of the UN command. Notice should have been taken of the rumors about the takeover of the radio station and the inspection shouldn’t have taken place. He wanted an inquiry into the incident by the Security Council.<sup>346</sup>

The Speaker assured the House that he would revive the issue of sending a parliamentary delegation to Somalia and that he would share the post visit report with the Assembly. The last question was raised by Ms. Nusrat Bhutto, vice chairman of the PPP. She wanted to know why only Pakistani soldiers were sent for inspection when there were troops from other countries as well. She thought it would have been better to send a ‘mixed contingent’ for the inspection. The Speaker assured her that that it was ‘probably’ a mixed team and included some Americans also. Minister Kanju added “There were people from other countries as well.”<sup>347</sup> The Speaker and the Minister did not have the complete details and were only making honest guesses about the composition of the inspecting teams, which were primarily composed of Pakistani soldiers. Unfortunately no fact finding mission could be sent because the parliament was again dissolved in July and parliamentary elections were called in three months’ time.

It is quite clear that the unstable political situation notwithstanding, parliamentary representatives were perturbed and wanted honest answers for the debacle in Mogadishu. They were upset about having being kept in the dark about the nature and purpose of the deployment of the troops on peacekeeping operations abroad. They wanted to know if food distribution was part of their duties as peacekeepers. They were worried if Pakistan had become inadvertently

<sup>345</sup> Ibid, 190.


<sup>346</sup> Ibid, 191.

<sup>347</sup> Ibid, 191.

part of an international game to make them party to an internecine conflict being fought in an Islamic country. Some of them suspected it to be a part of an international intrigue to surround Muslim countries like Sudan that had been branded a terrorist state. The last question by Nusrat Bhutto though innocuous made eminent sense. She had asked why only Pakistani troops were sent on such a dangerous mission and why it wasn't a mixed team comprising troops from other countries. The Speaker wanted to send a high level delegation to go to Somalia to assess the ground situation but political situation within the country was beyond his control. One wonders, if the politicians had not given so much space to the military because of their internal divisions, they would perhaps have dealt with the situation in a better manner.

### **Visit of the Pakistani Army Chief to Somalia**

On 4 September 1993, COAS Gen Abdul Waheed visited Mogadishu to meet the troops. He was accompanied by DGMO Maj Gen Pervez Musharraf and DGMI Maj Gen Ali Kuli Khan; and his personal staff Brig Javed Afzal Khan, PS(C) and Capt. Khurram Agha, ADC. He arrived in Mogadishu on a special UN plane from Nairobi. During his daylong visit he addressed the troops and commended them for their performance in Somalia despite the odds. He told them that it was because of them that Pakistan stood a chance of winning the diplomatic battle to retrieve the F16s that the US had refused to release after the application of the Pressler amendment. The Army chief blamed Gen. Aidid for the massacre of Pakistani troops and declared him his personal enemy.<sup>348</sup>



**General Abdul Waheed Kakar - COAS Pakistan Army visiting Pakistani Troops in Somalia**

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<sup>348</sup> Interview Brig (retd.) Sher Akbar (CO Sind), 19 September 2017.

Later he met with SRSG Adm. Howe, Force Commander Gen Bir and the US special envoy Mr. Gosende. After lunch in 7 FF field mess, he flew to Afgoye to meet the officers and men of 10 Baloch. He flew back to Nairobi in the evening.<sup>349</sup>

### **7 FF RETURNS TO PAKISTAN**

For 7 FF operating in a multinational environment was a mixed experience. Americans, their official policies notwithstanding, were found to be good soldiers, who followed SOPs religiously, fought professionally and set themselves high standards of physical fitness. The senior officers were candid and straight forward and did not stand on ceremony. There was much to learn from them. On the flipside, the Americans did not share operational intelligence with other nations e.g. Pakistanis were kept in the dark about the SNA's rejection of the inspection of the AWS and the dire consequences that they had suffer due to that. The unkindest cut was the delay by international partners in sending reinforcements for the besieged Pakistani peacekeepers. The Italians sought prolonged clearances from Rome before sending the tanks to the rescue.<sup>350</sup> There was a feeling that the causalities could have been avoided, had the Pakistani Brigade been equipped with its own tanks. As a result, a squadron of 19 Lancers was rushed to Somalia in July 1993. In March 1994, the entire regiment was sent to Somalia. 19 Lancers and 7 FF had fought together in the 1965 war and since those days enjoyed traditional warm relations. In Somalia they quickly gelled together and carried out joint patrols. The tanks assisted the infantry in clearing the main routes, re-establishing abandoned strongpoints, and conducting cordon and search operations.

Soldiers of 7 FF were awarded seven military awards for conspicuous gallantry during their one-year stint on peacekeeping operations. Somalia became a cherished battle honor and was emblazoned on regimental quarter guard and colors. Veterans now fondly remember of times they spent on one of the largest humanitarian operations at that time and how they bravely fought militias, when things went bad. They also remember how they relieved the tension and monotony by swimming on the beach and organizing barbecue dinners. During their stay in Somalia, the officers got a chance to visit Nairobi and Mombasa on R&R. Some

<sup>349</sup> Copy of Gen Waheed's program shared by Brig Sher Akbar Khan (retd.), CO 1 Sind, who was the conducting officer for the visit.

<sup>350</sup>*The Colonial Legacy*, 148.

ventured as far as Europe or took the opportunity to perform pilgrimage to the holy cities of Makka and Medina.

## CHAPTER V UNOSOM II

In September 1993, 7 FF was relieved by 15 FF. CO 15 FF Lt Col Fazal-i-Maqbool Afridi had visited Mogadishu in June 1993 to learn firsthand the ground situation in Somalia. So, he was better prepared than his predecessor. The move back was organized on chartered commercial planes. A chartered Russian Plane arrived at Mogadishu carrying the advance party of 15 FF on 25 August 93 at 0800 hours and left the same day with the advance party of 7 FF at about 1100 hours. The command was handed over to 15 FF on first light 7 September 93. On 9 September 93 the last detachment of 7 FF departed from Mogadishu International Airport at 1300 hours. On 10 September 93, General Joseph P. Hoar, Commander CENTCOM visited 15 FF and had lunch in their mess. During the visit their camp came under a mortar attack. The bombs narrowly missed the mess tent and landed in the sea. Apparently, the Somalis had got wind of Hoar's program and wanted to target him.

### **Winning Hearts and Mind**

A lot of goodwill had been lost as a result of the 5 June incident. Aidid, his faction of the Somali National Alliance (SNA and his clan – the Habr Gidr clan had become enemies for the UNOSOM forces. There was only one way defuse tensions and recreate the spirit of trust and friendliness by winning the hearts and minds. There was no policy as such on this front but the peacekeeping units did what they could to make friends in their areas of responsibility by doing a number of things such as sharing their surplus rations with the needy Somalis. No discrimination was made on the basis of tribal or political affiliations. All those asking for help were provided food, medicine etc. Leftovers meals in the unit kitchens were not thrown away and instead distributed among the hungry population outside the camps. Some units cooked two or three woks every day for those living near their strongpoints. It was a routine to distribute food to Somali children, females and males thronging the gates on a daily basis. The crowd seeking food at an average had a strength of 300 of old and young, men and women. The condition of the women and children was pathetic. Most women had five to six children to feed and invariably carried a toddler on their hips. The children had potbellies and sunken eyes

and were suffering from malnourishment of the extreme order. Under such circumstances, many a times the Somalis thronging the gates would get impatient, jump the queue and throw stones. Troops distributing the food were forced to wear helmets to protect themselves. To reach out to the sick and diseased, medical camps were established at Pakistani strongpoints. One medical camp was established at Strongpoint 207 in the stadium area and the medical aid was provided by 122 Field Ambulance.

### **Manning the Check Posts and Strongpoints**

However, despite all efforts to create a peaceful atmosphere, Mogadishu remained a turbulent city. To maintain an effective military presence, UNOSOM established a network of check posts and strongpoints in the city. This system was reinforced through frequent and visible patrolling along all well-known routes. In a violence ridden city, there is no option for the law enforcement agencies but to establish checkpoints, but this can spoil relations with the locals because impedes free movement and violates the privacy of female passengers in conservative societies. For law abiding citizens frequent interruptions on the way can add to the anxieties of daily life and sometimes inspire fear.<sup>351</sup> For a young soldier, manning a checkpoint is a tedious and dangerous job. He has to be constantly on the alert for the odd troublemaker hiding in a crowd of impatient and irate citizens jostling to get past the barrier. He is exposed at all times to remotely controlled bomb blasts or suicide attacks – an occupational hazard that he learns to live with. His is a thankless job and doesn't earn him any special recognition. Manning check posts in Mogadishu was particularly difficult because sometimes these were located near areas populated by hostile militias and snipers could easily take pot shots at the sentries. There were frequent rotations, in which soldiers had to be moved from one checkpoint to another as their units were re-located. Sometime these changes were made in difficult circumstances and under the direct gaze of the militants. It was not infrequent for Somalis opposed to the UN presence to attack the strongpoints and guard post. Sometimes attacks were carried out by armed groups using unarmed civilians as human shields.<sup>352</sup>

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<sup>351</sup> For scholarly research on how checkpoints impact the life of civilians in a conflict zone read Justin Schon, "The Centrality of checkpoints for civilians during conflict," 2016, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2016.1215638> (accessed January 22, 2018).

<sup>352</sup> Press statement made by the President of the UN Security Council on 14 June 1993 about the use of human shields by armed men in attacking guard positions in Mogadishu mentioned in M.A. Mohamed Salih & Lennart

The first task given to 15 FF was to take over strongpoints 69 and 77 from the Italians, who were suspected of passing UNOSOM information to Aidid's SNA. This proved quite a task because both strongpoints were located on the Green Line separating South Mogadishu (Aidid's area) from North Mogadishu (Ali Mahdi's area) and were of great tactical significance for all parties. The Italians as well as Aidid's Habr Gidr clan were reluctant to hand over these strongpoints to the Pakistanis, who were under orders to take over the strongpoints by 6 September. The takeover was preceded by rounds of futile negotiations, which served no other purpose but to delay the takeover. Those participating in these meetings included local elders (including representatives of both Aidid and Ali Mahdi), UNOSOM military officials, political and humanitarian representatives, and the Italian and Pakistani military commanders. The meetings were held alternately in the premises of the Italian Embassy, Strongpoint 19, UNOSOM Headquarters and Wardhiigley Police station.

The main meeting was held at Wardhiigley Police Station on 12<sup>th</sup> September. This district was under the control of SNA, so elders from Ali Mahdi's clan did not turn up. The Italian contingent commander (a Brigadier General), UNOSOM representatives, local elders and the Pakistani battalion commander addressed the gathering. The Italian commander explained that UNOSOM wanted them to leave but the Somalis didn't want them to go. SNA was incensed because the Pakistani Army Chief in his visit earlier that month had declared Aidid as his personal enemy. In his address the Pakistani CO emphasized that his country believed in the principles of Islamic brotherhood and humanity and the purpose of sending troops to Somalia was to help the Muslim brethren in need. After him, an old lady, representing the SNA got up to make a speech. To the utter embarrassment of the Pakistanis, she bitterly complained that Americans were killing them from top with helicopter fire and the Pakistanis were hitting them from below. After her speech, an emotionally charged Somali got up and started criticizing the Americans and the Pakistanis and rejected the idea of vacating of strongpoints by Italians. After venting his spleen, he cooled down. Thereafter the complete gathering broke up into smaller groups to discuss matters among themselves. Meanwhile, the

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Wohlgemuth (eds.), *Crisis Management and the Politics of Reconciliation in Somalia: Statements from the Uppsala Forum 17-19 January 1994* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1994)168; James Mayall (ed.), *The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 217-218.

old lady who had castigated Pakistan presented bouquets not only to the Italian contingent commander but also to the Pakistani CO. The Pakistani Colonel was taken aback because moments earlier she was spewing venom against Pakistan and now she was beaming and smiling. Meanwhile, a number of Somali elders gathered round him to express solidarity with Pakistan. This encounter provided a strange paradox in the Somali character and proved that their public and private stances was completely at odds with each other.

The meeting next day at Nigerian battalion Headquarters at Strongpoint 19 did not take place because SNA leaders were busy fighting inside the city. On 14 September it was decided in a meeting held at the UNOSOM Headquarters to occupy the strongpoints without further delay and relieve the Italians. 1 Sind was to occupy Strongpoint 207 and the Malaysians Strongpoint 19. At 1400 hours 15 FF was told to occupy strongpoints 69 and 77. 15 FF planned to send its APCs via the seaport direct to strongpoints 77 and 69. Strongpoint 69 was to be occupied by a company minus strength and strongpoint 77 by two platoons. The wheeled vehicles column was to bring up the luggage and logistics from strongpoint 1, after occupation of strongpoints. The Pakistani APC column was stopped by the Italians short of strongpoint 77. They were reluctant to vacate the strongpoints and it took some hard negotiations to convince them that their tenure at these points was over. By late afternoon the Pakistani battalion had taken over the strongpoints and had started improving their defenses. Strongpoint 69 was actually the architecturally grand structure of the triple story old parliament. By 1730 hours all luggage had been unloaded and the vehicular column was sent back to the airport. Before last light i.e. 1800 hours, the men at the strongpoints had installed three to four searchlights and posted sentries to guard against any attack. As expected strongpoint came under attack that night. The attack was successfully beaten back. Next day a stone throwing mob again attacked strongpoint 69 around midday. Brick batting continued intermittently. The soldiers manning the check post soon got used to this routine.<sup>353</sup>

### **Hostile Mortar Firing**

Apart from facing angry mobs, Pakistani peacekeepers were routinely subjected to mortar fire. Retaliation is difficult because mortars can quickly change their positions. It was

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<sup>353</sup> Col Fazal-i-Maqbool Afridi, *War Digli to Villa Somalia*, Unpublished memoirs,

believed that the US had installed a locating radar, but no information was shared by them with the Pakistani peacekeepers. The 8-10 Black Hawk helicopters constantly hovering overhead also failed to detect the direction of the mortar fire. Somalis would usually start mortar fire in the hours of darkness, at around 8 pm and would routinely target the airport and occasionally the Force Headquarters. Although the mortar fire was inaccurate at best but sometimes the shells did land dangerously close to troop locations. Once the mortar landed on the tent of US troops at the airport, killing one soldier and wounding thirteen others. Few also landed at Force Headquarters and killed a sentry guarding the main entrance of UNOSOM HQ. One of the mortar rounds landed on the north ramp of the airport, where Pakistani officers were staying but caused no physical damage. A Saudi plane and UNOSOM planes parked 100 yards away from the place of impact also received some splinters but remained safe. Mortar fire did not cause much damage as but it did cause unnecessary harassment.

On occasions, there was counter mortar fire from the UNOSOM troops but this could not be done for prolonged periods for fear of causing collateral damage to women and children living in the densely populated areas of the urban sprawl of Mogadishu.<sup>354</sup>

### **Operation Lemon Barley**

The addition of the Pakistani tank squadron in July 1993 added to the firepower of the Pakistani brigade. In March 1994, the remaining two squadrons and the regimental HQ also joined up with them. Operation Lemon Barley was the first cordon and search operation conducted by Pakistani peacekeepers using tanks on 9 August 1993. A large quantity of arms and ammunition was recovered. In the aftermath of this operation, relationship with Somalis worsened. They erected roadblocks, laid land mines, fired anti-tank rockets, pelted stones, hurled Molotov cocktails and burnt tires on roads.

On 9 September, a troop of 19 Lancers squadron was ordered to clear roadblocks on 21 October Road till Pasta Factory. 1<sup>st</sup> troop of the Armored Squadron and five APCs of 1 Sind moved out at 1415 hours and were joined by two military dozers, two jeeps and one 2 ½ ton truck of the US forces from Sword base. Two roadblocks were removed with the help of dozers before they were ambushed at the third roadblock. US soldiers dismounted and took up

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<sup>354</sup> Ibid.

positions behind the containers lying on the road. Tanks returned the fire with their .50 Browning and coaxial machine guns towards the suspected sites. The troop leader Capt. Muhammad Waqas Farook had to abandon his tank along with the crew after it took a direct hit. He and his crew withdrew to the safety of the stadium under covering fire provided by the other two tanks. Lt Tipu Sultan Awan, Alpha tank commander, assumed the command of the troop. Risaldar Aslam, the Bravo tank commander provided effective covering fire. When the firing subsided the remaining party of Pakistani APCs and American jeeps, truck and dozers were able to return safely to the Stadium. On reaching the Stadium, the US commander informed that some of his troops were still in Cigarette Factory area and needed to be extricated. Two tanks of 2<sup>nd</sup> troop led by Capt. Sheikh Amir Fakhro with Capt. Muhammad Saad Farook as the 2<sup>nd</sup> tank commander immediately moved out with the US troops to the ambush site. They moved past the burning tank through a hail of fire to the Cigarette Factory and were able to pick up the Americans and return safely to the stadium.<sup>355</sup>

After this incident, the tanks were used more extensively for escort duties outside the camp premises, for reinforcing the strong points, for link patrolling, and for search and cordon operations. Exchange of fire with Somalis became a routine affair.

#### **Operation Gothic Serpent (August 22 – October 13, 1993: American Special Operations to catch Aidid**

Once the Americans realized that the UNOSOM forces were not in a position to apprehend Aidid, the Americans decided to take matters into their own hands. This was a decision they would live to regret. The mission to catch Aidid was given to the elite Delta Force under the codename Operation Gothic Serpent. The commander of this covert operation was Maj Gen William F. Garrison.<sup>356</sup> This operation was outside the purview of UNOSOM HQ and Maj Gen Montgomery, the commander of the American forces and deputy force commander UNOSOM did not exercise any authority over them.

Task Force Ranger comprising 130 Delta Force commandos, a company of US Rangers and 16 helicopters arrived in Mogadishu on board six giant C-5A Galaxy cargo jets in the night

<sup>355</sup> 19 Lancers' After Mission Report.

<sup>356</sup> Rick Atkinson, "The Raid that went wrong," *Washington Post*, January 30, 1994,

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/01/30/the-raid-that-went-wrong/c1c12ab2-5d76-4931-8604-db4b1fb698e2/?utm\\_term=.899225d779ad](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/01/30/the-raid-that-went-wrong/c1c12ab2-5d76-4931-8604-db4b1fb698e2/?utm_term=.899225d779ad) (accessed December 14, 2017).

of August 26. The arrival of the Ranger, however, was not a well-kept secret and the Somalis soon knew about the arrival of the Special Forces. Task Force Rangers conducted seven raids in a bid to get hold of the elusive Aidid. The first one was the strike on Liqliqato House off Via Lenin. This house belonged to General Mohamed Ibrahim Liqliqato, a former police and army chief and ambassador to the Soviet Union and West Germany in the 1970s. Reportedly this house had become the command-and-control center for the SNA, and it was rumored that sometimes it was visited by Aidid himself. At 3 in the morning of August 30, Delta Force commandos flying in a dozen helicopters roped down onto the roof of the house and quickly handcuffed its occupants. To their utter embarrassment, the captives turned out to be UN aid officials and their Somali assistants. Aidid and his men were nowhere to be found.<sup>357</sup> The raid was based on a false lead.

The Rangers were short of credible information about the whereabouts of Aidid and decided instead to target top tier SNA personalities. On 21 September, they were able to capture Aidid's top aide Osman Atto, while he was getting his car refueled at a petrol pump. In an interview to the BBC in 2002, Atto claimed that he had been wrongly depicted in the movie *Black Hawk Down* and most of the scenes did not reflect the whole truth. Even the date of his capture had been altered to 3<sup>rd</sup> October to suit the script. He said he was caught travelling alone in one Fiat 124 and not in a fleet of three vehicles as shown in the film. In the helicopter attack that followed his car had been hit 50 times and his colleague Ahmed Ali had received injuries on both legs. The movie character Atto is shown as an earring wearing, cigar chomping head strong villain.<sup>358</sup> According to a former Pakistani diplomat, Atto was actually been 'turned' against Aidid by his American captors and could have been responsible for death his former boss in 1996.<sup>359</sup>

On 21 September 93, the day Atto was caught, a Pakistani convoy comprising three APCs of 1 Sind and two tanks of 19 Lancers was ambushed in a well laid out trap. Whether it was in retaliation to Atto being picked up is not known. The convoy was on a usual patrol

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<sup>357</sup> Peter Baxter, *Somalia: US Intervention 1992 1994* (Heion and Company: 2013), 34-35.

<sup>358</sup> Hassan Barise, "Warlord thumbs down for Somalia film," *BBC News*, January 29, 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1789170.stm> (accessed January 12, 2017).

<sup>359</sup> Exchange of email with Tariq Chaudhry, December 11, 2017.

combined with a mail run touching upon the three strongpoints manned by 1 Sind. A generator full of fuel had been collected for repairs from Strongpoint 21. The regimental medical officer was in the APC holding the generator. He was on his way to the airport to collect TB medicines that he had got from Pakistan from money he had personally raised. Once the convoy crossed K 7 roundabout and reached Benader crossing (SNA dominated area), a rocket hit the APC carrying the generator. The vehicle caught fire and three passengers, Major Dr. Ijaz and two soldiers of 1 Sind were charred beyond recognition. Five were seriously injured.<sup>360</sup>

The Somalis were becoming more aggressive. On 25 September, the Americans lost their first Black Hawk. It was flying very low and was shot down by an RPG 7 anti-tank rocket at around 2 in the morning at the New Sea Port in Mogadishu. All three crew members were killed. American, Pakistani and Malaysian soldiers were sent to secure the crash site. Three Americans and three Pakistanis were injured in the firefight, while protecting the crash site.<sup>361</sup> The downing of the helicopter gave SNA the confidence that they could shoot down American flying machines.

On 27 September 93, three APCs of 6 Punjab and two tanks of 19 Lancers patrolling on Afgoye road were ambushed again at the infamous Benadir crossing. One APC received a direct hit from an RPG round seriously injuring Major Tariq Sharif. Major Sharif was rushed to the Romanian hospital, where he was operated upon. Next day he was evacuated to Nairobi, where he succumbed to his injuries. The Somalis now had a fair idea that they could conveniently destroy Pakistani APCs with their shoulder fired anti-tank grenades.<sup>362</sup>

In the ongoing campaign to capture the SNA leadership, the Pakistani brigade was given three to four search and capture targets. As part of Operation Eagle, 15 FF was given the task to raid Hotel Mubarik on Makka al Mukrama Road to apprehend suspected SNA leaders. Aerial reconnaissance was carried out on 26 September followed by ground reconnaissance. On 1<sup>st</sup> of October, the raid plan was finalized at the Brigade Headquarters. On 2<sup>nd</sup> October, CO 15 FF presented the plan before the Force Commander. The Brigade Commander and senior

<sup>360</sup> Interview Brig Sher Akbar (retired) December 15, 2017.

<sup>361</sup> “3 Killed as U.S. Chopper Is Shot Down in Somalia, *New York Times*, September 25, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/25/world/3-killed-as-us-chopper-is-shot-down-in-somalia.html> (accessed December 14, 2017).

<sup>362</sup> Col Afridi, *War Digli to Villa Somalia*,

staff officers in the Force Headquarters including U3 (operation's branch) and U2 (intelligence) also attended the briefing. After having presented the plan, Col Afridi expressed his concern that there were women and children inside the hotel. The Colonel from U2 (Intelligence) had no such information. The plan was approved and rehearsals were carried out but instead that night the Pakistani troops had to go for the rescue of the US Rangers trapped near the Olympic Hotel.<sup>363</sup>

### **3<sup>rd</sup> of October: Black Hawk Down**

The raid on October 3 was part of the US special operations to apprehend Omar Salad Elmi and Mohamed Hassan Awale – two relatively obscure SNA leaders. There was a tipoff that the two were meeting that afternoon inside a compound 50 yards down Hawl Wadaag Road from the Olympic Hotel near the Bakaara Market, in the heart of Aidid country. An operation launched in the afternoon meant that the attackers had decided to give up the cover of darkness and were moving men, helicopters, and vehicles in broad daylight, exposing them to direct fire and observation.<sup>364</sup> It was to be a quick snatch and grab operation. The success of the raid clearly depended on the element of surprise, shock action and minimum time spent in the target area. The whole operation was not expected to last more than 30 minutes. It was a short three-minute helicopter ride to the target area. The plan was simple: In phase I, soften the target with gunship fire. In phase II, insert the raiders aerially to quickly get hold of the high value targets and in phase III make a quick getaway on the vehicular column sent to retrieve them. The American attack plan failed because they had obviously underestimated the capacity and capability of the Somalis to fight on their home turf.

In the afternoon of 3<sup>rd</sup> October, the raiding party was ready for action. At 1.50 pm they received information about the SNA meeting. An informer was to confirm the venue but was reluctant to go near it. Once he finally located the building, the Task Force went into action at 3.30 pm. Those pressed into the assault comprised 160 men from an assortment of Special

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<sup>363</sup> Ibid,

<sup>364</sup> Mark Bowden, "A defining battle," *The Inquirer*, November 16, 1997, <http://inquirer.philly.com/packages/somalia/nov16/rang16.asp> (accessed October 3, 2017).

Forces but comprised mostly of the 75<sup>th</sup> Ranger Regiment and Delta Force. They were distributed into four chalks (groups) and were assigned to secure the four corners of the target building.

19 aircraft of the 160<sup>th</sup> Special Operation Aviation Regiment (SOAR) formed the aerial component of the mission. Three were for surveillance purposes and sixteen for combat operations. This included eight AH/MH 6 Little Birds and eight MH 60 Black Hawks. The Little Birds are two seat bubble front attack helicopters with a crew of two and can carry 6 passengers. The Little Bird helicopter is armed with one or two machine guns, rockets, and anti-tank missiles. The Black Hawk is an elongated troop-carrying helicopter with a crew of two and a passenger load of 11 soldiers. Its armament includes two machine guns, rockets, and anti-tank missiles. This was a very potent force to nab two Somalis of little value in the SNA hierarchy.

The Delta Team was transported to the target area in the Little Birds, while the Rangers travelled in the larger Black Hawks.<sup>365</sup> Capt. Scott Miller, the Delta Force assault commander was nominated to become the commanding general of the US forces in Afghanistan in May 2018. Once on ground Miller wanted his Ranger colleague Capt. Mike Steele to move his men to where he was located. Steele refused to comply. The matter was referred to the mission commander Lt. Col. Gary Harrell, hovering overhead on a Black Hawk. Harrell could not resolve the issue between the Delta Force and the Rangers, clearly showing a disarray in his command.<sup>366</sup>

The attack began as gunships fired a salvo of anti-tank missiles to suppress ground resistance. In the cover of the initial bombardment, the men of the Delta Force and Rangers quickly roped down from hovering Black Hawks towards the target building. One American soldier dropped down and died as he fumbled with the rope. The Rangers quickly arrested 24 civilians but neither Aidid nor any of his close associate were among them.

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<sup>365</sup> Mark Bowden, *Black Hawk Down: Story of a Modern War* (New York: Bantam Press, 1999), 1-9.

<sup>366</sup> Ibid, 80.

At 3.45 pm the lead Black Hawk helicopters was shot down by anti-tank rockets fired from the ground. The Somalis were not known to possess surface to air missiles.<sup>367</sup> A second helicopter was shot down, a while later. The wreckage of the two helicopters lay north and south of the Olympic Hotel. Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant, the pilot flying the second Black Hawk that went down, was captured alive by the Somalis. Durant was held hostage for 11 days before being released to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).<sup>368</sup> Ambassador Robert Oakley and Maj Gen Zinni were ordered by the Clinton administration to broker the release of Durant. The quid pro quo offered by the American negotiating team was an informal truce.<sup>369</sup>

As the Black Hawks crashed down adding to the fog of war, an infantry company from the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division moved on the ground to link up with raiding party. Their mission was to extricate the Rangers and 24 Somalis hauled up from the meeting. The vehicular column led by Lt. Col. Danny McKnight comprised nine High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) or Humvees and three M939 five ton trucks. McKnight and his convoy was able to reach the building, where the prisoners were held. The Somali captives were hurriedly bundled into the trucks under a hail of fire from the militiamen. Several American soldiers had to leave the vehicles to make space for the prisoners and had to move back on foot. Meanwhile, the convoy was ordered to immediately reach the crash sites to reinforce the stranded Task Force and extricate the trapped men. The soldiers moving on foot reached the helicopter crash site immediately, but the vehicle convoy kept moving back to the headquarters

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<sup>367</sup> John H. Cushman Jr., “5 GI’s are killed as Somalis down 2 U.S. helicopters,” *New York Times*, October 4, 1993, A00001, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/04/world/5-gi-s-are-killed-as-somalis-down-2-us-helicopters.html> (accessed April 11, 2018).

<sup>368</sup> For details Michael Durant and Steven Hartov, *In the Company of Heroes* (New York: New American Liberty, 2003).

<sup>369</sup> Douglas Jehl, “U.S. Is Reported to Be Seeking an Informal Truce with Somali,” *New York Times*, October 14, 1993, <https://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/14/world/us-is-reported-to-be-seeking-an-informal-truce-with-somali.html> (accessed July 16, 2018).

because it had already suffered a lot casualties. The downed crewmen and the heli-dropped soldiers were left to fend for themselves.<sup>370</sup>

As nightfall fell, roughly 90 American soldiers had taken up a defensive perimeter near the site of the first crash. Little Bird gunships provided air support as best as they could with mini guns as thousands of Somali militiamen closed in. The survivors attempted to keep the militia at bay while retrieving available medical supplies and ammunition from airdrops. With wounded men, limited ammunition and a growing militiamen presence, the situation for the survivors was getting bleak. Task Force Ranger hadn't reckoned with a pitched battle that would extend into the night and into the next morning. It was supposed to be quick get in and get out operation.

The two influential Americans in the top political and military leadership positions of the UN HQ in Somalia were not in town on the day of the raid. Maj Gen Montgomery was with the German contingent in the town of Bulent Uen in Western Somalia and learnt of the raid around 3 pm upon his return.<sup>371</sup> Jonathan Howe, the SRSG had gone on a mission to Ethiopia on the orders of the secretary general that Sunday and it was four or five in the afternoon, when he flew back into Mogadishu. As his aircraft approached the airport, it was put on hold and not allowed to land immediately. Upon landing he could see a number of helicopters in operation. Once he learnt from his chief of staff of what was going on, he hastened to inform the UN HQ in New York about the developing situation. He did not interfere with the military operations being conducted by General Montgomery because he felt that he was in the best position to marshal the resources available to him. The Americans did not have tanks of their own so Montgomery asked the Pakistani for help. Howe remembers that there was immediate response to the SOS from the Pakistanis and the Malaysians. The Italian tanks were out of town and the Indians, recently inducted into Somalia, were on their way to Baidoa area.<sup>372</sup>

## **The Rescue Operation**

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<sup>370</sup> Michael R. Gordon with Thomas L. Friedman, "Details of U.S. Raid in Somalia: Success So Near, a Loss So Deep," *New York Times*, October 25, 1993, <https://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/25/world/details-of-us-raid-in-somalia-success-so-near-a-loss-so-deep.html> (accessed March 26, 2018).

<sup>371</sup> Ambush in Mogadishu: Interview Gen Thomas Montgomery (retd.), *Frontline*, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/montgomery.html> (accessed January 12, 2018).

<sup>372</sup> Ambush in Mogadishu: Interview Adm. Howe, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/howe.html> (accessed August 14, 2017)

Col Asif Doraiz, the deputy commander of the Pakistani Brigade was jogging inside the University complex, when he received the call from Maj Gen Montgomery in the afternoon, asking for help to rescue the trapped Special Forces. A troop of tanks and a15 FF platoon on two APCs were immediately put-on notice to become part of the QRF.<sup>373</sup>

On the morning of 3<sup>rd</sup> October, CO 15 FF Col Afridi was part of a Pakistani delegation comprising 10 to 15 officers including the Brigade Commander that had gone by air to Belet-Uen approximately 400 Kilometers from Mogadishu to attend the reunification day ceremony of Germany. It was the first time after World War II that Germans had deployed their troops outside their territorial limits. Their participation in peacekeeping operations in Somalia was restricted to logistics and staff duties at the Force Headquarters. On the way back, Col Afridi struck up a conversation with a German colonel, who had participated in the Afghan jihad and could speak Urdu and Pushto. On landing back at Mogadishu airport, Afridi observed a lot of frantic flying by US Black Hawk and Cobra helicopters and the atmosphere seemed charged. The helicopter shuttle service between airport and Force Headquarters was suspended and all the passengers returning from Bulet-Uen had to wait at the airport till clearance was given from Air Traffic Control. Meanwhile, Deputy Commander Colonel Asif Doraiz called him on Motorola and told him that US Rangers were trapped in Olympic Hotel, while carrying out a raid and the Force Headquarters wanted Pakistani tanks and APCs to become part of a joint rescue operation. His unit was to provide the infantry support and APCs. Back in his unit, Afridi observed from a high sand dune, smoke clouds billowing from the center of the city and some helicopters hovering overhead. At about 1740 hours he got a call from the Brigade HQ to send the two APCs to New Seaport, where the rescue force was being assembled. 15 FF Quick Reaction Force (QRF) comprising a platoon minus mounted on two APCs under the command of Lieutenant Mustafiz Babar were immediately sent to the Assembly Area. As 15 FF QRF moved out of their camp, an APC developed a fault and had to be replaced with another one. The replacement APC caught up with the rest of the troops at the New Seaport. There they waited for the rest of the rescue force to join up. Three Condor APCs of Malaysian Battalion (MAL BATT) with their drivers and commanders arrived at 1845 hours. They did not have any fighting force with them. Condor is a wheeled 4x4 APC with a crew of two and can seat 12

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<sup>373</sup> Interview Maj Gen Asif Doraiz, December 16, 2017.

men. It can also act as an ambulance. Optional weapon mountings include a 20 mm cannon with a coaxial 7.62 mm MG.<sup>374</sup> The US QRF consisting of two mechanized companies and one Rangers company was the last to arrive at 2130 hours.<sup>375</sup> Why they arrived more than two hours late thus shortening the rescue time, remains a mystery.

At that time, the Americans did not have their own tanks and the response from the countries with tanks i.e. the Italian and Indian was lukewarm. The only other tanks available were with the Pakistani contingent. The Pakistanis had opted for integral tank support after the 5<sup>th</sup> of June incident, when the Italian tanks failed to reach on time. A squadron of 19 Lancer with 129 all ranks had reached Mogadishu in two groups on 19 and 23 July 1993. Upon arrival they had received eight 1952 vintage M48A2 tanks from Turkish stocks. To their utter dismay, they found these tanks to be pieces of junk that had been painted over. It took them a great deal of time and effort to make at least four of them operational.<sup>376</sup> When Gen. Montgomery asked the Pakistani Brigade for tank support for the rescue operation, the response was immediate and positive and the four operationally fit M48 tanks were dispatched for the rescue operation.<sup>377</sup>

The Pakistani armor squadron was located at the airport. On 3<sup>rd</sup> of October, the squadron commander Maj Umar Farooq Durrani and his crews had gone to the seaport to receive a shipment of ten M48A5 tanks from Pakistan. A ship carrying the cargo of tanks was to dock that evening but there was more in store for the Pakistani tank men at around the same time. At about 1500 hours, they observed about 18 helicopters, a mix of Cobras and Black Hawks, flying towards the city center. At about 1830 hours, the squadron commander received a call from the Brigade Headquarter to send the four of its functional tanks to become part of the rescue operation. The Pakistani tanks did NOT have any night vision capability and the Americans were aware of this shortcoming. The Pakistani tanks immediately moved to the seaport to link up with the Americans. They reached there at around 1905 hours but there was no American on the site. At about 2130 hours, American QRF reached the seaport. The

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<sup>374</sup> Condor Armored Personal Carrier, <http://www.military-today.com/apc/condor.htm> (accessed January 1, 2018).

<sup>375</sup> Col Afridi, *War Digli to Villa Somalia*,

<sup>376</sup> 19 Lancers in Somalia.

<sup>377</sup> Ambush in Mogadishu: Interview Lt. Gen. Thomas Montgomery (retd.), *Frontline*, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/montgomery.html> (accessed December 30, 2017).

American forces comprised a battalion of Rangers, transport helicopters and Cobras. The Brigadier General commanding the QRF explained the situation to the commanders of the multinational forces. The tasks given to the Pakistani tank and APC group was to:

1. Lead the rescue force to the crash site.
2. Cordon the objective area and provide intimate fire support to the US troops going for the crash sites.
3. Ensure that none of the troops were left behind.
4. Provide rearguard cover to the withdrawing troops.<sup>378</sup>

At 2330 hours, the UNOSOM QRF with Pakistani tanks, Malaysian and Pakistani APCs and US HUMVEES moved out of the assembly area. They moved past Strong Points 77 and 69, westwards onto National Street. When they were about 200 Meters ahead of Strong Point 207, the column drew heavy automatic and mortar fire. It was a pitch dark night and the movement was difficult through the narrow alleyways with fire coming down from the multistoried buildings on both sides. The tanks did not have night vision devices and could only fire back speculatively. Heavy fire continued till the column reached the junction of National and Hawl Wadaag Streets. The QRF made it to the crash site without any loss. Once the column stopped two tanks moved ahead of the road junction and stopped plus of it, both APCs remained at the crossing and one tank was behind. The two leading tanks took up position on the shoulders of the narrow street, where the trapped Rangers were fighting for their lives inside a building, whilst the other team took up position on road crossings on either side of this street. One American company each moved north and south to look for buildings, where the Rangers could be hiding. One company remained in reserve. Mortar shells began to land around the forward tanks from a position not visible to them from the north. At about 0200 hours the rescue team sent to North side was able to extricate the stranded Rangers but no physical contact could be established in the south. Lieutenant Babar was able to locate the shooters and engaged them with his sub machine gun. At the same time he indicated the target to a tank which reversed to engage the mortar site. A machine gun burst broke the antenna of Lieutenant Babar's APC and disrupted his communications, where after he communicated on PRC-77 with the tanks. Lieutenant Babar observed five militia men armed with two RPG-7s,

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<sup>378</sup> 19 Lancers Somalia Report.

crawling forward from behind a wrecked car, about 100 meters to the north of Hawl Wadaag Street. They were engaged with submachine gun fire by Lieutenant Babar and his team. All five men were killed. A man behind a wall, on a building on the south eastern corner of the junction, fired an automatic burst at the leading APC hitting the cupola of Lieutenant Babar's APC and narrowly missing his head. Lance Naik Abdul Jalil fired back with his 12.7 millimeter anti-aircraft gun and killed the shooter. At around 0350 hours, the surviving Rangers started coming out of the narrow street and piled helter-skelter into the APCs of the rescue convoy. There wasn't enough space for everyone, but best efforts were made to accommodate as many Rangers as possible.

As the South group personnel started withdrawing, due to some misunderstanding the Rangers Company in Reserve started firing on them. Most casualties occurred due to this mix up. At 0530 hours 4 October the Pakistani APCs and tanks covered the withdrawal of US QRF and Malaysians. Few US Humvees went out of order and two Malaysian APCs were hit, therefore some of the rescued US soldiers were left without any transport. At this time the militiamen brought down a heavy volume of fire on the withdrawing troops. At this precarious stage, Lieutenant Babar accommodated 40 US soldiers in his APCs. One badly injured US soldier, who had been left behind, begged Lieutenant Babar with folded hands to take him along else with motion of his hand across his neck he indicated he would be slaughtered. At the same time other Rangers told Babar to forget about him and move on, otherwise all of them would be killed. Babar paid no heed to the Rangers' anxiety and without hesitating for a moment jumped out of his APC. Under heavy fire the young lieutenant pulled and dragged the injured American soldier for 20 yards and brought him to his APC. Babar is small and slightly built and the man he rescued was heavier and taller. Dragging him back under a hail of fire needed courage. Hostile firing continued, as the rescue column made its way back towards the Soccer Stadium, where 1 Sind was located. One mortar round landed close to the leading APC and one soldier received shrapnel wounds. The entire rescue operation lasted eleven hours and the Pakistani QRF was safely in the Soccer Stadium by first light after an eventful night.

The Pakistani tank troop comprised Captain Saad (troop leader and first team commander) and Risaldar Ashraf and Captain Imran Naqvi (2<sup>nd</sup> team commander) and Risaldar Aslam. The movement towards the target area commenced at 2335 hours. After 30 minutes approximately 700 meters short of the objective the tanks came under heavy small arms and anti-tank fire. Two RPG rounds were fired at the troop leader's tank. The troop reacted promptly and fired back after identifying the target. After neutralizing the target, the troop moved ahead through heavy resistance. Their movement was hampered by pitch darkness and narrow streets dominated by multistoried buildings. At 0005 hours, the troop reached the objective and Captain Saad (the troop leader) guided the US troops to the two crash sites in the North and the South of the Olympic Hotel.

Moving through the narrow streets of the infamous Bakaara Market without night vision devices and through a hail of fire and reaching the correct road junction speaks volumes of the sense of direction of the troop leader.



Pakistani Soldiers after rescuing a US Army Ranger

At the road intersection, the tank troop once again came under heavy fire. Mortar fire came from a place, some 700 meters towards North of National Street. After identifying the location of mortar site, the troop leader ordered a shell shot to neutralize the target. At around 0300 hours, the crews notice that the tanks were running low on fuel as their engines had been running for over three hours since the commencement of the operation. The troop leader ordered Captain Naqvi and Risaldar Aslam to move back to Strongpoint 207 located at the junction of Bakaara Market for refueling. After the first tank team had refueled, the second team went back for refueling. At around 0600 hours the American troops started extricating from the northern crash site on foot and came under heavy fire. Captain Naqvi and his second tank kept firing and covered the move of the withdrawing Americans. When the American troops reached the National Street from the crash site, they were heavily fired upon from one of the buildings north of the road, which completely halted their further withdrawal. The American Reserve Company got confused and started firing in the direction from where their

own soldiers were withdrawing and injured some of them. The fire from the building was so intense that around hundred withdrawing soldiers were cut-off from the rest of the force, which had by then mounted into the vehicles and were ready to move back. At this point, Captain Naqvi identified the exact location of the sniper in the building and fired two main gun rounds and blew up the sniper site enabling the cut off American troops to move back and link up with the withdrawing APCs.

Two Malaysian APCs were hit by RPG rounds and one Malaysian soldier was killed.<sup>379</sup> The American soldiers sitting in the Malaysian Condors were shifted to the Pakistani APCs and at least four of them sat on top of the Pakistani tanks. After ensuring that nobody had been left behind, the rescue column started to move back. The troop leader with another tank led the column, while two tanks and two APCs provided the rearguard.

Just after the arrival of the rescue column in the stadium, the US gunship helicopters started punishing all suspected SNA sites and destroyed these. The tank commanders who participated in this operation were awarded Tamgha-i-Jura'at (medal of courage). Three Pakistani soldiers died in the rescue attempt.

The role of Pakistan troops was given bad press by some American magazines. This was deeply annoying and conveyed a distinct bias by the US reporters. In his letter to the Pakistani Army Chief, Commander CENTCOM alluded to this neglect in balanced reporting

Dear General Waheed,

We at Central Command wish to express our deep felt appreciation for the courageous efforts to rescue US Army Rangers ambushed by Somali gunmen on the third of October. There is no doubt that Pakistani force, under the most trying and dangerous circumstances, were instrumental in saving the lives of many American soldiers and for that the American people will be eternally grateful.

It is unfortunate that much of the press ignores the noble efforts being carried out by UN forces and the international community in areas away from south

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<sup>379</sup> Tan Yi Liang, "Twenty years on, Malaysian sacrifices in Somalia still remembered," *The Star online*, <https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2013/12/13/us--thanks-msia-black-hawk/> (accessed February 1, 2018).

Mogadishu. Throughout Somalia, great strides are being made to bring lasting and peaceful solutions to Somalia's many problems in this process.

Pakistan's steadfast support throughout this joint operation despite its own great sacrifice deserves our most sincere gratitude, and we are honored to be participating alongside Pakistan's forces.

Warm regards.

Gen. J.P. Hoar, Commander CENTCOM

MacDill Air Force Base, October 12, 1993

The following statement was issued by the White House, Washington DC on 19 October 1993: -

We wish also to reaffirm our gratitude for the professionalism the Pakistani contingent has demonstrated over the course of the UN'S commitment to Somalia. The Pakistanis have been in Mogadishu longer and have suffered more casualties than any other national contingent. We have great respect for the courage and steadfastness of Pakistani troops..... as well as that of the Malaysian forces.....who helped rescue soldiers involved in the events of October 3 and 4. They, as well as all the other countries who have sacrificed in this humanitarian effort, have earned the thanks of the international community and the Somali people.

The SRSG Admiral Jonathan Howe and UNOSOM Force Commander Lieutenant General Cevik Bir expressed special appreciation for Pakistani troops' determination and professionalism and thanked them for helping the US troops. Major General Thomas M. Montgomery, Deputy Commander of the UN Forces in Somalia thanked General Abdul Waheed (COAS, Pakistan Army) in the following words:

Many soldiers are alive today because of willingness and skill of Pakistani, Malaysian and American Soldiers working together in the most dangerous and difficult combat circumstances. Such a performance comes from disciplined, well trained and well led

soldiers. That is the real reputation of Pakistani Soldiers in UNOSOM II. We thank the people and Army of Pakistan for sending such splendid soldiers to Somalia. We are very proud to serve at their side.<sup>380</sup>

At the end of the operations, 18 American soldiers were dead and 73 injured. One helicopter pilot had been taken prisoner and bruised and battered bodies of American soldiers were dragged through the streets of Bakaara market, as hostile Somali crowds jeered and cursed. President Clinton thought that he had been betrayed as John F. Kennedy was in the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1962. A repentant Defense Secretary Les Aspin resigned for failing to equip the American forces properly.<sup>381</sup> The Ranger Task Force Commander Maj. Gen. Garrison, in a handwritten letter to Clinton accepted full responsibility for what had happened on 3<sup>rd</sup> of October.<sup>382</sup> His career was effectively over.



Pakistani Peacekeepers escorting Humanitarian Convoy

In order to soften the blow and salvage national pride, the event was glamorized in Hollywood film *Black Hawk Down*. Artistic license was taken to show the heroics of the Rangers distorting actual facts. The film became part of the international folklore and the role of the Pakistanis in rescuing the elite troops of the world's mightiest armed forces was forgotten and obscured. The fact is that had it not been for the bravery of Pakistani QRF, the US force would have remained surrounded and could have suffered greater losses.<sup>383</sup>

After the failure to apprehend Aidid, the UN toned down its mission. On 4 February 1994, UNSCR 897 revised mandate of UNOSOM II to exclude the use of coercive measures.<sup>384</sup> For the Americans the events of 3<sup>rd</sup> of October proved to be the last nail in the

<sup>380</sup> Extracts from letter written by Major General Thomas Montgomery, US Army to Pakistan Chief of Army Staff  
<sup>381</sup> Russell Riley, "Bill Clinton: Foreign Affairs," Miller Center, <https://millercenter.org/president/clinton/foreign-affairs> (accessed January 12, 2018).

<sup>382</sup> "Blackhawk Down, Somalia not what US envisioned," *Arizona Republic*, December 21, 1997, p AI, <https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/124285793/> (accessed April 25, 2017).

<sup>383</sup> Lt Col Kamal Anwar Chaudhry, "The Black Hawk Down," *Hilal*, April 2014, <http://hilal.gov.pk/index.php/grids-preview/2014-09-09-14-38-33/item/409-the-black-hawk-down> (accessed October 3, 2017).

coffin of their ill-fated military intervention in Somalia. Images of a dazed helicopter pilot held in captivity by Somalis and the body of a soldier being dragged in the streets of Bakaara market seared into the minds of the American citizens. They were shocked and wondered why their boys were being killed and humiliated in a remote and unknown corner of the world better known for death and starvation rather than any strategic US objectives? The Congressmen started clamoring for a quick pullout.<sup>385</sup> It didn't take long for the Clinton administration to make a quick decision to wrap up an unpopular mission started by his predecessor in the dying days of his presidency. In a nationally televised address on October 7, Clinton pledged an immediate withdrawal from Somalia, by March 31. In an effort to ensure that US forces had necessary protection before they withdrew, he ordered an additional 1,700 Army troops to Somalia and announced that 3,600 more Marines were to be stationed offshore.<sup>386</sup>

Political casualties of the 3<sup>rd</sup> of October military debacle were Ambassador Gosende and Adm. Howe. Gosende was recalled for consultations in what proved to be the end of his diplomatic career. Howe was replaced in February. The ultimate insult for him was hearing about his own dismissal in a BBC broadcast.<sup>387</sup> Howe was blamed for being indecisive and permitting General Aidid to escape into the labyrinth of Mogadishu to organize his troops. He was also accused of declaring Aidid a wanted man and thus enhancing his aura. To many of his associates, Howe was an enigma. He had commanded a Polaris submarine during his naval career. His stints at the Capitol Hill involved being an assistant secretary of politico-military affairs and an adviser to President Bush on national security matters but had little exposure in managing international conflicts. He had never dealt in person with the Somali faction leaders

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<sup>384</sup> UNSCR 897, 1993, available at <http://www.un.org>.

<sup>385</sup> "Hill Demands Early '94 Somalia Withdrawal," *CQ Almanac* 1993, <https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal93-1104663> (accessed January 10, 2018).

<sup>386</sup> William J. Clinton, "Address to the Nation on Somalia," October 7, 1993, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47180> (accessed June 4, 2018).

<sup>387</sup> Donatella Lorch, "Last of the U.S. Troops Leave Somalia; What Began as a Mission of Mercy Closes with Little Ceremony," *New York Times*, March 26, 1994, <http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/26/world/last-us-troops-leave-somalia-what-began-mission-mercy-closes-with-little.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed January 10, 2018).

and was mostly isolated from events taking place in Somalia. Over all he was considered too naïve to understand the politics and dynamics of inter clan warfare of Somalia.<sup>388</sup>

After the 3<sup>rd</sup> October operation, the US realized the need for armor support and attached a special operations team with 19 Lancers' squadron. The team comprising one captain and 9 sergeants remained with them till December 1993. They were specialists in various fields and one could speak good Urdu. They had direct communication with the aircraft carrier and could call in air support of all descriptions within 15 minutes. An American tank unit arrived in Mogadishu in November and was deployed north of Mogadishu in Victory Base but was hardly ever used. In any case, the situation became very peaceful after December 1993. In January 19 Lancers got 30 US M60A3 tanks. A team of US instructors converted the Pakistani crews on these tanks. After departure of the US Armored Regiment, the Pakistani squadron took over Victory Base. The base was a marvel of latest technology and American prosperity. The rest of 19 Lancers joined the squadron in March 1994 and remained in Mogadishu till March 1995.<sup>389</sup>

A US special operations team was also attached with 15 FF. The task assigned to this team was to direct AC130 fire against Somali weapon positions. Also part of the team was a sniper equipped with heavy caliber .50 Browning sniper rifle. On 29 November 93, an American sniper killed a Somali, who was allegedly firing anti-tank rockets. This sparked a huge demonstration by the Somalis, who wanted compensation for the death of an innocent man. After intense negotiations lasting a fortnight, the CO placated the angry Somalis by giving rations and offering a goat each to the tribal elders.<sup>390</sup>

The decision to send armored reinforcements for US troops in Somalia was too late and could practically do too little. US Secretary Defense Les Aspin had earlier rejected the demand

<sup>388</sup> Donatella Lorch, "THE SOMALIA MISSION: United Nations; Envoy, With Glass Half Full, Toasts Operation in Somalia despite Critics," *New York Times*, October 9, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/09/world/somalia-mission-united-nations-envoy-with-glass-half-full-toasts-operation.html> (accessed January 16, 2017).

<sup>389</sup> 19 Lancers in Somalia.

<sup>390</sup> Col Afzali, *War Digli*

for deploying heavy armor in Somalia.<sup>391</sup> American tanks were moved from their home base in Fort Stewart, Georgia. The 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, 64<sup>th</sup> Armor Regiment, 24<sup>th</sup> Mechanized Division was equipped with 18 M1A1 Abraham tanks and 44 M2 Bradley Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs). This tank unit was never employed in any major engagement because the Americans had made up their minds to leave and were loath to escalate tensions. As a result the tank crews battled boredom and the elements of nature bunkered down in Victory Base located in the outskirts of Mogadishu. Also based with them were 1,100 infantry reinforcements. Victory Base had been a former missile assembly area and was converted into an American military camp in the best possible manner.<sup>392</sup>

### **Operation Blackjack**

The SNA leadership apprehended in the abortive 3<sup>rd</sup> of October raid were interned in Bajuni Islands in the Indian Ocean as part of Operation Blackjack. Bajuni or Bajun Islands form an archipelago off the southern coast of Somalia, between Kismayo and Ras Kiyamboni. These islands lie at the northern end of a string of reefs that continues south to Zanzibar and Pemba. One barren island known as Wadin, was selected as the prison. This small island is about four-square kilometer in area and there is no escape from here because of rough sea and shark infested waters. Guards from Pakistani contingent were deployed on the outer perimeter. Guard duties at this God forsaken island finds mention in the accounts of 15 FF and 10 Baloch. A platoon strength of 15 FF guard with weapons, equipment, and rations, was flown to Kismayo on 15 December by Russian MI-26 and MI-17 helicopters. It took a total of four helicopter loads to ferry across the platoon and their equipment. One-way journey by helicopters took two hours from Kismayo. 15 FF guard platoon remained on the island till 19 January 1994. Life was difficult on this barren piece of rock. There was no vegetation, and

<sup>391</sup> John H. Cushman Jr., “THE SOMALIA MISSION: Forces; How Powerful U.S. Units Will Work,” *New York Times*, October 8, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/08/world/the-somalia-mission-forces-how-powerful-us-units-will-work.html> (accessed January 9, 2018).

<sup>392</sup> Donatella Lorch, “Mogadishu Journal; In Desert Camp, G.I.’s Fight Tedium,” *New York Times*, November 6, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/06/world/mogadishu-journal-in-desert-camp-gi-s-fight-tedium.html> (accessed January 9, 2018); Mark Fineman, “Somalia Mission for U.S. Armor: Hurry Up and Wait : Africa: A political decision to avoid provoking warlord Aidid idles the American firepower. Card-playing gunners want action,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 23, 1993, [http://articles.latimes.com/1993-11-23/news/mn-59958\\_1\\_political-decision](http://articles.latimes.com/1993-11-23/news/mn-59958_1_political-decision) (accessed January 9, 2018)

it was infested with snakes. With water rationed to 3 liters per man per day, bathing was an infrequent luxury. The inner cordon had Indian MP, Malaysian doctors, and American signalers, who were in communication on satellite telephones and wireless with the UNOSOM HQ in Mogadishu, the offshore fleet, the airborne C130A Spectre gunships and New York. In protest for the inhuman treatment being meted out to them, the inmates staged a prolonged hunger strike. After two months the prisoners were released after UNOSOM agreed to a ceasefire with Aidid. The operations of this early model of Guantanamo Bay prison remains a closely guarded secret to this day.<sup>393</sup>

### **Friends of Pakistan in Somalia**

Despite the 5<sup>th</sup> of June incident a number of influential people in Mogadishu remained engaged with the Pakistani peacekeepers. It was sad to see how these people, who were once the elite of the city had fallen on bad times and were now reduced to begging for rations. Truly conflict spares no one and treats everyone badly. Many of these once powerful men now reduced to poverty included among others, diplomats, generals, teachers, men of the cloth and community leaders. One of them was Mr. Alim who had been the Somali Ambassador to Pakistan and was a frequent visitor to the Pakistani unit manning strongpoints 69 and 77. He was helpful in getting some Pakistani soldiers released after the 5<sup>th</sup> of June 1993 incident. At that time, two of his sons were living in Pakistan but his wife was in India. His house in Mogadishu was located North-West of Villa Somalia near National Street in Hawal Wadaag district. This was one of the most dangerous areas in town and was dominated by the SNA.

Sheikh Aden Dhere was a religious scholar and lived near the Olympic Hotel in Wardhiigley district, where the 3<sup>rd</sup> of October 1993 action had taken place. His sons Wali and Ahmed were the go between the Pakistani troops and the Sheikh. In later years Sheikh Ahmed Sheikh Aden Dhere would emerge as the leader of the armed religious group called the Ahlu-suna Waljamea.<sup>394</sup> Another holy man, who sought good relations with the Pakistanis was the Imam of Hiraab and his younger brother Imam Osman. Hiraab is one of the Gorgaarte Hawiye sub-clans. The members of the Hiraab live in central and southern Somalia,

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<sup>393</sup> Col Afridi, *War Digli to Villa Somalia*; Col Abdul Mateen Mehsud, *Yaad-i-Ayaam*, 146-149.

<sup>394</sup> URI Africa convenes meeting on violence in Somalia, United Religions Initiative (URI), January 6, 2012, <https://uri.org/uri-story/20120106-uri-africa-convenes-meeting-violence-somalia> (accessed April 11, 2018).

from Galkayo to Kismayo. Most of them, such as the Abgaal, live in Mogadishu. Others live in the Somali Region of Ethiopia. They once formed a kingdom which successfully revolted against the Ajuran Sultanate and established an independent Hiraab Imamate, which included Hobyo. The Imam of Hiraab is a hereditary position that is traditionally held by a person of the first-born branch, the Mudulod. Imam Mohamed Imam Omar was the Imam of Hiraab at that time.<sup>395</sup>

Two former army chiefs were on the guest list of the Pakistani peacekeepers. One was General Mohamed Ibrahim Liqliqato and the other was General Mohamed Nur Galal. The latter had been the Somali Army Chief in the early 1960s and had visited Pakistan in that capacity. He had been taken around to Lahore, Peshawar and the Staff College at Quetta by his Pakistani hosts. Professor Noor (Abgaal) an academic and Ugas Ali a community leader were also treated as a friend of Pakistan.<sup>396</sup> The Pakistani peacekeepers not only provided their Somali friends with rations and medical support but also invited them to functions such as 23<sup>rd</sup> of March, 14<sup>th</sup> of August, regimental tattoos and Eid Day festivities.

### **The Arrival of Pakistani chargé d'affaires**

Initially diplomatic cover to the Pakistani troops was provided remotely from the high commission in Nairobi. This was a highly unsatisfactory arrangement. With a large troop presence, there should have been proper political support so that the Pakistani point of view could be formally communicated to not only the UNOSOM HQ in Mogadishu but also to the local Somali parties to the conflict. This situation was corrected with the posting of a proper in station diplomat. On 22 November 1993, Abbas Haider Zaidi arrived in Mogadishu as Pakistan's *chargé d'affaires*. He had previous experience of serving in Somalia and had a good understanding of the prevailing situation. It was a good decision to send him to Somalia by the Pakistan Government. The first and foremost thing he did was to meet General Aidid in Nairobi. He clarified the Pakistan stance in UNOSOM and as per him the misunderstanding

<sup>395</sup> The Hraab Treaty, *Somalia News Update*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (January 19, 1994), <https://web.archive.org/web/20070224161113/http://www.etext.org/Politics/Somalia.News.Update/Volume.3/snu-03.003> (accessed February 1, 2018).

<sup>396</sup> M.A. Mohamed Salih & Lennart Wohlgemuth (eds.), Crisis Management and the Politics of Reconciliation in Somalia: Statements from Uppsala Forum 17-19 January 1994 (Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 1994), 122.

and doubts were cleared. Mr. Zaidi made efforts to improve relations with Somali National Alliance (SNA) as well as Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA). On 22 December 1993 he met with President Ali Mahdi and discussed with him the situation of Somalia. Ali Mahdi acknowledged the fact that Mogadishu had been destroyed due to the infighting between his faction and Aidid's. Mr. Zaidi also met other notables such as General Galal ex-chief of staff and president of Habr Gidr peace committee. Galal was opposed to Aidid's policies.

## Chapter VI

### **UNOSOM after the US Withdrawal**

As the US drawdown began, there were speculations about the fate of the peacekeepers being left behind. UN officers privately admitted that a Pakistani pullout at this juncture could cripple the UN Operation in Somalia. The Security Council had set a maximum strength of 22000 for UNOSOM II for the next six months. The Pakistani brigade would be the largest contingent in the UNOSOM forces after the Americans left. Brigadier Saulat Abbas, the commander of the Pakistani brigade was reported in a newspaper report as saying that his force would be left “high and dry” unless it received helicopters and tanks to make up for the loss of firepower after the US and their allied forces pulled out. The Pakistani force had eight Cobra helicopter gunships leased from the US. The brigade commander felt that without scout helicopters they would only be 50 per cent effective. He was, however, confident that there would be no repeat of the 5 June 1993 incident in which the Somalis belonging to the Aidid faction had killed two dozen Pakistani soldiers. Brig Abbas was sure that his government would make the best decision under the circumstances.<sup>397</sup>

To find out the ground situation and to ensure that their troops were not targeted by Aidid or other hostile Somali parties, after the Americans left; a high-level delegation comprising the foreign minister Sardar Assef Ahmed Ali and the defense minister Aftab Shaban Mirani visited Somalia in March 1994. On their way the ministers stopped over in Nairobi, where they met with the main stakeholders in Mogadishu – Gen Farah Aidid and interim President Ali Mahdi Mohammed.<sup>398</sup>

The meeting with Aidid was lengthy. He was angry and annoyed at Pakistanis having become tools in the hands of the Americans. After prolonged negotiations, the foreign minister felt that he had been able to convince Aidid about Pakistan’s good intentions. During the

<sup>397</sup> “UN Abandoning Peacekeepers?” *The Namibian*, February 18, 1994, p. 10, [https://www.namibian.com.na/archive\\_pdf\\_19851990/1994\\_TheNamibian/18%20February%201994.pdf](https://www.namibian.com.na/archive_pdf_19851990/1994_TheNamibian/18%20February%201994.pdf) (accessed September 24, 2017).

<sup>398</sup> Telephonic Interview with Sarwar Munir Rao, June 3, 2018.

negotiations, he told Aidid that he would like to see the Pakistani hospital in Mogadishu continue as long as it could. He also reminded Aidid about the role Pakistan had played in the independence of Somalia and Mr. Bhutto's initiative of championing the cause of the suppressed Afro-Asian nations. His daughter was now in power. Aidid had high regard for her and admired her for the struggle for democracy. At the end of the meeting the foreign minister presented Aidid with a satellite phone costing a hundred thousand dollars and a rug that PTV correspondent Sarwar Munir Rao faithfully recorded for the 9' o clock news. At the end of the meeting the foreign minister informed the Somali warlord that he would be celebrating Eid-ul-Fitr with troops in Mogadishu and would be inviting all Somali factions to join the celebrations as a token of reconciliation. Why was there no backlash within Pakistani public about these parleys with a person accused of having a hand in killing Pakistani soldiers is difficult to comprehend. The meeting, however, did not go unnoticed in the military circles and the foreign minister was chastised through the prime minister for not seeking the approval of the Army before meeting Aidid. He was accused of annoying the Americans. A charge that still rankles him.<sup>399</sup>

In Mogadishu, the Pakistani foreign minister met with Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, the Chairman of US Joint Chiefs of Staff and complained that the UN peacekeeping force were being left behind with obsolete helicopters. The eight Cobra helicopters provided on lease had only 45 minutes of flying time left. The UN forces also needed scout helicopters and aerial surveillance equipment. Without better equipment, the entire mission could be placed in jeopardy. In a news conference closing his 22-hour tour of US and UN camps in Mogadishu, Shalikashvili said he will review Pakistan's request, when he returned to Washington. He said that Pakistani officers had assured him that the leased equipment given to them provided them enough combat strength to continue the mission. Assef Ahmed Ali's comments reflected a sense of bitterness and abandonment as the US and a dozen other Western and Middle Eastern nations prepared to withdraw from Somalia. "Are Pakistani lives worth less than those that come from the West?" he had asked, referring to the "outmoded and substandard" Cobra helicopters. He had accused the UN and the West of racism: "It is beginning to look like

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<sup>399</sup> Interview Sardar Assef Ahmed Ali, 12 November 2017, Lahore.

Europeans for Bosnia, and Africans and Asians for Somalia.” Assef said that if Shalikashvili and the UN Security Council cannot satisfy Pakistan’s concerns, “we will have to take a very careful look at what sort of role we are going to have in the future – and if we are going to have a role.” Asked whether he believed that the US was abandoning the country, Assef said: “Life in America is very good. Nobody in America wants to die for anybody else’s causes.”<sup>400</sup>

As per foreign minister’s desire, invitation for the Eid day lunch were extended to all Somali elders and clansmen, irrespective of their political affiliations. On 10 March 94, CO 15 FF Col Maqbool Afridi personally hand delivered the invitations to the SNA leadership in their enclave on the main Afgoye road in the Benadir district. Although surprised by the initiative, the SNA leaders accepted the invitation to join the Pakistani Brigade on the Eid day festivities.<sup>401</sup> Eid was celebrated on 13 March. The Pakistani foreign minister Sardar Assef Ahmed Ali addressed the troops and emphasized the importance of winning the hearts and minds through acts such as sharing rations with the locals. This was something that the peacekeepers were already doing and did not need to be reminded about. After the Eid day address, Sardar Assef visited the Pakistani hospital and found the atmosphere on the streets extremely friendly. This change in attitude he thought was due to his parleys with Aidid in Nairobi.<sup>402</sup>

The Americans left within ten days of the Pakistani foreign minister’s visit to Mogadishu without replacing the Cobra helicopters. However, thanks to ingenuity of the technicians and the professionalism of the pilots, the helicopters kept flying till the end of the mission. To make up for the operational deficiencies, a batch of 80 old vintage APC M113s ex US stocks in Germany were handed over to Pakistani crews at the port. M113 APC has limited armor protection and is not a fighting vehicle *per se*. The main armament is either a 12.7 mm Anti-Aircraft machine gun or a .50 Browning. The Somalis by then had a fairly good idea that the M113 APCs with their large silhouettes and box like shape provided good targets for their RPG7s. Maj. Gen. Thomas Montgomery, commander of the US force on the eve of departure

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<sup>400</sup> Mark Fineman, “Aging U.S. Copters Sent to Somalia, Pakistani Charges,” *LA Times*, March 14, 1994, [http://articles.latimes.com/1994-03-14/news/mn-33836\\_1\\_pakistani-charges](http://articles.latimes.com/1994-03-14/news/mn-33836_1_pakistani-charges) (accessed August 7, 2017).

<sup>401</sup> Col Afridi, *War Digli to Villa Somalia*.

<sup>402</sup> Interview Sardar Assef Ahmed Ali, 12 November 2017, Lahore.

saw no reason why the UN forces wouldn't be able to take adequate care of themselves with the existing helicopters. The Cobras gunships given to them were equipped with machine guns, rockets and grenade launchers and had been effectively used in Vietnam to put accurate fire within 50 yards of own forces. More precise weapons, he said, were not necessary for the kind of combat expected in Mogadishu.<sup>403</sup>

The last eleven hundred US Marines left Mogadishu on 25 March. By then, French, German, Belgian, Italian, Turkish and Tunisian contingents had also withdrawn. UNOSOM's reduced strength totaled about 20,000, consisting mainly of 7,220 Pakistanis with QRF responsibility, 1,660 Egyptians in Mogadishu, and 4,930 Indians at Kismayo and Bardera.<sup>404</sup> Approximately 90 US government personnel remained in Somalia. Fifty four were members of a Marine Fleet Antiterrorism Support Team (FAST) Platoon, including intelligence support, assigned to provide security to the US Liaison Office (USLO) in Mogadishu till June 30, 1994. It was planned that the Marines were to be replaced by civilian security guards at a later stage. Another 27 personnel were assigned to USLO, including 3 military personnel. 12 contract specialists, both military and civilian, were seconded to the UNOSOM II to assist in the administration of the logistics contract the UN had with Brown & Root, a US engineering firm, and with other UN support contracts. An Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) of about 4,000 personnel, including about 2,000 Marines, was stationed off the coast to protect US citizens and assist in their evacuation from Somalia if necessary.<sup>405</sup>

According to a report prepared by the US auditors, the General Accounting Office (GAO), upon withdrawal, the US Department of Defense (DOD) sold and leased to the UN equipment worth over \$44 million. The leased equipment cost almost \$4 million. Forklifts, fuel/water tanks, tow bars, pumps, and firefighting equipment worth about \$4.1 million was sold to the UN. Also sold were items worth \$6.6 million such as runway matting, tents,

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<sup>403</sup> Rick Atkinson, "U.N. Force in Somalia Changes Guard," *Washington Post*, March 20, 1994, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/03/20/un-force-in-somalia-changes-guard/5eb0375d-f324-47ba-a8f8-193c75d9e497/?utm\\_term=.6aab8221820e](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/03/20/un-force-in-somalia-changes-guard/5eb0375d-f324-47ba-a8f8-193c75d9e497/?utm_term=.6aab8221820e) (accessed August 14, 2017).

<sup>404</sup> Poole, *Efforts to Save Somalia*, 66.

<sup>405</sup> Richard Davis, Peace Operations: Withdrawal of US Forces from Somalia (UN General Accounting Office: Report to the Congress, June 1994): 4

building fixtures, air conditioners, various tools and generators. To support leased equipment, items costing \$32.9 million in spares packages, ammunition, communications gear, training, and transportation were sold to the UN. A lease was arranged through the Air Force for items such as maintenance stands, staircase trucks, and an air cart. The lease cost of \$1,811.00 was valid till June 30, 1994. A second lease for airfield lighting and associated generator sets was to run through September 30, 1994, for a total of \$15,886.00.<sup>406</sup>

To maintain some military capability, the US leased combat equipment to the Pakistani contingent in UNOSOM II such as 80 M113A2 armored personnel carriers from stocks in Europe; 30 M 60A3 tanks from stock in the US; 8 AH 1 Cobra attack helicopters from the Hawaii National Guard; and 5 OH-58C Scout helicopters from stocks in Europe. Also included were associated guns, grenade launchers, radios, radar sets, and test equipment. The leases ran through December 1994 and the items were to be returned to the US in the same condition in which they had been received. Items destroyed were to be paid for. The total lease costs were \$3.9 million. This amount was to be paid by the end of the lease and included a charge for depreciation. According to the terms of the leases, all items leased were to remain the property of the US military.<sup>407</sup>

The French, Germans, and Italians also left with the US forces. A handful of Norwegians and fewer than 200 Western soldiers - Australians, New Zealanders, and the Irish - remained behind under the UN flag in Somalia. Nearly two-thirds of the UNOSOM forces comprised troops from Pakistan, India and Egypt. The mission of the residual UN force was to continue operating under Chapter 7 of the UN charter that called for a peace-making operation with aggressive patrolling, protection of humanitarian groups and the forceful separation of belligerents. However, they knew that neither could they be aggressive, nor would they be actively disarming Somali militia fighters. They would actually be treading a very fine line between Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. Three basic contingency plans had been prepared predicated on the level of violence expected in Somalia in the coming months. If the current level of

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<sup>406</sup> Ibid, 5-7.

<sup>407</sup> Ibid, 7.

relative tranquility persisted, troops would continue limited patrolling and occupation of strongpoints in Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia. If violence increased, they could withdraw into fortified compounds left behind by the US i.e., Victory, Sword and Hunter bases. In case of an all-out offensive by the hostile militia forces the UN forces could execute a fighting withdrawal to Mogadishu port and airfield before a complete evacuation could be arranged out of Somalia.<sup>408</sup>

Amid all the uncertainty created by the departure of the American forces from Somalia, the Pakistani Army Chief Gen Abdul Waheed visited the US in the last week of March and the first week of April 1994. He headed a high-powered delegation that included Commander 2 Corps Lt. Gen. Jehangir Karamat and Director General of Military Intelligence Major General Ali Kuli Khan Khattak. Also accompanying the entourage were the Pakistani Defense and Military Attaché to Washington Brigadier Khalid Maqbool and the US Army Attaché in Islamabad Colonel Jason Greer. In Washington DC, the red carpet was rolled out for the Army Chief and his program included meetings with all high-level US officials. He met with Director Central Intelligence Agency R. James Woolsey on March 30 and with Secretary of the Army Togo West Jr. on March 31. The same day he was invested with the Legion of Merit, Degree of Commander by the Chief of Staff of the US Army General Gordon Sullivan. He met with Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott on April 1 and the two discussed among other things Pakistan's role in peacekeeping operations in Somalia and regional security in South Asia. After the meeting, the State Department spokesman announced that Pakistani military troops "have played and continue to play a constructive role in Somalia." Talbot must have got some useful inputs from this session for his forthcoming visit to the South Asian subcontinent. He was to visit India from April 6-8 and Pakistan from April 8-10. Talbott would play a leading role in enhancing US-India relationship at the expense of Pakistan. The special relationship that he developed with his Indian counterpart Jaswant Singh became the central treatise of his book

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<sup>408</sup> Rick Atkinson, "U.N. Force in Somalia Changes Guard," *Washington Post*, March 20, 1994, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/03/20/un-force-in-somalia-changes-guard/5eb0375d-f324-47ba-a8f8-193c75d9e497/?utm\\_term=.6aab8221820e](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/03/20/un-force-in-somalia-changes-guard/5eb0375d-f324-47ba-a8f8-193c75d9e497/?utm_term=.6aab8221820e) (accessed August 14, 2017).

*Engaging India.*<sup>409</sup> Talbott was President Clinton's lead person for nuclear non-proliferation. In March 1994, the Clinton administration had taken a non-proliferation initiative, whereby it had sought the approval of the Congress to release the embargoed F16s, if Pakistan agreed to cap its nuclear program and accept American demand of 'non-intrusive' inspection. During his visit to the US Gen Waheed quite clearly voiced his opposition to such a proposal, declaring forcefully that the military would not "bargain away Pakistan's nuclear program for F-16s or anything else." Fortunately, both the military and civil leadership were on one page on the issue of the nuclear program. So when Talbott met Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, she told him clearly, "If we are unilaterally pressed for capping, it will be discriminatory and Pakistan will not agree to it."<sup>410</sup>

In Washington, General Waheed also met with National Security Adviser (NSA) Anthony Lake, Secretary of Defense William Perry, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Frank Wisner. At a dinner hosted by Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan's Ambassador to the US, he met Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff. He also visited HQ Central Command (CENTCOM), MacDill Air Force base in Tampa, Florida on April 4; Fort Hood, Texas on April 5; and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas on April 6.<sup>411</sup>

Back home on 14<sup>th</sup> of April UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia again came up under discussion in the National Assembly. MNA Sahibzada Fatehullah wanted the foreign minister to explain, if Pakistani troops would remain stationed in Somalia after the withdrawal of the US forces on 31<sup>st</sup> of March what would be their mandate? He also wanted to know about the commander of the peacekeeping troops in Somalia after the Americans left. Sardar Assef Ahmed Ali informed the House that Pakistani troops were in Somalia in response to

<sup>409</sup> Strobe Talbot, *Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).

<sup>410</sup> Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947 – 2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Press, 2001) 326-327.

<sup>411</sup> PAKISTAN'S CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF MEETS WITH U.S. OFFICIALS (04/04/94), ACCESSION NUMBER: 336872, FILE ID: NEA103, <https://fas.org/irp/news/1994/24840639-24843713.htm> (accessed September 2, 2017).

international community's appeal through the UNSC to help restore law and order. This decision had been fully endorsed by the OIC. Pakistani contingent in Somalia was part of a multinational force and the current mandate of UNOSOM under UNSCR 837 was set to expire on 31<sup>st</sup> May 1994 and that's how long at least Pakistani troops would be there. The charter of duties of the Pakistani troops under the UN mandate was:

[P]eacekeeping through cooperation with the Somali factions rather than coercive disarmament, protection of relief supplies; assistance for the reorganization of the Somali police; repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons and cooperation with Somali parties for the implementation of the Addis Ababa Accords.<sup>412</sup>

The foreign minister told the Assembly that the decision regarding the presence of the Pakistani troops beyond May 31, 1994 would be made after the UN Security Council decided how to proceed depending upon the attitude of the Somali parties and the situation on ground. He also told the members that Lt Gen Aboo Samah bin Aboo Bakar of Malaysia had replaced Lt Gen Çevik Bir of Turkey as the commander of the UNOSOM forces with effect from 15 February 1994.<sup>413</sup>

### **33 Combat Aviation Squadron**

The addition of 33 Combat Army Aviation Squadron to the Pakistani contingent was the result of the 5<sup>th</sup> of June incident. It was strongly felt that the Pakistani peacekeepers needed assured air support, particularly after the Americans left. 33 Squadron was given eight leased AH1G Cobra helicopters to operate. These helicopters were Vietnam War vintage machines and were not equipped with TOW missiles. Instead of canons they had a machine gun and other armament included grenade launchers and rockets. The Pakistan Army Aviation also got four scout helicopters. The helicopters remained operational till the end of the deployment. One

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<sup>412</sup> Proceedings of the National Assembly, April 14, 1994, 724.

<sup>413</sup> Ibid, 724.

was grounded because it was hit by a stray bullet. The helicopters were returned to the Americans before the mission closed.<sup>414</sup>

The squadron's deployment in Somalia began on 4<sup>th</sup> March 1994 with the arrival of an advance party of 11 officers and 146 all ranks. An American Military Training Team (MTT) converted the pilots on to the old Cobras that they were to fly. The first operational flight was made on the 25<sup>th</sup> of March after the Americans departed from Somalia. The main body comprising 17 officers and 244 other ranks joined on 26 March. In April, the UN acquired five OH 58C Kiowa scout helicopters on lease from the US. On 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> May, 10 pilots earmarked for the scout helicopters and a team of technicians joined the combat aviation group. The scout helicopters were drawn from Ramstein airbase in Germany and the pilots successfully converted to fly these helicopters on 30<sup>th</sup> of August. The helicopters were to act as the eyes and ears of the gunships.<sup>415</sup> The pilots of the 33 squadron flew a number of combat sorties. One of their first missions was in support of the Moroccan troops patrolling the city of Marka, on 10 April.

In mid April 1994, hundreds of miles away from Mogadishu in the South Western City of Kismayo, guerrillas of Farah Aidid's faction entered into a UNHCR compound and took people working there as hostage. Indian 1<sup>st</sup> Bihar Regiment located in Kismayo was asked to get the hostages released. Indian Army Aviation Unit along with helicopters from Canadian Aviation deployed in the area were wary of venturing into the target area because the hostage takers were equipped with Russian ZSU-23-2 Anti-Aircraft Guns. The Indian Commander appealed to the Pakistan Army contingent deployed in the Mogadishu for combat aviation support. Pakistani Army was not authorized to operate in the area, so they wanted the request to be channeled through the Force HQ. The request was made through proper channel and Pakistani contingent agreed to undertake the mission. This was a unique occasion in which

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<sup>414</sup> Interview Lt Col Jamshed Bajwa, Pakistan Army Aviation (retired), January 11, 2018.

<sup>415</sup> Maj Gen Muhammad Azam, *History of Pakistan Army Aviation: 1947 – 2007*, Historical Section, Army Aviation Directorate, (Rawalpindi: The Army Press, 2008), 237-238.

Pakistani helicopters were sent to provide air support to an Indian infantry battalion. On home ground, the two forces would have been most likely trading bullets.

On 19 April 1994, two AH 1 Cobra helicopters of 33 Pakistan Army Combat Aviation flew to Kismayo to support the Indian Bihar Regiment operation. The flight mission was commanded by Colonel Saleem Akhund, Commander of 33 Combat Aviation Group. Colonel Saleem's co-pilot was Major Farhat Ali. The second helicopter was flown by Colonel Arshad Farooq and Major Waseem Akhtar. These pilots flew for continuous five hours to reach the Indian Army camp in Kismayo. As per plan in the first phase the Pakistani gunships neutralized the hostile anti-aircraft guns. In the second phase, the soldiers of the Bihar Regiment were flown in four Bell 212 helicopters and landed outside the UNHCR compound. They were easily able to get the seven hostages released, thanks to the Pakistani cobra helicopters hovering overhead. The operation lasted for over 2 hours. That day Pakistani pilots flew for nine hours and crossed the Equator twice on their two-way trip to the target area and back.<sup>416</sup>

On 22<sup>nd</sup> August, Indian peacekeepers were ambushed in the village of Burleego, 70 km southwest of Mogadishu. Seven Indian soldiers were killed and nine were wounded. Three of the wounded were left in a serious condition. The damage was done, when 70 militiamen equipped with anti-aircraft weapons and small arms had attacked an Indian convoy. The attack was described as 'unprovoked' but 'carefully coordinated.' It had taken place in the area of Farah Aidid but no one had claimed responsibility for it.<sup>417</sup> The rescue team sent by the Indian contingent was also trapped by the attackers. The Indians sent an SOS message for armed helicopter air support. Two Cobras of 33 squadron were sent to cordon off the area near the ambush site, and to search and destroy the hostile militia vehicles. Cobras, with their weapons blazing, went in first and cleared the area, thereby making it possible for two other UN helicopters to land in the compound of UNHCR building and complete the rescue operation. As a result four Somali gunmen along with one 23 mm anti-aircraft gun were captured. Since the

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<sup>416</sup> Ibid.

<sup>417</sup> "7 Indian Troops Die in Somali Ambush of U.N. Peace Force," *New York Times*, August 23, 1994, page A00005.

helicopters were low on fuel, they had to land in the Indian camp and the crew had their lunch in there. Lieutenant Colonel Jamshed Bajwa of 33 squadron was happy to discover that a Jat from his village was the commanding officer of the Indian unit. His family had migrated to India in 1947.<sup>418</sup>

On 10 September Pakistani helicopters helped extricate the Zimbabwe battalion encircled by hostile militia in the Balad. On 21 September two cobras and two scout helicopters successfully located and destroyed an armed technical vehicle that had fired on a Pakistani convoy in Mogadishu. On 23 September 1994, a formation of three cobras and two scout helicopters helped extricate a trapped Botswanian contingent. En route the Pakistani helicopters refueled at Baidoa and were invited by the Indian Contingent Commander for a cup of tea in his camp. One of the helicopters developed a fault and the pilots had to stay the night in the Indian camp. One pilot recalled giving the Azaan (call for prayer) at least four times during the stay in the Indian camp. At Fajr prayers, the Indian night guard panicked and took battle stations fearing an attack by the Somalis.

The Chief Operations Officer (COO) at UNOSOM Force Headquarters Colonel Deepak Kapoor (Later Chief of Indian Army) acknowledged the professionalism shown by Pakistani Army Aviation Squadron in the following words:

I would like to take this opportunity to extend my own and U-3 Air's sincere appreciation for the efforts provided to Force Headquarters and UNOSOM-II by Pakistan Combat Aviation Group. We have consistently found them to be extremely proficient and professional aviators who react rapidly to all mission and tasks allocated. We are impressed with responsiveness to impromptu missions and have received excellent support whenever required.

On 6 December 1994, the Pakistani gunship helicopters helped a Bangladeshi company encircled by a Somali warlord in Afgoye. Two Somali tanks were destroyed, and the area secured. On 1<sup>st</sup> of February, the combat aviation squadron covered the withdrawal of 4 Sind and 19 Lancers from Mogadishu city to the airport. The squadron flew its last mission over

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<sup>418</sup> Ibid.

Mogadishu city on 26 February. The Force Commander Lt Gen Aboo Smah bin Aboo Bakar appreciated the performance of the Pakistani pilots in his recorded remarks: “The task given is immense, but the Combat Group has done a wonderful job to support the UN mission.”

### **Exposure to Multinational Forces**

During their stay in Somalia, the Pakistani peacekeepers not only came across US soldiers but also those from other countries with whom they've otherwise had little occasion to meet such as the Indians. They also met and made friends with other contingents from Bangladesh and Malaysia. The Bangladeshi battalion was very keen to meet and befriend the Pakistanis. Their CO Colonel Ashfaq had been commissioned in 20 FF and wanted to renew his acquaintance with the PIFFERS. The Bangladeshi battalion was located in the soap factory (strongpoint 82), where they invited COs 7 FF and 15 FF for lunch. The meeting turned out to be a joyous and happy occasion. On the request of the Bangladeshi Colonel, the Pakistani battalion introduced the Bangladeshi soldiers to the M113 APCs and taught them how to drive these vehicles. They also exchanged mementos and gifts in remembrance of the time that they spent together.

There was a feeling that the Indians had sent their troops to Somalia to balance the Pakistani presence. The Indian started coming in October 1993, and within a month or two their concentration was complete. The Indian army deployed an infantry brigade comprising 5,000 personnel for the peacekeeping operations. Four naval battleships transported the Indian Brigade.<sup>419</sup> The IAF component had seven Cheetah (Alouette) missile helicopters. The Indian squadron was commanded by Wing Commander N.K. Upadhy. His helicopters were mostly used for medical casualty evacuation.<sup>420</sup>

There was a general understanding that irrespective of their national differences, the Pakistanis and Indians would maintain cordial relations. The Indians sought the help of the

<sup>419</sup> The website of the Permanent Mission of India to the UN, <https://www.pminewyork.org/pages.php?id=1985> (accessed January 27, 2017).

<sup>420</sup> Keith B. Richburg, “Indians Grinding Down for Gentler Somalia Mission, *Washington Post*, February 19, 1994, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/02/19/indians-girding-down-for-gentler-somalia-mission/ea42209d-534f-4934-8015-4bd1f2e2b78f/?utm\\_term=.65aa38dd7c1e](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/02/19/indians-girding-down-for-gentler-somalia-mission/ea42209d-534f-4934-8015-4bd1f2e2b78f/?utm_term=.65aa38dd7c1e) (accessed June 19, 2018).

Pakistanis located near the airport for mechanical breakdown, while disembarking at the seaport and airport. The Pakistani officers found an occasion to visit the Indian brigade HQ to offer condolences after a devastating earthquake that had struck Maharashtra state in September 1993. They were able to meet Major Taneje, the Brigade Major in his office. The office layout and the markings on the map appeared familiar to the Pakistani officers. They were joined by Captain Thakur, 5<sup>th</sup> Gurkha Rifles (FF) but the brigade commander Brigadier Mano Baghat was not present. The Sikh officers were particularly friendly and would converse in Punjabi. Colonel Surinder Singh in particular was a convivial hale fellow well met kind of a person. The Pakistani staff at the Force HQ soon became familiar with their Indian colleague Colonel Deepak Kapoor, who would later become the Indian army chief.

### **Sword Base**

In the last week of December 93, it was decided that all Pakistani troops would leave the stadium and occupy Sword Base that was being vacated by US forces. This had been an old Russian Tank compound and was now under the use of the US 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division and was located south of 21 October Road. Other US bases included: University Compound, Victory Base, Embassy Compound, Seaport and Airport Compounds. Initially it was decided by the Pakistani Brigade Headquarters that all element living inside the stadium would occupy Sword Base. This included 15 FF, 122 Field Ambulance and a tank squadron from 19 Lancers. An elaborate plan was chalked out for move. A load of more than 1000 vehicle was to be shifted via Gupta track. Gupta is a district in northern Mogadishu. However, later on it was decided to shift only 15 FF to Sword Base and squadron 19 Lancers and 122 Field Ambulance would go to the Brigade Compound. On 4 January the Stadium was vacated. The move was planned in utmost secrecy. Inevitably, since the move was spread over six days, the news leaked out. Three days prior to the final abandonment of the Stadium, an informer told the Pakistani peacekeepers that the location was being surrounded by SNA militia, in anticipation of taking it over. The move was carried out as planned on 15 January and there was no interference from SNA militia. The QRF picketed the route and Cobra helicopters provided air cover. One last food distribution was carried out before leaving and as the Pakistanis moved out of the Stadium, they were waved good-bye by shabbily dressed SNA militiamen, carrying

M16s, AK7s and RPG7s. The departure of the Pakistani troops from the Stadium left the locals used to Pakistani medical and food help despondent and gloomy.

The troops from the stadium first moved to the university hostel near the Brigade Headquarters, where they stayed for 2-3 weeks and then moved to Sword Base because it had not been vacated by US troops on due date. In the first week of February 94, Pakistani troops had taken over Sword Base, Victory Base, University compound and checkpoint 31. Later on, the Pakistani peacekeepers were given the task to guard Gesira bypass which was connecting Hunter Base (a place about 2 kilometers from Sword Base) with airport bypassing the city on a track. The patrol and escort duties were over and above these commitments.

### **Problem at Strongpoint 7**

The withdrawal of the Americans emboldened the local warlords and they indulged in their favorite pastime of fighting each other. One typical example was the disturbance at strongpoint 7 that forced the crowd comprising mostly of women tried to seek refuge inside the strongpoint. The women were selling khat next to the strongpoint. Khat was imported from Kenya on small aircraft on daily basis and used as a mild narcotic in Somalia. The aircraft would land on a countryside runway, from where khat would be transported to various parts of Somalia by road. There were several points in the city, where this narcotic was sold. Somalis chew this leaf after sunset, and in 2-3 hours are on a ‘high’ to launch an attack. One khat market was located approximately 300 yards north of Strongpoint 7 on Afgoye road. Here, Somali women would sell Khat for an hour and then go away. The bandits attacked the market on a day of intense trading. The vendors mostly women rushed to take shelter inside the strongpoint. This was an act of self-preservation but sentry at the spot thought that he was being mobbed and fired in the air to keep the crowd at bay.

Another day on which the Somalis wanted to enter strongpoint 7 occurred on 12 April 94. Mahdi Ali Brithish, a secretary to Osman Atto had started visiting Sword Base to build good relations on behalf of SNA. He would also ask for rations for the SNA enclave near Digfer Hospital. This area was not receiving any humanitarian aid. On the given day, Otto’s secretary came with two of his master’s sons. One of his sons introduced himself as Ahmed

and informed that he had recently came back from USA, where he was studying. The reason of their visit was to seek passage for a very ‘important’ leader through Strongpoint 7. The leader was to be accompanied by armed militia consisting of many vehicles and personnel. It turned out that the leader in question was Osman Atto. The permission was denied.

### **Eid Ul Azha**

Prior to Eid day it was decided to distribute dry rations among the Somalis so that they could celebrate the occasion in a good way. For this the elders of Wardhiigley and Hodan districts were invited to take away rations for needy people in their camps. On 20 May 94, a day before Eid day, ration was distributed in the cigarette factory on 21 October Road among 200 - 300 Somalis. They were living in tents made of multi-colored pieces of cloth. Thereafter rations were distributed in the Stadium. Initially the women and children hid themselves but then they came out once they learnt that food was being distributed. Thereafter food was distributed inside the Wardhiigley district where Mr. Jaffar’s house was located. Food was also distributed at another camp close by. Thereafter the Pakistani peacekeepers came to Sheikh Aden Dhere’s house and gave him dry rations, water, milk powder and cooking oil. A piece of cloth was presented as a personal gift to the Sheikh. The Sheikh was visibly moved and prayed for the wellbeing of the peacekeepers and Pakistan.

On 21 May after the Eid prayer, the peacekeepers visited Victory Base, and Field Ambulance to inquire about the welfare of the patients and troops manning the water point. Food was served to Somali men and children inside Sword Base and females were given cooked food to take home. For lunch Somali leaders were invited to the Brigade HQ. No SNA leader had come except Ambassador Alim. Before lunch the Pakistani QRF was put on alert to go to Balad as one of the helicopters had malfunctioned and landed 8 Kilometers short of Balad (110 Kilometers from Mogadishu). After 30 minutes, the alert was called off. After brigade lunch a variety show was organized in the Sword Base. The local guests included Maryam Gassen, the writer of the book *Hostage*, her son in law, brother, Miss Nasira Wheley, her cousin Mr. Fareh, a renowned businessman and Engineer Anchore. Ugas Ali’s complete family and Mr. Alim were brought to Sword Base under escort. There were about 200 or so local leaders and elders, who were served with lunch. Mainly they were Mursades and as the area was dominated by SNA, they had to be provided protection. The variety show was a great

success. Announcements were made in Urdu and Somali and Somali orchestra played Pakistani and local tunes. The Somalis as well as the Pakistani troops thoroughly enjoyed the songs and there was spontaneous and impromptu dancing by Somalis and Pakistanis on some lilting scores.

### **Escorting Internally Displaced People (IDP)**

On 23<sup>rd</sup> June, Pakistani peacekeepers escorted a large party of IDPs from Mogadishu seaport to Sarare, 125 KM to the north. The escort moved to airport at 0300 hours to accompany the displaced personnel. From airport they went to seaport and after loading the IDPs on vehicles, they set off on their journey at 0500 hours. There were approximately 500 personnel including men, women, and children, who were sitting in G-3 civilian trucks. The escort comprised tracked and wheeled vehicles. The length of the convoy came to 2-3 KM and the gap between vehicles was 50 yards. All precautions were taken because the entire area was infested with hostile militias. The move was uneventful, and the convoy returned with the empty trucks in the evening. Due to inter clan fighting they had to stay the night at the seaport and returned to the camp next evening after the fighting reduced. The UNOSOM humanitarian division appreciated the well-organized move.

### **Inter Clan Fighting**

After the US withdrawal in March 94, troops representing western countries such as France, Belgium, Norway, Sweden and Germany also left quickly. After the Americans moved out, it was clear that there would no more genuine efforts towards peace or reconciliation and the UNOSOM mission would also wind up soon. Sensing that the end was nigh, the Somali warlords became more aggressive and the movement of their armed technical vehicles more pronounced. The main fighting broke out between Habr Gidr on one side and Hawadle and Mursade on the other. Initially the fight was for domination of seaport and airport. The seaport was to some extent under control of all the factions but main fight took place between Habr Gidr and Hawadle for domination of airport. As per the Habr Gidr, the Hawadle tribe was getting thousands of dollars from UNOSOM for protecting the airport. The Habir Gidr wanted

that the seaport and airport should be shared equally by all factions and no one should have any special rights at these two places.

In the last week of June, serious factional fighting broke out. The fighting between Habir Gidr and Mursade was pretty intense. The Habir Gidr were south of 21 October Road and were occupying the Military Academy behind the Sword Base. The Mursade were on Northern side of 21 October Road and were dominating one of the roads leading to Mogadishu city, which was being used by the locals for bringing milk etc. from the village to the city. Both sides would start fighting early in the morning engaging each other with small arms and automatic weapons. The fight would usually stop after last light and resume the next day. Both groups wanted to occupy the pink building, probably the University of Mogadishu.<sup>421</sup> Normally firing was from a static position but once in a while it would be followed up by an attack and counterattack. Before a physical assault, the faction being attacked would vacate its position. Once one faction had overrun a position, it would fire randomly and finish off their ammunition. Then the counterattack would begin. This ebb and flow would go on endlessly without any meaningful result. The Habir Gidr would occupy the pink building and Mursade would attack them. The Habr Gidr would fall back behind Sword Base and the workshop compound, reorganize and then attack the Mursade. The women would chant slogans and cheer their fighters. They would also bring ammunition and water for them. The technicals would give covering fire from 21 October Road. In this exchange of fire between the Mursade and Habr Gidr, one soldier from an aviation unit at the airport was hit by a stray bullet and was paralyzed.

At times the Pakistani peacekeepers tried to act as mediators to bring about peace and calm by arranging meetings between the notables of each clan. The *modus operandi* of the meeting was that I would call the elders from each side. Sometime the elders had to be fetched in UN vehicles. Both faction leaders would come and sit gravely around a table. Each speaker would start the discussion by raising the slogan Allah u Akbar and then deliver his speech. Each party would listen very patiently. They would never once interfere or quarrel during a meeting or discussion.

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<sup>421</sup> Amanda Lindhout and Sara Corbett, *A House in the Sky: A Memoir* (New York: Scribner, 2013), 268.

### **Relocation of Check Point 31**

After the vacation of Victory Base, where 19 Lancers and one Company of 15 FF was stationed and the eruption of inter clan fighting, Check Point-31 had become highly vulnerable because it fell within Habr Gidr and Mursade crossfire. On 10 July orders were issued to demolish the post and relocate it outside the main gate of the Sword Base. The new post was to be established by first light the next day. The dismantling of the old Check Point began at 2100 hours and the material was transported to the new location. This included the shifting of hundreds of sandbags, logs, barbed wire and electric wire. The work commenced immediately and by morning the new check post had been established.

### **Rescue Operation (12 July 1994) Clearance of Roadblock between Strongpoint 7 and Hunter Base**

The road between Strongpoint 7, Hunter Base, Gesira bypass and airport was the main supply route (MSR) of the Brigade Headquarters as well as the Force Headquarters. On 21<sup>st</sup> July, roadblocks were established between Strongpoint 7 and Check Post 1 on Gesira bypass. The posts were established for monitoring the traffic on Gesira bypass after regular intervals, since the road passed through uninhabited area and Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) would frequently cut off the MSR of the UNOSOM troops. Orders were given to re-open the blocked road with the help of tanks. There were three roadblocks, two between Strongpoint 7 and Hunter Base and one between Hunter Base and Check Post 1 on the Gesira bypass. On 22<sup>nd</sup> July, the commanders were given orders to remove the roadblocks but then after negotiations with the Somalis the road was opened up without taking any military action.

### **Rescue Operation of Zimbabwe Company at Belet Uen**

Zimbabwe contingent was located in Balad district about 35 km from Mogadishu in the Middle Shabelle region. One of its Company was deployed at Belet Uen approximately 400 Kilometers from Mogadishu. Reports were received by Force HQ that the company was under threat by SNA. Belet Uen was approachable by air and C-130s could land on a dirt runway. On 26 July one company of Pakistani peacekeepers was moved to Airport to be sent by air to reinforce to reinforce the Zimbabwe Company in Belet Uen. The Company was to be airlifted

in two C-130 sorties. The Company was told to carry ration for two weeks and as much as ammunition as possible but was not given any briefing about the situation in Belet Uen. Again, on 28 July the Company was kept on 3 hours' notice for move to Belet Uen. The complete day and the next day were spent in anticipation but nothing happened.

On 30 July it was learnt that the Force Headquarters had lost contact with the Zimbabwean Company and it was assumed that they had been attacked and either killed or made hostage. At about 0945 hours, a recce party flew out to Belet Uen in a Jet Ranger to have a look at the evolving situation and to establish wireless contact with the Zimbabwe Company which had been overrun by SNA in the morning at 0500 hours. The reconnaissance group included a Pakistani officer, Colonel Sree Kumar (Chief Signal Officer at the Force Headquarters from India), two Majors from India, one Major from Bangladesh and one Major and one soldier from Zimbabwe. Three passes were made over the city. The pilot was cautious about anti-aircraft guns, so it was difficult to get a clear view. However, there was a good view of the runway and the platoon's barracks appeared to be vacant. The Somalis had come out in the streets and started waving to the peacekeepers to go back. After the third circle, the pilot informed that he was low on fuel and that he had to return. No wireless contact could be established with the company. By 1130 the factual position was conveyed to the Brigade Commander.

It was later learnt that Zimbabwe Company at Belet Uen had deployed a platoon each at airport and at the water point. The rest of the Company was in the city. The Zimbabwean soldiers were freely intermingling with the local population and their discipline was lax. This indiscretion cost them heavily. They were attacked, disarmed, and made prisoners. The remaining personnel had surrendered. One Zimbabwe soldier had been killed and everything else including ration, vehicles, equipment, arms and ammunition had been captured. On 30 July in the evening, it was decided that one Pakistani platoon was to protect the aircraft which was to take about 25 Somali leaders to Belet Uen. Anyhow later the orders changed, and it was decided that Zimbabwe platoon will go for the protection of the aircraft. On 31<sup>st</sup> July, the C-130 took the SNA elders to negotiate the release of the Zimbabweans held hostage.

## **Exercise at Bardera**

After the capture of Zimbabwe Company by SNA militia at Belet Uen, contingency plans were made to prevent similar happenings at other places, where the UN troops were deployed. One Pakistani company was sent for reconnaissance of Marka. It also surveyed Afgoye, where the Bangladesh contingent was deployed. On 6 August, an exercise was held to practice Force Commander's QRF in securing Bardera, 450 KM west of Mogadishu, where Botswana troops were deployed. Colonel Ellis (Australian Army) of the Force HQ's Intelligence Branch provided the background briefing. The exercise was aimed to practice reinforcing or evacuating the Botswana troops in case of an attack. A company strength including a commando platoon was airlifted on a C-130 to Bardera in the morning. Upon landing at Berdera, the troops immediately secured the airport, and established contact with Botswana troops and also with the helicopters. In this exercise four Alouette helicopters from Indian contingent also took part along with Pakistani cobra helicopters.

## **Escorting Food Convoys to Baledogle**

In the month of August and September, the Pakistani peacekeepers provided escort duties to the food convoys of World Food Program (WFP) to Baledogle 110 Kilometers northwest of Mogadishu. The Soviets had constructed a military airport at Baledogle during the Cold War. Now the US forces operate drones from this base against Al Shabab fighters. The US has another drone base in Kismayo.<sup>422</sup>

Typically, a food convoy had 28-30 trucks with trailers. A total of 5 food convoys were sent out. The move was planned with great care to ensure their safety and security. Pakistani escorts had to be careful because food convoys accompanied by Indian, Bangladeshi, and Malaysian peacekeepers had already been ambushed. Armed Somalis were made to sit on top of each truck as an additional security measure. The convoy was spread over a distance of 2-3 Kilometers distance. Sometimes unscheduled stops had to be made due to breakdowns or because the Somalis wanted a break. The food convoys were handed over the Indians, to

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<sup>422</sup> Somalia is home to two secret US drone bases – report, *Russia Times*, July 3. 2015, <https://www.rt.com/usa/271369-us-secret-drones-somalia/> (accessed June 3, 2018).

further escort these to Baidoa, Bardera, Oddur and Wajid located in the interior within their area of responsibility. Initially it was decided that a Pakistani Company would escort the food convoy from seaport, then come to K4, Airport Road, Gesira bypass Strongpoint 7 and then onwards to Baledogle but the civilian trucks could not travel on Gesira bypass as it was not metaled and had heights that they could not climb. It was then decided that the food convoy would go through K4 – K7 and the escort duty was to be taken over from Strongpoint 7.

### **Independence Day Celebrations**

In the morning of 14 August 1994, a flag hoisting ceremony was held, followed by music show and tea party at the Pakistani brigade HQ. Somalis from a wide spectrum of their society were invited. The main guests included General Mohamed Ibrahim Liqliqato, former Somali Chief of Army staff, General M.N. Galal the former Somali Chief of Staff, Imam Osman (Imam of Hiraab's younger brother), Professor Noor (Abgaal tribe) and Mr. Alim former Somali Ambassador to Pakistan. Others, who joined the festivities were local friends, interpreters employed in the brigade Bashir, and Sheikh Aden Dhere's sons Ahmed and Wali. Ugas Ali, a community leader had brought along his newly wed wife. In addition, more than 200 male and female Somali attended the function.

They were hosted to a lunch followed by a music show. The function was held in a big hall in which all guests could be accommodated. The Somalis found some of the skits the peacekeepers interaction with locals hilarious. A message of peace was delivered through a Somali boy and a girl. In between a Pakistan folk song, one Somali song and English song were sung. On one of the Pakistani folk songs, young officers started dancing, and the whole hall started clapping. Thereafter a Somali song started. As the Somali orchestra started its music suddenly Somali males and females got up and started dancing. Everybody seemed to be enjoying and living the moment. After the dance, the Somali sat down to catch their breath. As a people, the Somali are very lively and like all Africans cannot resist music.

The event was considered opportune to explain to the audience about the freedom struggle for Pakistan and the background to the two-nation theory. It was also highlighted that after independence the first thing Pakistan did was to fight the case for independence of

Somalia in UN. General Liqliqato spoke in Somali language, explaining the role of Pakistan Army role in UNOSOM and Pak-Somali relation. Both the addresses were interpreted by a Somali girl, who knew Urdu also. At the end Pakistani and Somali national anthems were sung by all the elders who voluntarily came up to the stage. One female SNA leader led the anthem. The atmosphere had become very emotional and it was palpable that the Somalis were singing from their hearts.

### **Vacation of Sword Base**

As mentioned earlier, Sword Base was occupied by the Pakistani troops after the departure of the US forces. On 1<sup>st</sup> September 94, 15 FF, the unit located inside Sword Base was given instructions to vacate Sword Base and to occupy the soap factory, near airport for move back to Pakistan. The vacation presented problems because stores like barbed wires and searchlights had to be removed in the presence of SNA militia, who dominated the eastern side. The stores to be shifted included bathing and ablution units, and containers. The workshop unit inside Sword Base was to provide escort for the stores being moved. Before the Pakistani workshop unit, 598 Maintenance Unit, 13<sup>th</sup> Corps Support Battalion of US 10 Mountain Division was deployed at Sword Base.<sup>423</sup>

To begin with on 17-18 September, Check Point-31 was vacated. After the barbed wire had been removed foot patrolling was conducted at night to provide perimeter security. The dismantled defense stores such as sand bags, wooden planks, logs, concertina coils and barbed wire, long and short pickets etc. were distributed among the units to reinforce existing strongpoints. On 20 September, local Somalis laid claim on ten out of 93 containers and refused to allow their removal. These containers were being used on the eastern side of the base to protect it from the hostile militia. It also had a sandbag embankment on the top. Later the SNA demand increased from 10 to 35. Several meetings were held between local SNA leaders, UNOSOM team (Political wing and Force Headquarters, led by chief operation officer Colonel Kapoor from India) and by the representatives of the Pakistani contingent. The meetings ended

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<sup>423</sup> Djanvk, "Sword Base, Mogadishu Somalia," June 28, 2006,

<https://productforums.google.com/forum/#!msg/gec-military/j2DiccpzHTk/N645XnLruJAJ> (accessed April 5, 2018).

without any decisions. Anyhow further negotiations were stopped because it was decided that the containers should not be removed as it was giving protection to Sword Base for the moment. On 25 September, the final vacation of Sword Base took place without removing the containers. The final move started at 1430 hours with wheeled vehicles leaving first, followed by tracked vehicles at 1500 hours. Helicopter cover was made available during the operation. The pilots provided useful information about locals gathering on the eastern side of the Base. Many of them particularly children and women wore a sad look at being abandoned. Ahmed Sheikh Usman the local SNA leader had promised safe passage to the Pakistani peacekeepers and there was no interference during the movement. As the Pakistanis crossed the workshop, the helicopter passed the message that the local had entered the Sword Base and were plundering it. As the barriers were removed, some Somalis tried to take away stores like iron pickets and barbed wire. As soon as the soldiers departed it was free for all.

On September 13, an investiture ceremony was held to mark the participation of 15 FF in the operations in Somalia. In October 1994, the unit was rotated back to Pakistan. The move back took place on chartered commercial planes. Heavy luggage was moved back by sea. On 18 October 94, the Russian cargo vessel Knud Jesperson, arrived at Mogadishu seaport to carry the stores and vehicles to Pakistan. Soon after its arrival the loading started. A total of 35 A vehicles, 83 B vehicles, 32 containers sailed out for Karachi on 22<sup>nd</sup> October 94. The task of loading the ship was a new skill for the unit and the sea journey was a novel experience for the two young officers accompanying the cargo. During the journey, they sighted flying fish and sharks on daily basis but the awesome sight were killer white and green turtles. The first two days were difficult and the vessel met with some turbulence on the third day of the journey. The Pakistani soldiers soon got over the sea sickness and were looked after well by the Russian crew. Communication was restricted because neither knew each other's language but they could convey their messages through sign language. The ship reached Karachi on 30 October.

### **Media Coverage**

The US Government used the media effectively to prepare grounds for a military intervention in Somalia.<sup>424</sup> Later a full-fledged psy-warfare campaign was waged through extensive media coverage to showcase the might of the US armed forces as they made a splendid amphibious landing on the beaches of Mogadishu in December 1992. Dropping leaflets and making announcements to the Somali population ahead of any military operation became the norm. As part of the psy ops operations UNITAF published a newspaper by the name of *Rajo* (hope) and a radio station by the same name. The radio station was located in the US embassy compound and broadcast a range of mid wave and short-wave transmissions.<sup>425</sup>

To begin with the Pakistani media was practically non-existent in the region, where the national troops were rendering a noteworthy humanitarian contribution. It was quite late when Pakistani journalists arrived Somalia. Among those venturing into the conflict zone were independent journalist Rafique Dogar and Lieutenant Colonel Ashfaq Hussain, representing the Pakistani military's media wing – the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) Directorate. Both penned down their experiences in Somalia in Urdu in their books *Operation Somalia*,<sup>426</sup> and *Gentlemen Subhanallah*. On the basis of his experience that Col Ashfaq gained from his visit to Somalia, he wrote the script of the ISPR documentary titled Aman kay Safeer (Ambassadors of peace). The film went an award in a competition held in the Armed Forces film festival held in Rome.<sup>427</sup>

The two journalists held detailed meetings with important stakeholders in Mogadishu, including politicians, religious leaders, and social workers to build an honest opinion about the situation in Somalia. Ali Mahdi, the 'interim President' had an inflated cabinet of 80 ministers. 36 of whom were actually residing within the country.<sup>428</sup> Out of these the minister of information and culture Hussain Shaikh Ali Qadarey of the Abgal tribe was interviewed by

<sup>424</sup> Jonathan Mermel, *Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of U.S. Intervention in the Post Vietnam Era* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 121.

<sup>425</sup> "Normality Begins to Return" in *Restoring Hope to Somalia with the Unified Task Force 1992-1993*, 138-139, [https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Restoring%20Hope%20In%20Somalia%20with%20the%20Unified%20Task%20Force%201992-1993%20PCN%2019000413500\\_7.pdf](https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Restoring%20Hope%20In%20Somalia%20with%20the%20Unified%20Task%20Force%201992-1993%20PCN%2019000413500_7.pdf) (accessed June 8, 2018).

<sup>426</sup> M. Rafique Dogar, *Operation Somalia: A Journey – The Story of a Country's Destruction* (Lahore: Deed Shunaid Publications, 1994).

<sup>427</sup> Col Ashfaq Hussain, *Gentlemen Subhanallah* (Lahore, Pakistan Idara Matbuat e Sulemani, 1999).

<sup>428</sup> Keith B. Richburg, "It Makes a Warlord Smile," *Washington Post*, June 24, 1993,

[https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/06/24/it-makes-a-warlord-smile/638af3e5-ed50-4546-8925-e66727e398b9/?utm\\_term=.ad49a2d32d93](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/06/24/it-makes-a-warlord-smile/638af3e5-ed50-4546-8925-e66727e398b9/?utm_term=.ad49a2d32d93) (accessed April 17, 2018).

Lieutenant Colonel Ashfaq in a mosque after the Juma prayers.<sup>429</sup> Rafique Dogar also interviewed him at his home and found him to be an articulate person and very well inclined towards Pakistan.<sup>430</sup> Col Ashfaq and Rafique Dogar were also met prominent religious leader, the Imam Umar of Hiraab. In March 1994, when these interviews were conducted. The Imam was trying to broker peace between the warring tribe under a private initiative called the Hiraab peace conference. He was also trying to solicit the support of the Pakistani brigade to arrange the logistics of the process. Dogar found him to be a sincere and amiable person. The Imam expressed his concerns about the Indian military medical mission, whom he said was involved in spreading and promoting their religion and culture.<sup>431</sup>

In his book, Rafique Dogar recounts meetings with Somali journalists working for UNOSOM newspaper by the name of *Manta* (Today). A radio station by the same name was also running. It is not known if *Manta* was the successor to UNITAF mouthpiece *Rajo*. Dogar was introduced to the program manager of Radio *Manta* Muhammad Hasan Ali Vegi. He also met the Abdul Qadir, the owner /editor of daily *Karan* (Nation), one of the two newspapers being published from Aidid controlled Southern Mogadishu. For known reasons Abdul Qadir was critical of the peacekeepers and dubbed them mercenaries.<sup>432</sup>

During the course of his stay in Mogadishu, Dogar also met prominent social workers such as Fatima from the Abgaal tribe. Fatima was running a hospital from a building that she had donated for the cause. The Pakistani peacekeepers had also provided some administrative support for. Her father had been trained in Pakistan and she had a lot of liking for the country. Interestingly Fatima's hospital had also received from a quasi-missionary society – the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA). ADRA had just established its presence in Somalia in 1992 and is still there. Over the years ADRA has managed over 50 projects in areas such as water; primary health care; education; food security; infrastructure; institutional capacity building; micro-enterprise development and emergency response interventions. Like

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<sup>429</sup> Ashfaq, *Subhanallah*, 208 – 217.

<sup>430</sup> Dogar, *Operation Somalia*, 72 – 74.

<sup>431</sup> Dogar, *Operation Somalia*, 78 -83.

<sup>432</sup> Ibid, 52 – 58.

many other western NGOs, for safety reasons, ADRA's administrative and logistic base is located in Nairobi in Kenya.<sup>433</sup>

Another social worker that Dogar interviewed was Hawa Muhammad Osoble, the chairperson of United Somali Women Association. Hawa belonged to the Mursade clan. Dogar's analysis of the situation was that Operation Somalia was an American strategy to extend the emerging new world order, to exploit Somalia's mineral wealth and to provide a toehold to Christian missionaries to spread this religion in a predominantly Muslim country.

Sarwar Munir Rao from Pakistan Television (PTV) also visited the Pakistan contingent to record their peacekeeping activity. He visited covered the foreign minister's visit to Nairobi and Mogadishu. He made short films of his visits to checkpoint 31, Sword Base and of a camp of displaced people, east of the Military Academy. He found the Somalis to be living in miserable conditions. On Parade Review Ground, he saw Somali women filling their water pitchers from a well. Water was in short supply and Somalis would fight over a bottle of water, when the peacekeepers gave them one from their rations. Mr. Rao filmed these glimpses of human misery and sent back images to be broadcast on PTV.<sup>434</sup> The film was sent by UN aircraft to Nairobi, from where these were relayed via satellite link to Islamabad. So there was always a time lag in the actual broadcast of the events taking place on ground.<sup>435</sup>

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<sup>433</sup> Information about ADRA is available at their website <http://www.adrasom.org/ar/home/about-us/brief.html>.

<sup>434</sup> Interview Sarwar Munir Rao, July 2017, NUST Islamabad.

<sup>435</sup> Telephonic interview with Sarwar Munir Rao, June 3, 2018.

## Chapter VII

### The Evacuation of UN Forces from Somalia

After the departure of the Americans, it was a foregone conclusion that it was only a matter of time before the UN mission would wrap up. During the summer of 1994, it was decided to end UNOSOM mission and withdraw UN forces from Somalia by March 1995. The withdrawal was approved by the UN Security Council Resolution of 954 of November 1994.<sup>436</sup> The evacuation was planned within the framework of Operation United Shield. The complete build up and execution of the evacuation would span a period of over two months from 9 January to 3 March 1995. Lt Gen Anthony Zinni, commanding general of I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) was appointed the commander of the Combined Task Force (CTF) to protect the UN withdrawal. The CTF included Zinni's I MEF. Zinni was a Somalia veteran. He had served as Director for Operations for UNITAF during Operation Restore Hope in 1992-1993 and had returned to Somalia as the military advisor to special envoy Oakley after the Black Hawk Down incident.<sup>437</sup> He knew the area and most of the Somali leaders and the Pakistani commanders operating with UNOSOM.

After he became commander CENTCOM as a four-star general, Zinni would engage more intimately with Pakistan's top military leadership. He made high profile visits to Pakistan in 1998 and 1999 to carry out some aggressive diplomacy. In 1998, he was part of a two-member team headed by Under Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, sent to dissuade the Pakistani civil and military leadership from carrying out tit for tat nuclear tests in response to the Indian explosions conducted on the 11 and 13<sup>th</sup> of May. The Talbott team was severely snubbed by the Foreign Office but got a relatively sympathetic hearing at the GHQ.<sup>438</sup> The Government of Pakistan (GOP) was under tremendous public pressure and had no option but to go ahead with the nuclear tests.

<sup>436</sup> UNSCR 954, Extension of the mandate of the UN Operation in Somalia II for a final period until 31 March. 1994 and secure withdrawal of personnel and assets from Somalia, November 4, 1994, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/954> (accessed June 3, 2018).

<sup>437</sup> Interview with Gen Anthony Zinni, "Ambush in Mogadishu," *Frontline*, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/interviews/zinni.html> (accessed June 1, 2018).

<sup>438</sup> Strobe Talbott, *Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb* (Washington DC: Brooking Institute, 2004), 64.

After General Jahangir Karamat fell out with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and resigned, Pervez Musharraf became the Army Chief in October 1998. Musharraf lost no time in inviting Zinni and his wife for a four day visit to Pakistan. He took Zinni along for a tour of the Line of Control (LOC), Siachin and Khyber Pass. They hit off rather well and their personal bond flourished outside the troubled official relationship.<sup>439</sup> In early June 1999, Zinni contacted his Pakistani counterpart Musharraf to inquire about the ground situation, after reports that Pakistan Army had crossed the LOC in Kargil after the spring thaw.<sup>440</sup> As the situation spun out of control, the Clinton Administration, sent Zinni and Edward ‘Gib’ Lanpher, Deputy Assistant Secretary South Asian Affairs to Pakistan to pressurize GOP to cease hostilities and withdraw its troop from across the LOC. The team arrive in Pakistan on 24 June 1999 and Zinni met both Gen Musharraf as well and the prime minister to convey President Clinton’s ultimatum to unilaterally withdraw troops from across the LOC.<sup>441</sup>

In 1993, Zinni and his staff in I MEF, were considered most suited for Operation United Shield. They were familiar with the situation in Somalia and had good experience in handling international forces. They were to oversee a complex evacuation by sea. A 4,000-man air-ground task force was to cover the withdrawal. A seaborne coalition of American, Italian, Pakistani, French, British, and Malaysian naval vessels was to wait off the coast of Mogadishu to accept the forces being evacuated.

Indian Navy (IN) provided three ships i.e., INS Ganga, INS Godavari, and INS Shakti.<sup>442</sup> The Pakistan Navy (PN) fielded two ships and a submarine. PNS Shamsher, equipped with anti-ship missiles and surface guns was commanded by Captain Noman Bashir. Shamsher’s CO would later become the Pakistani naval chief. PNS Nasr, a replenishment ship was commanded by Captain A.Z. Safvi; and PNS Ghazi 134 – a submarine charged with intelligence management gathering was commanded by Commander Adnan Nazir. PN participated in the withdrawal operation, despite the fact its sea borne fleet had shrunk in size

<sup>439</sup> Nasim Zehra, *From Kargil to the Coup: Events that Shook Pakistan* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2018), 186-187.

<sup>440</sup> Ibid, 237.

<sup>441</sup> Ibid, 240-245.

<sup>442</sup> Ruchita Beri, “India’s Role in Keeping Peace in Africa,” *Strategic Analysis*, Volume 32, Issue 2 (2008), <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09700160801994852?src=recsys&> (accessed January 12, 2018).

after the infamous Pressler amendment was invoked on 1 October 1990. The lease of the first Brooke class frigate had expired in March 1993, and of the remaining in early 1994. The ships were returned only to be mothballed. This had seriously impaired the operational efficiency of a service that was composed almost entirely of US origin warships.<sup>443</sup>

The United Shield planners had prepared the pullout plan in four phases. The planning phase lasted from August to mid-January. The move and deployment phase were scheduled from mid-January to the beginning of February. In phase three, the US forces assumed the command of the UN forces between February 8 and 28. During phase four, the actual execution of the withdrawal was scheduled from February 28 to March 3. The operational tasks involved two-night amphibious landings at the Mogadishu port and airfield. The landing forces were to relieve the UN forces. The Pakistani Brigade was to pass through the US coalition lines (US and Italian Marines) to reach the shore. Besides the withdrawal of the military forces, a Non-combatant Evacuation of UN, media, and civilian agencies personnel had to be carried out. There was a possibility of interference by civilian crowds, mobs, and looters and help was sought from the fragmentary Somali police and military presence in Mogadishu to prevent such a happening. The operational chain of command involved the CTF Commander reporting to General Peay CINC CENTCOM through Vice Admiral Scott Redd, Commander of US 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet located in Bahrain. Twenty-three naval ships were involved in the evacuation by sea. Rear Admiral Lee Gunn, from the US 3<sup>rd</sup> Fleet, was the commander of the naval component of the CTF.

After last minute coordination in Bahrain, Zinni went to Nairobi, Kenya, to meet the military chief of staff, General Mohamed, and other government officials. The Americans intended to use Mombasa as a base for the AC 130 gunships and as a logistics and staging base (to stage forces that would link up with ships sailing in from the Pacific) and wanted the Kenyans to be in the loop. In Nairobi, he picked up Ambassador Dan Simpson, the President's special envoy to the Somalia mission, and Ambassador David Shinn, the State Department's Africa bureau head, and flew to Mogadishu to coordinate with the UNOSOM forces and met with the warlords.

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<sup>443</sup> Pakistan Navy, <https://alchetron.com/Pakistan-Navy-3974580-W> (accessed June 6, 2017).

In Somalia, Zinni met the force commander General Aboo Samah, the Malaysian commander of the UNOSOM forces, and Ambassador Victor Gbeho, the SRSG, whom he found to be professional and cooperative. The Americans wanted no trouble during the evacuation and most of the warlords had no issue with this demand. The main meeting was with Aidid. Aidid was happy to see the UN leave and he was not going to be the one to delay their departure. The negotiations, however, began on a bad note when Ambassador Simpson adopted a very provocative approach. Aidid kept his cool and did not respond to the provocations of the American diplomats. At the conclusion of the meeting, there was a photo-op at the bottom of the building steps. As everyone was preparing to leave, Aidid grabbed Zinni's arm, drew him aside and asked him, why he looked so worried. Zinni explained that he didn't want any casualties during the withdrawal. Aidid assured him that he could count on him but admitted that he didn't control militias or gangs other than his own.

After the meeting in Mogadishu with Aidid, Zinni left for wrap-up meetings in Bahrain and Pakistan. In Pakistan he briefed Army Chief General Abdul Waheed about the withdrawal plans for his troops. The Pakistani Brigade would be the last of the UNOSOM forces to leave Mogadishu. After having tied up all ends, Zinni headed to Kenya, to board his command ship the USS Belleau Wood. The naval fleet for Operation United Shield included twenty-three ships, and had on board 16,485 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines from seven nations.

The evacuation of UNOSOM II was planned in three phases. In Phase-I, all troops employed outside Mogadishu were to withdraw and concentrate at Mogadishu air and seaport for departure to their respective homelands. In Phase-II, all troops inside Mogadishu were to withdraw and join the forces already concentrating in the air and seaports. In first two phases, 19<sup>th</sup> Lancers was to provide security to the withdrawing troops. In Phase-III, American forces was to establish a beachhead to cover the withdrawal of Pakistani contingent. Phase-I was executed as per plan. Phase-II was trickier, as almost two brigade size forces were required to vacate Mogadishu. Somalis were keen to gain control over all the facilities being left behind by UN forces. There was a threat of riots, plunder, disturbance and even ambushes against the withdrawing forces. Embassy and University complex housed the Force HQ and 4 Sind, whereas, K7, strongpoint 7 and bypass route was where most of 5 FF and Engineers were

deployed. 19<sup>th</sup> Lancers was to act as rearguard to cover the withdrawal of these forces. Bulk of the civilian staff and international observers were inside the US embassy compound. One tank squadron was to act as rearguard for all UN forces, military, and civilian present in Mogadishu, whereas another squadron was to secure the route of withdrawal by establishing roadside pickets. The non-essentials were sent back to the airport on 31 January 1995. On 1<sup>st</sup> February, at 0400 hours, the deployment of both squadrons commenced. One Squadron was deployed on the Mogadishu Bypass and the other was deployed ahead of the US embassy and K7 compounds. The withdrawal was completed at 1100 hours the same day. The operation went smoothly and there was no Somali interference.<sup>444</sup>

The CTF sailed from Mombasa on the 1<sup>st</sup> of February. It stopped off the coast of Malindi, Kenya, to rehearse the landing and withdrawal operations. It arrived off the coast of Mogadishu on 7<sup>th</sup> February to set the stage for the final withdrawal. For the next three weeks, the UN drew down its presence until it controlled only the port and airfield.

As per plan, American troops were to land on a wide expanse of beach south of Mogadishu next to the Pakistani Brigade which held the airport. The amphibious landing began just before midnight on 27–28 February 1995, Mogadishu time. By the time the Landing Force went ashore, the UNOSOM forces had already concentrated in the New Port and Mogadishu International Airport area. The landing operation lasted a little over four hours. A mechanized force consisting of about 1,800 US Marines and 350 Italian Marines, along with 150 pieces of military equipment had come ashore to escort the UN forces to the waiting ships. These men and machines (including LCUs, LAVs, AAVs, and LCACs) were employed to rapidly secure Mogadishu International Airport and New Port (the seaport facility). The entire amphibious landing was complete by half past four in the morning of 28 February.

On the 3<sup>rd</sup> of March 1995, 73 hours after the beginning of the amphibious landing, 2,422 UN troops and approximately 3,800 CTF troops; and over a hundred combat vehicles had withdrawn. After the UN forces had departed, the US Marines also moved out.<sup>445</sup> The operation to escort the last UN troops out of the country had ended without any casualties. The

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<sup>444</sup> 19 Lancers Somalia Report, 20.

<sup>445</sup> Gen Anthony Zinni with Tom Clancy, *Battle Ready* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2004), 288-302.

atmosphere during the withdrawal was tense. The final phase of the pullout was delayed because a ship that was to ferry the Pakistani peacekeeping troops was late in arriving. The retreat was a sober and mellow affair. It was a far cry from the grand amphibious landing made by the US Marine Corps expeditionary force in December 1992 before a battery of camera clicking journalists waiting for them on the beaches. As the last wave of 15 amphibious assault vehicles made their way two miles down the beach to board the waiting warships, there was no fanfare, only the buzz of helicopter gunships and an AC 130 Spectre gunship overhead. The Somali police and militia, as per their promise, kept the crowds a safe distance away from the withdrawing troops. The evacuation process was completed without a hitch and the United Shield Force closed down its HQ in Nairobi on the 8<sup>th</sup> of March 1995.<sup>446</sup>

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<sup>446</sup> “UNOSOM Withdrawal Completed ‘Virtually without a Hitch’: UN Efforts Save a Quarter Million Lives,” <https://www.questia.com/magazine/1G1-17369670/unosom-withdrawal-completed-virtually-without-a-hitch> (accessed June 3, 2018).

## Chapter VIII

### CONCLUSION

The humanitarian intervention in Somalia brought about only a temporary relief for the hungry and the starving Somalis. 300,000 had already died of starvation before international relief was launched. Probably the same number was saved once food aid began reaching the correct quarters under the protection of the peacekeepers. On the political level, the Somali parties to the conflict had serious doubts about the impartiality of the UN to broker peace. Three major conferences arranged at a substantial price by the UN to provide a platform to the warring factions proved to be an exercise in futility. The single-minded approach to disarm the Somali militias was counterproductive and destroyed any chance of peace returning to Somalia. At the end, the net effort to bring about relief and reconstruction amounted to cipher. Somalia remains a failed state.

The four-year intervention in Somalia (1992 to 1995) cost the world dearly in terms of human lives and money. Estimates vary about how many dollars were spent on the peacekeeping mission in Somalia. According to one report, the mission cost the UN one billion dollars a year.<sup>447</sup> Another figure gives a total cost of more than \$2 billion, or several million dollars a day on a mission that was blighted by mistakes and failures. Most of the damage done was due to the lack of coordination and understanding at the planning and execution stages. The absence of cooperation between the UN forces comprising multinational contingents and the relief organizations, hamstrung the operations at strategic and tactical levels. Multiple efforts by different agencies caused more confusion and added to the disunity.

As the US and UN fought their separate wars in Somalia, mission creep set in and a purely humanitarian mandate was expanded to fight a running battle with the Somali National Army (SNA) faction of the United Somali Congress (USC). The task to bring succor to the dying Somalis was diverted by the urgency to bring Aidid to book. The US Marines and Special Forces despite having an edge in military hardware and technology were not able to

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<sup>447</sup> Julia Preston, “Waste in Somalia typifies failings of U.N. Management,” Washington Post, January 3, 1995, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/01/03/waste-in-somalia-typifies-failings-of-un-management/8ac3ac85-cce9-40b7-9823-9910425142f0/?noredirect=on&utm\\_term=.3bfde41c926c](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/01/03/waste-in-somalia-typifies-failings-of-un-management/8ac3ac85-cce9-40b7-9823-9910425142f0/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3bfde41c926c) (accessed July 10, 2018).

catch Aidid instead they were badly bruised by the rag tag Somalia militias. The *Black Hawk Down* debacle has become etched in the psyche of the US military and evokes nasty images of angry crowds in Mogadishu celebrating over the dead bodies of American soldiers. The hasty withdrawal of troops was an acknowledgment that conflicts cannot be resolved through kinetic means alone and an alien system of governance cannot be imposed on a tribal society.<sup>448</sup>

The botched attempts to bring peace and stability in Somalia led to a number of studies, including a comprehensive report from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO). Many of the conclusions drew attention to the need for clear mandates, resources, better planning and coordination, and unity of command. However, another aspect which would prove to be an emerging problem in many future operations was the fluidity and uncertainty of consent, in particular in absence of a sustained political process.<sup>449</sup> Ironically in years to come, the US would continue to repeat these mistakes in other conflict zones. Now the great powers are now contemplating to introduce the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) at the UN without obtaining the consent of the warring parties. This will ultimately make peacekeeping more intrusive of the warring parties.

Back in 1992, the world was witnessing a change in world order from bipolarity to unipolarity. The Cold War had ended in the favor of the western bloc led by the US. The Afghan jihad had been fought and the Soviet Union defeated with the help rendered by Pakistan. The cycle of a mutually convenient transactional relationship had run its course and no more strategic benefits were expected from it. Curtains had dropped on another episode of realpolitik in South Asia. The rug was swiftly pulled from under the feet and Pakistan fell flat, losing its prized position as the most allied ally to become the most sanctioned ally. Intense diplomatic pressure was mounted. President George Bush, the elder refused to certify that Pakistan was not building an atom bomb. Without any mercy or consideration, Pressler Amendment was slapped on its trusted ally. The military and economic aid faucets were turned off. The F16

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<sup>448</sup> Donatella Lorch, "Last U.S. Marines Quit Somalia as Escorts for the U.N.," *New York Times*, March 3, 1995, <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/03/world/last-us-marines-quit-somalia-as-escorts-for-the-un.html> (accessed August 7, 2017).

<sup>449</sup> Security Council Report: SPECIAL RESEARCH REPORT, No.1, 23 June 2008, 22, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Research%20Report%20Chapter%20VII%202023%20June%202008.pdf> (accessed December 9, 2016).

aircraft that have been paid were here held back, The US refused to reimburse the payment already made and instead asked for storage fees, while another buyer was sought for the parked fighter aircraft. Equally painful was the termination of the lease of Brooke class frigates. These ships were of no use to the US and were mothballed upon return. Other actions like declaring Pakistan a terrorist state were in the pipeline. This ironic turn around in relationship would repeat itself again when the US invasion of faltered in Afghanistan the second decade of the twenty first century and the American generals and politicians found it convenient to scapegoat Pakistan and isolate it. The acute trust deficit in the Pak-US relations continues at the time of the writing of this book.

The peacekeeping mission in Somalia provided Pakistan a perfect opportunity to escape the American dragnet of diminishing returns. The participation in the UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia was fleeting opportunity to repair a damaged relationship. Ironically as it may seem. Pakistan's internal situation was less than stable. The President and the prime minister were finding it difficult to co-exist. The troika of power was tilted in the favor of the only stable institution of the country – the Pakistan Army. Despite the rocky interstate relations, the American generals had a strong and healthy relation with the Pakistani generals. So they talked to them directly and asked them if they were willing to contribute troops for this potentially dangerous mission. It was an offer difficult to resist. The troops were made available. First only 500 and later more than 7000 were sent to Somalia. On 5 June Pakistan lost 24 peacekeepers on a routine mission to inspect weapon stores of Farah Aidid's militia. The Pakistanis were caught unaware, they were not informed by the UNOSOM HQ that the Somalis had refused the inspection and threatened war. This proved to be landmark event in a UN mission that was transformed from a humanitarian one to one involving the capture of Aidid with a head bounty of twenty five thousand US dollars. The US Special Forces were injected into the theater of operation that became a war zone. On 3<sup>rd</sup> of October 1993, the US Rangers launched a botched operation to apprehend a couple of Aidid's lieutenants. The daytime raid failed. Two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down and a pilot was taken prisoner. Eighteen soldiers were killed in action and American dead bodies were dragged through the streets of Bakkara Market by jeering crowds. The Pakistani contingent responded

with alacrity to the American SOS signal and its soldiers played a heroic role in rescuing trapped Rangers.

There was a severe backlash in the US on account of the desecration of the American dead. Bowing down to public pressure, the Clinton administration wrapped up a mission that it had inherited from the previous government. The US forces left within a few months. Shorn of the presence of American and western forces, the Pakistanis and the leftover peacekeepers were left to fend for themselves. Almost a year later, an evacuation plan was put in place to withdraw, abandoning the mission to put in place a stable government and restore the law-and-order situation in Somalia

For Pakistan, UN peacekeeping operations in Somalia provided a rare window of opportunity to reclaim lost space in matters of international relations. The peacekeepers despite the terrible loss of life were able to stand up to the rigors of international peacekeeping and restore their country's salience among the comity of nations. In these four years in Somalia, 50 soldiers lost their lives, but two objectives of national importance had been attained i.e. Pakistan was able to come out of straitjacket of international isolation and was able to secure a permanent place in UN peacekeeping operations in the years to come.

After the attacks on mainland USA on 11 September 2001, a theory was put forward drawing a connection between failed states and international terrorism. This immediately raised the red flag on Somalia. In 2002, the UNSC responded to fears of terrorism and the potential connection with extremist Islamic groups within Somalia by creating a monitoring mechanism (Panel of Experts) and modifying the arms embargo. The sanctions now had a counter-terrorism focus, although the modifications to the sanctions were negligible.<sup>450</sup> Key international actors, particularly the US, while driving UNSC interests from behind the scenes, chose to take a more direct approach in Somalia by conducting air and ground raids against perceived terrorists and by providing military training and assistance to government forces.<sup>451</sup>

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<sup>450</sup> UNSC Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1474 (2002), S/2003/1035 (November 4, 2003), 27-32, <https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/report-panel-experts-somalia-s20031035> (accessed August 7, 2017).

<sup>451</sup> Loraine Rickard-Martin, Rico Carisch, Shawna Meister & Dr. Andrea Charron, "Evaluating the Impacts and Effectiveness of Targeted Sanctions," 2, [graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/.../internationalgovernance/.../Somalia%20Template.doc](https://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/.../internationalgovernance/.../Somalia%20Template.doc) (accessed August 7, 2017).

Like Afghanistan, the effort to build credible state structures has made little progress in Somalia. Fears abound that the existing vacuum created by absence of robust governance is being exploited by hostile non-state actors, who can potentially damage the national interests of great powers. Unfortunately, a quarter of a century after the UN peacekeeping effort, Somalia remains a battlefield and there seems to be no light at the end of the tunnel.



(86)

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA  
*Office of the Deputy Force Commander*  
MG THOMAS M. MONTGOMERY

General Abdul Waheed  
Chief of the Army Staff  
General Headquarters, Rawalpindi

20 October 1993


Dear General Waheed,

I am writing to express to you my continued appreciation and great respect for the performance of your very capable contingent in Somalia. In my role as Deputy Commander of United Nations Forces, Somalia, I have been extremely impressed by the skill and cooperation of our Pakistani Contingent. Your soldiers have been completely dependable even in the most difficult circumstances. They have shouldered a huge and dangerous load for UNOSOM and the Somali people. Their sacrifices will never be forgotten.

As you know, I am also the U.S. Forces Commander. On 3 October, the Pakistani Commander, Brigadier Ikram, was called upon to assist U.S. Ranger Forces in duress. His positive response was immediate and unconditional. The Pakistani tank element quickly moved to the new seaport and poised to take part in the link up operation being mounted by the U.S. Quick Reaction Force. This tank element was instrumental in effecting the link up with besieged troops. It was exceptionally well done. We are all mindful of the price paid by your brave soldiers along with that of our Malaysian comrades in this battle. We will always be very grateful. We pledge our best efforts to help insure the situation in Mogadishu is resolved in a manner befitting our mutual sacrifices for the Somali people.

I assure you that any U.S. press report critical of any contingent in this amazing coalition effort is pure fantasy, not fact. We have made that clear in our own reports. I have too much respect and admiration for the skill and dedication of your contingent to allow such speculation to be accepted as fact. The fact is that many soldiers are alive today because of the willingness and skill of Pakistani, Malaysian and American soldiers working together in the most dangerous and difficult combat circumstances. Such a performance only comes from disciplined, well trained and well led soldiers. That's the real reputation of Pakistani soldiers in UNOSOM II.

We thank the people and Army of Pakistan for sending these splendid soldiers to Somalia. We are very proud to serve at their side.

VR,  
  
 THOMAS M. MONTGOMERY  
 Major General, USA  
 Deputy Force Commander

GS (Plan) Branch

HEADQUARTERS UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA

*Office of the Deputy Force Commander*

(MG THOMAS M. MONTGOMERY)

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**THOMAS M. MONTGOMERY**


Major General. USA

Deputy Force Commander

**SKETCH OF THE AREA, WHERE DIFFERENT OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED BY 19<sup>TH</sup> LANCERS IN UNOSOM**



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